I would like to sincerely thank all the historically aware men and women who helped me with information and, in part, d e s c r i b e d their own experiences with the serious sabotage that followed during the war, the authors of the works that were brought to my attention and the Militärarc iv in Koblenz and Freiburg. Without this material and this help, I would not have been able to write my documentation.

The author

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VO OIT

War, for whatever purpose it is waged, is without mercy. From those ancient times, when the victor usually took the order, to our so-called modern civilization, where the opponent is attacked with nuclear missiles and napalm bombs, basically nothing has changed.

In the Middle Ages, there was something like a knightly fairness4 that lasted well into the First World War. In addition, attempts were made in 1899 and 1907 to establish rules to humanize war with the Hague Land Warfare Convention and the Convention on the Rules of War. By the time of the all-out Second World War at the latest, these rules had become obsolete. Individual belligerents, such as the Soviet Union, had never joined the Hague Convention anyway. Anyone who therefore tried to fight according to the old soldierly concept of morality in the Second World War was usually the fool.

Not only the bolsdiewist East with its murderous partisans, not only the Tito gangs threw morality overboard in a flash. The French, Belgian, Danish, Norwegian and Greek partisans deformed the soldierly struggle into insidious mass murder.

Ever since Winston Chur':triff had ordered the British pilots to Glacéhwdsdiuhe off, and England in the Nad't from 10.

Since England began its brutal air terror against German civilian neighborhoods on May 10, 1940 - Churdiill's friend Linderman had drawn up his own plan for perfecting this mass murder from the air - humanity in the Second World War had paused.

The murderous partisan struggle, the insidious sabotage, the criminal attacks on the German civilian population provoked a harsh reaction from the German troops, who were not prepared to leave their slaughtered comrades unavenged. Only against this background can it be explained that the unsoldatized .Kommissarbefehl° could be partially applied.

In this Second World War, a new mass struggle was born: the underground struggle. Every German soldier first seen on a dark street became a symbol of Allied victory - every partisan killed gave satisfaction to the compatriots. The war had taken on the appearance of a genocide, thanks to the immense number of actors. It is almost a miracle that there was no real fighting at all.

In addition to these killers drilled either in Moscow or London

In addition to these murderers, trained either in Moscow or London, there were the spies and traitors of Rid ard Sorge, Harro Sdiulze-Boysen, Rudolf Röfiler and many others. There is more blood on their hands than on those of their murderous partisan henchmen.

Over the years, we have gained a fairly precise knowledge of the partisan struggle and the betrayal - with the exception of the main traitor, Wenher°. Years ago, in my documentary "Verrat an Deutsd land" and "p5o wurde Deutsdiland verraten", I, like the author of this book, Karl Balzer, clarified a number of these disgusting, undeniable facts in his documentary "Der 20. Juli und der Landesverrat". The convulsive attempts of certain writers to trivialize these shameful events do not help. And anyone who thinks that this gigantic betrayal w a s insignificant for the outcome of the war is wrong.

more than naive. What cannot be denied is being denied for political, ulterior motives.

While this military betrayal is open to every honorable historian, the facts of the controlled sabotage are, strangely enough, largely unknown. Yet every front-line soldier has repeatedly experienced that the wrong munitions were delivered in the blind spot where the sabotage would have been vital and decisive in battle. Some were perplexed, but most were comforted by the sloppiness of the stage. This may well have contributed to the inadequacies here and there. However, only the deliberately controlled sabotage was decisive. Especially in the occupied territories. There was also sabotage in the German Reich. In Germany, millions of foreigners worked in the war industry and in agriculture. In 1942, for example, there were 1,148,000 Eastern w o r k e r s , 2,400,000 voluntary workers from Europe and 1,524,000 prisoners of war: all in all, 5,24,000 mensdieri. On top of this, concentration camp prisoners were employed in the production of V-weapon components in the underground factories in the Harz valley, which were crucial to the war effort.

It does not take too much imagination to imagine that neither the British nor the Soviets let this ideal opportunity pass by unused. However, in these masses, tau- sende nadiriclite agents, and above all saboteurs, were smuggled into Germany.

While treason and partisan murder sometimes involved a considerable risk, this was not the case with sabotage. A little powder or sugar in the aviation fuel there, a screw thrown into the gearbox here - and several German airplanes crashed or important parts of the war industry were paralyzed.

Karl Balzer has t a k e n the trouble to shed light above all on the sabotage that took place within senior German government officials and the military high command. This sabotage probably had more serious consequences than that which emanated from Moscow and London. Just like the London sabotage

and Moscow sabotage, it bears the blood of many hundreds of thousands of German soldiers.

On top of this, the author is a master at documenting the political dreaming of those circles who had fallen for the disastrous illusion that a violent removal of Adolf Hitler from the leadership could save what could not be saved. The fact that they destroyed the last chances of winning the war with their constant insinuations, their lack of readiness for action and their sometimes dangerous sabotage is a guilt from which society will not be absolved one day.

In the face of this harrowing documentation, the reader could all too easily fall into the trap of thinking that the German generals had advised Hitler, Germany and the armies. This is of course not the case. The *majority* of the German generals fulfilled their military duty; over 1200 fell before the enemy or perished in the merciless Allied prison camps. Audi the general staff officers were in their overwhelming mass true to their soldierly duty. The group of generals and general staff officers who placed politics above their soldierly duty and took their guilt upon themselves was in reality a numerical minority. The effect of their irresponsible actions was only so disastrous because they sat in various leadership positions, where they were able to exert considerable influence on events.

In the interest of the historical responsibility of our generation, this documentation is very welcome. For it is only by shedding light on so many dark events in our recent history that those who come after us will be able to recognize the course of events as it was, and not as it is portrayed today by the excessive Allied war propaganda.

Eri& Kern

Sabotage abroad

Sabotage against the Germans in the occupied territories, as far as western, northern and southern Europe were concerned, was controlled centrally from London. In 1940, the British government set up the Special Operations Executive (SOE), which had the task of supporting the European resistance groups with explosives, weapons, nadui'fites and money. The SOE set up separate departments for the individual countries, in which emigrants were advised and guided by British secret service agents. Espionage, sabotage and sdiliess1i& assassination attempts on German soldiers and civil servants were the SOE's aim. Sabotage was the first to start. The first parachutists were dropped over Denmark with explosives, weapons and radio equipment

Two large sabotage groups were formed in Denmark: a bourgeois group called "pPorgerlige Partisana" (PoPa) and a communist group under the cover name "pHolger Danskc". Its chief was the former Soviet agent Jöns Lillelund. In 1940, ten acts of sabotage were registered in Denmark, in 1944 there were 9, in 1942 they increased to 22, in 1943 to 1969, and in 1944 there were 867 in the first four months. In 1944/45 in particular, the Danish railroad lines were blown up so often that their transport capacity fell by 7 percent.

£e1. In addition, factories that were in violation of the war were attacked, such as the

Globus radio factory on the outskirts of Copenhagen, in the £unkausriistung for the German Lufl:waffe and ropes for the Navigation system for the V-Waflen.

For neighboring Belgium, the 2nd Section of the Foreign Ministry of Belgian National Defense, based in London, had only published an overall plan for the militias on t6. April 1943, the London-based 2nd Section of the Belgian Ministry of National Defense had drawn up an overall plan for military sabotage against the Germans. The sabotage itself had long been underway. In Belgium, the groups "pG" (Groupement Genernl de Sabotage) and "CPA" (Partisans Armes) were formed very soon after the German invasion.

Kurt Zentner describes how these sabotage groups proceeded. gIn the factories that work for the German armaments industry, production is repeatedly delayed. Aircraft engines, which normally take a':h days to assemble, suddenly take three weeks to complete ... A screw accidentally falls into a cylinder ... damaged pipes become unusable after 'accidentally' lying in an acid bath for too long ... etc. It only takes a few small actions to bring entire plants to a standstill. Blowing up power lines and control centers fulfills the same purpose. The interruption of the power supply alone
the loss of working hours i J----- t944 to over 20 million. Attacks on important traffic and transportation
transport routes, especially the railroad network, are part of the sabotage groups' constant program. Rubber warehouses are set on fire and ammunition depots are blown up. German military convoys are held up for hours because the vehicles leading them suddenly hit special nails designed so that one of their tips must always point upwards, inevitably causing the tires of the cars to be punctured.

Although most cases of sabotage are carried out using explosives, other means are used. These include the MNB's effective 'Aspirin' campaign.

If the individual saboteurs had been thwarted, one would have only undamaged-looking sdiaditeln with the imposition of Voxaline - dragees for singers'. In reality, however, these pills, whose composition has remained secret to this day, are an agent which, as soon as it comes into contact with fuel or gasoline, h a s a decomposing effect, m a k i n g engines and motors unroadworthy. Numerous larger and smaller resistance organizations are involved in these sabotage actions. The 'G' group is founded in t941 by members of the University of Briissel and is mainly made up of tedinics and engineers. Their aim w a s to carry out industrial sabotage on a national level with precisely prepared plans, a f f e c t i n g only the enemy if possible, but only their own national assets i f absolutely necessary. Under the direction of a general staff, the individual departments work in the respective sadilidian areas. The organization covers the entire country by dividing it into zones, regions and sectors, which in turn are divided into individual cells. Due to the carefully planned and maintained security precautions, the security police never managed to strike a decisive blow against the 'G' group, despite numerous arrests, so that it was able to carry out its resistance work until liberation.

The 'PA Group' was formed in the autumn of 1940 as a pure sabotage organization and was primarily made up of former members of the international brigades of the Spanish Civil War. In 1941/42 alone, more than 1600 actions were carried out, including 246 demolitions and derailments. From September 1942 to August 1944, more than a thousand 'traitors' and collaborators were eliminated. 500 German soldiers and officers were killed in the streets of Brussel from 1941 to 1945'.

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1 Kurt Rentner, "I1lustrierte Tes&idite des Widtrstandes in Europa lq33- 1945', Mün&en 1966.

In Holland, the sabotage was controlled by the Bureau Bijzondere Op- drathten (BBO) - Bureau for Special Tasks - at the Dutch government in London, naturally closely linked to the British SOE. There were three major waves of political strikes in Holland in 1941, 1943 and 1944, all of which w e r e planned and directed from London. The last strike was a dangerous railroad strike. Germany had to deploy 5000 railroad workers in Holland, around 500 of whom were killed by acts of sabotage and Allied bombing raids.

The SD (Deutscher Sidierheitsdienst) reported on November 25, 1941, in its news report from Holland:

pt. A perpetrator who has not yet been identified shot himself in the night of 15. t1. 41 around 3.00 a.m. in Middelharnis (center of the island of Overglakbee, Prov. South Holland) through the window of the local commandant's office. Investigations are ongoing.

2. At a LuRwaife construction site near Sd oorl/Prov. North Holland (about 10 km north of Alkmaar), an act of sabotage was discovered on 17. 11. 41 on a power cable serving as a power line for a cable winch. Investigations are ongoing.

3. On 18. l t. a sabotage attack broke out in a factory in Amsterdam that was busy with defense orders. 4t at around 3.30 a.m., a fire of seeming proportions broke out, which had to be fought with 14 fire-fighting lines and was contained at around 6.00 a.m..

4. During several nights before 19. 11. 41, previously unknown perpetrators broke into the gas tanks of a number of cars belonging to the unit 'L t0 199 LGPA. Berlin' (currently stationed in the province of Limburg) and thereby rendered the fuel unusable. Investigations are ongoing.

5. On 19. 11. 41, a piece of cable about 5 meters long was cut out of a long-distance field cable located on the Bussun (Prov. Nordhol1and)-Amers- foort (Prov. Utr "ltt) road, which connects the III. division of the air nadiridite regiment located in this area with the regimental commander. Investigations into the previously unknown perpetrators are ongoing.

6. According to a report from the Army Motor Vehicle Park 5S9 KFZ, Hengel/overijssel collection point, large quantities of sawdust were found in the fuel tanks of two trucks delivered brand new from the Ford works in Amsterdam on 21. 11. 41. Investigations have been initiated.

7. In the night of November 21, 41, a rescue boat with an auxiliary engine belonging to the 'Niederl. Rescue company'. The boat was presumably being used by an as yet unidentified man for a trip to England, who arrived in Hoek van Holland on t2. 11. 4t in Hoek van Holland and declared that he wanted to use the - now lost - lifeboat. Despite the subsequent tightening of the boat's security and disarming of the engine, the perpetrator managed to dispatch the boat and escape unnoticed.

All this happened in just one week!

In France, sabotage controlled from London took place for the first time in the fall of J941. The cables of the transmitters that radioed the deployment of the German air force over England were destroyed. In France, the national group qCombat' under Henty Frenay soon united with the communist qLiberation'. The first assassinations of German soldiers were carried out, the first trains were blown up: on September 19, 1942 in Dijon, the rails came loose, a military train was derailed and eleven Germans were wounded. On April 16, 1942, a':hteen meters of rails were removed on the Caen road, derailing a front-line U-boat train. Twenty German sailors were killed in the attack and nineteen were injured. On
May 1, 1942, rails came loose again near Caen. Once again, a front-line tourist train derailed, killing ten soldiers and injuring twenty-two.

In addition, numerous assassination attempts were made on German soldiers. In his documentary qDer fran-

The French Resistance", Hans Luther lists a whole list of these criminal attacks. sdilages.

The French sabotage, led from London by Colonel Bii'kmaster, the head of the gFren'h Section' of the SOE, soon went over systematically to murder attacks against the Germans, which were carried out with such cruelty that they were in nidits to the Soviet partisans.

The war diary of the Commander-in-Chief West lists the following attacks from September 1943 to March J944 alone:

Cable sabotage	473
Railroad sabotage	3615
Other sabotage	2025
Arson	848
Attacks on military installations and on members of the armed forces	636

In addition, factories that worked for Germany, such as
z. Germany, such as the pBronsavia' air engine works in Lyon, were attacked and blown up.

Even in Luxembourg, as *Franz Delveaux* describes in his report "Luxembourg in the Second World War", sabotage was at work, but here it was mainly mass strikes that were staged.

In Italy, sabotage was mainly carried out by Italian admirals. It was mainly directed against the nadisdiub of the German Afrika Korps. *Grid Kern* writes the following about this in his documentary "pVerrat an Deutsdiland":

pThe daring of General Erwin Rommel, the sacrifice and bravery of his officers and soldiers - everything was for naught. The German tanks were left lying in the glowing sand, the

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2 Tübingen l94Z.
3 Luxembourg 1946.
4 Eri& Kern, "Verrat an Deutsdiland", Preußisdi Oldendorf 19b3.

Cannons fell silent. Whenever England's troops were down, the Nadisdiub failed. This nadisdiub, which was brought in from Italian ports, either reached the North African front only very sparsely or not at all. Systematically, transporter after transporter, convoy after convoy was sunk by British submarines and Royal Air Force bombs. Tanks, cannons, ammunition, supplies and, last but not least, dew and thousands of German soldiers were sunk to the bottom of the Mediterranean. A gigantic betrayal was at workhere.

The Italian aviation officer and war advisor, *Antonio* Trizzino, published a book pNavi e poltrone* in Italy in 1952 and a second "Settembre nero" in 1956. These two books were published in the Federal Republic of Germany in 1957 in an abridged version under the title pDie verraiene Flotte'. In this excerpt, the author deals with the betrayal of the Nadisdiube for North Africa. He describes:

The steamships had barely left the harbors when they were torpedoed. The enemy's warships and submarines, as well as their aircraft, were so conspicuously fast at our convoys that it could no longer be a coincidence. Until then, a convoy had only ever been out of danger when it took a course contrary to orders. Was that nt&t ondiluJL rei& enough? The tankers were particularly threatened. When Rommel was preparing his attack on El Alamein at the end of August 1942, he relied primarily on the t2,000 tons of petrol from the tanker 'Pozza Ricm'. But shortly before the day of arrival, the tanker was torpedoed and managed to load some of the fuel onto another tanker, which left in great haste. But it also suffered the same fate, so that Rommel was forced to cancel his attack after 24 hours because the fuel nadis&ub

In September, the pace of the attacks increased tremendously. Hundreds of tanks, thousands of motor vehicles,

Tens of thousands of tons of fuel and food are owed
in the sea.

On October 9, Admiral Sansonetti, deputy chief of the admiral's staff and Campioni's successor, reported to Marshal Ca- vallero that there must be extremely well-informed spies at work because of the conspicuous circumstances surrounding the sinking of our ships. They were not to be found in the harbors, they were in Rome.

Two important books were published after the war, one by *the* Italian *admiral Mangelt* entitled From the Ashes of Disgrace, and the other by the American frigate captain Z "Aariäi, gsecret Missions'. Antonio Trizzino writes about Admiral Maugeri:

"There is no sea in Rome. So only the gentlemen of the ministries could be informed about the arrival and departure times of the ships. Admiral Jachino narrowed the circle of his nadiforst nodi by writing: 'During my command I often had occasion to make the firm observation that certain na6iritlites could only have been disseminated by members of the Ministry. I do not mean to say that it was always deliberate. The Admiral's Staff and the Nadiridite Office never wanted to admit that their organization was permeable. They did everything they could to blame outside agencies.'

The Naval Information Office was undoubtedly acting against its better judgment than Admiral Jadiino was trying to reassure. His boss, Admiral Maugeri, knew exactly how things were. He himself admitted riadi the war in his book 'From the Ashes of Disgrace' that the English Admiralty could count on loyal friends of the utmost disloyalty among their Italian colleagues and in the Ministry itself. These men had only one goal in m i n d , to end the war as quickly as possible in order to finally liberate Italy from fascism. He himself belonged to the circle of people who wanted only one thing: End to rasdi as possible and at any price) We can't necessarily say so. What is certain, however, is that Maugeri was awarded the American

rican Legion of Merit, which he received in recognition of his service during his tenure as Chief of the Naval Intelligence Bureau.

Trizzino writes about the publication by frigate captain Zaeharias, who talks very openly about his experiences in the Second World War:

"This secret was later revealed by the American frigate captain Ellis M. Zadiarias. He was then assigned to the 'Office of Naval Intelligence', of which he became vice chief in the second half of 1942. Zadiarias was informed from case to case about the decisions of the admiral staffs of the Adise as well as about the content of the talks between the representatives of the German and Italian navies. He also had no difficulties in his dealings with men of the Italian naval high command, on whom he could rely, as well as on the fact that his agents who had landed on the Italian coast could work unhindered. He was even able to stop our fleet's operations when it suited the wishes and plans of the allies.

However, the full extent of the Italian saboteurs has not yet been grasped. In her book "Mussolini without a mask", the 83-year-old Briefe *Mussolini* reports on sabotage in the Italian army, among other things: But there were still two weighty cases which, in other countries, would have brought the perpetrator triit Sidierheit before the court martial: Badoglio never informed Mussolini accurately about the state of the army before Italy's entry into the war. And he did so during the campaigns in France and Greece. If Badoglio was convinced that the Italian army w a s not sufficiently prepared f o r war, and the Duce did not take this into account, why did he not resign as Chief of the General Staff or seek the decision of the King, the military commander-in-chief?

commander-in-chief?

But the second case is nod better: three months before Italy's entry into the war, the Fiat factories had completed a medium armored car of thirty tons.

thirty-ton armored car. After the whole world had been made aware that the German troops' striking power d e p e n d e d essentially on the use of this type of tank, Badoglio gave the order to reduce the weight of the tank to seven or twenty tons. When the engineers rushed to provide this model, the Chief of the General Staff demanded a new change: the weight was to be reduced to twenty-four tons.

Badoglio was by no means called to account for this, but continued to receive honorary titles and sinecures. Until the day when the Duce finally relieved him of his functions during the campaign in Greece.

One day a telegraphist brought my husband home a copy of a telegram that the commander-in-chief in Albania, General Ubaldo Soddu, had sent to inform the general staff about the alarming situation there. However, he emphasized in his report that the Duce was not to be informed of this. Ubaldo was also relieved of his command. From the day Italy entered the war, Mussolini was b e t r a y e d . Rad ele Mus- solini goes on to describe the extent of this sabotage in Italy: 'In the winter of 1942, for example, a carabiniere brought me a rocket that h a d been manufactured in the Terni arms factory: it did not contain powder, but sawdust. The results of the load disappeared without a trace.

In the same way, nobody knew why the Italian ships carrying fuel for Africa exploded as soon as they left the harbor. And Rommel kept complaining that the gasoline the troops were given contained water.

One day, the Duce made a surprising visit to an airbase where, according to the General Staff, there were supposed to be several squadrons of fighter planes. However, he did not see a single machine.

They had simply given false figures, and so that Mussolirii would not notice, they always had a few squadrons fly from one base to another according to his inspections. My anger was so intense that I fell ill for several days.

Another time, the Duce ordered the Deputy Secretary of State for the Air Force to visit the Caproni factory near Predappio. New airplanes were being built there. The secretary found that the factory needed material for several hundred machines. Some time later, my husband was informed that several hundred of the new type of aircraft had been assembled. But I soon discovered that the material supplied was only enough for two airplanes, and no more.

Idi had seldom seen Benito so on his toes as he was after this disengagement. He demanded strict sanctions, but many departments would have had to be purged in order to change the situation effectively. My husband admitted to me what would have made me particularly happy at another time: 'In ninety percent of all cases, the mom has rekt.'

The conscious betrayal of some was compounded by the inertia of others. and, since the first defeats, the disastrous habit of hiding the truth from the Duce for lack of courage. Our son Vittorio, an air force officer, told my husband that the radios on board the planes usually didn't work, forcing the pilots to communicate with their hands during combat.

Benito summoned a representative of the Ministry of Aviation and a number of generals and demanded explanations. He received them: the radios were in perfect condition ...

Ida even asked me certain questions after the death of my son Bruno. His airplane, a four-engine plane, had died on
August 7, 1941, crashed on the outskirts of Pisa airport for reasons that have never been clarified. Bruno was an experienced pilot who managed to get his damaged plane out of the wobovi'nH's path at the last moment.

ieidi of the *wobovi'nH*. One will not be able to dissuade midi from the thought that Bruno had a hard time discovering such things and t e l l i n g his father about them: and that he had to pay for his findings with his life. Idi had experienced too many acts of sdiand to believe in a single accident.

It was also no coincidence that three of the Italian navy's most beautiful armored cruisers, the 'Duilo', the 'Cavotir' and the
Littorio*, which were hit by narrow bombs in November 1940, sank in the middle of the port of Taranto.

And what are we to make of the submarines that sank as soon as they left their base? 'Without treachery, soldi's results are impossible,' my husband had to admit. The insurrection had already begun its work in 1940."

When Mrs. Radtele was also arrested after Mussolini's capture on August 2, 1943, she drew General Polito's attention to the detour they were taking because they were using up too much precious petrol. The Italian army was suffering from a fuel shortage. General Polito said: "Don't worry about that, we have enough gasoline. We've always had enough ... for us!"

We have an illustrious informant on the sabotage in Norway, *)Piffy Brandt.* In this country, the SOE agents under the leadership of Knut Haukelid were mainly concerned with the production of sdiwer water, which was essential for nuclear development. After the agents h a d been deployed to blow up the factory not far from Rjukan, they succeeded in blowing up a railroad ferry t h a t was carrying over 100,000 liters of sdiwer water. The damage to the German armor was immense. A Norwegian sabotage group under Gun-

5 Radiele Muiiolini, "Mussolini without a mask", Snittgart l9F4.

6 Reilly **Brandt, "Norwegens Freiheitskaopl t94W4$',** Hamburg **t94C.**

nar Son Steby worked on his own initiative and blew up the government office where the conscripts were sent to the labor office. At the same time, they began to rob tens of thousands of newly printed ration cards. The transport vehicles were simply held up at gunpoint, causing serious damage to Norway's supply.

Willy Brandt describes the activities of the Norwegian saboteurs in the chapter qsabotage sdiwillt an" as follows:

gIt was no coincidence that the signal for active sabotage was given in early 1944. At this time, the Allied High Command was making the final preparations for the invasion. The activation of resistance, which could lead to an Allied landing operation, tied up the troops in Norway. Due to the German shortage situation, even minor actions by the Heiinatwehr could lead to relatively major successes. What would previously have been nadd- stid e now became serious blows. As long as the fuel supply c o n t i n u e d without difficulties, attacks on the camps in Norway would not have had any significant effect. The situation became different in connection with the systematic attacks on the German production facilities and transport centers. Since Germany no longer received ball bearings from Sweden, attacks on remaining stocks in Norway had a noticeable effect. Due to the increasing supply difficulties, stock destruction meant a reduction in substance.

... Near Trondheim, saboteurs destroyed the last electric locomotive of the railroad leading from the sand and gravel pits near Orkla to the fjord, causing a severe disruption to exports. In J--', the explosion of two

two sulphuric acid factories near Oslo paralyzed explosives production.
production was paralyzed. In August, the Nor- disk aluminum industry in Holmestrand, which worked for the air force, was destroyed. In Oslo, 50 fighter planes, over 100 aircraft *engines* and many spare parts and special machines were destroyed when the Luftwaffe's largest repair workshop was blown up.

In August 1944, Audi began an offensive against the German diesel and gasoline depots. The first attacks on the Oslo Fjord cost the Wehrmacht 350,000 liters of diesel oil and gasoline, a somewhat later action in the Gulf area 300,000 liters of gasoline and 56,000 liters of diesel oil. Similar actions were undertaken in the country. In some places, the tried and tested method of 'sweetening' the fuel was used. In Hallingdal, 100,000 liters ran into the river o v e r the course of two days. The secret press launched the s l o g a n : 'Every liter of petrol destroyed means the war is shortened by one second'. The fuel shortage quickly became noticeable due to the sabotage and the minimal supply. The Wehrmadit switched to the use of generator engines on a large scale. As a result, the leadership of the home front ordered that deliveries of generator wood to the occupation military were to be sabotaged. In the course of the fall, all factories involved in the production of this material were blown up.

In September, the wafer factories in Kongsberg and Raufoss were shut down. In the latter case, an air raid was actually planned, but the Home Army took on the task with the backing of the Norwegian workers employed there. The same thing happened again when saboteurs destroyed 35,000 tons of storage space at two Oslo factories during a sample operation on the night of 24 November 1944, making an air raid on the capital's port unnecessary. On this occasion, Terboven demanded full murder for Hinri':stungen 'without regard to Sweden'. The method suggested by Keitel of making the factory workers and their families collectively responsible for acts of sabotage was rejected by the Reidtskommissar as unsuitable, as it would not make any impression on the Norwegians and would only throw water on the mill of the 'agitators in Sweden'.

It would be going too far to list even the most adverse acts of sabotage. The following may be mentioned: in October the destruction

In October, the destruction of a weapons depot and 100,000 kilos of lubricating oil in Oslo; in November, the blowing up of several car repair shops, bullet storage facilities in Oslo and the province, and shipyards in Bergen; in December, the blowing up of car repair shops and radio equipment for the Wehrmacht. Not a single day passed without saboteurs from the Home Army b e i n g at work. It was obvious that their activities were based on good organization.

The Rei&skommissar for maritime shipping at the time, Gauleiter *Karl Kaufmann,* complained in a submission dated 2O. December t944:

'One issue of particular importance is the sabotage at the Danish and Norwegian shipyards. For po1itis':h reasons, there has so far been no s&argent action against this plague. While at the same time, the work output of the shipbuilders in Northern Europe is only 75 % of that in Germany, it becomes completely pointless to have ships built abroad at the expense of our precious materials and scarce foreign currency when, for example, 7 out of 8 new-build ships in Denmark are now being sunk by sabotage.

Despite constant reinforcement, the security provided by military and SD posts alone has proven to be inadequate; it is especially incomplete as long as, for example, workers are not even allowed to be checked to see if they are carrying explosives when entering the shipyards. Measures to increase the fight against the saboteurs themselves have been i n t r o d u c e d by the SD.

If these do not lead to the desired result, it should be examined whether it would be necessary to change the policy pursued towards Denmark and Norway.

Since atonement measures against entire workforces where sabotage has occurred have proved successful elsewhere and, for example, shipyard sabotage has been completely suppressed in France, similar measures may also be considered in the Nordic countries. .7'

7 Midiael Salewski, pDie Deutsdie Seekriegileirung", Frankfuri/Msin i9zi, vol. II, page 394 f.

The communist chief agent Ernst Wollenweber operated from neutral Sweden and his sabotage campaign was primarily directed against the ships or ships sailing for Germany. The method was conceivably simple: the communist saboteurs smuggled infernal mines as sailors into the cargoes of the transporters, which then exploded on the high seas after being carefully planted. As a result, over seventy ships sank with men and women. There were almost never any survivors. Only rarely could the deadly fragment be discovered beforehand and the time fuse be disabled.

In comparison to this "noble" work, the bri-
tisdie Secret Service, on the other hand, proved to be a stiimper. Its chief agent Alfred Frederi& Ridunann and his dilettantish assistants, including the later SPD member of parliament Arno Berisdi, caught up before the group could cause any serious damage.

In Greece, the SOE agents, who were operating from Cairo this time, were able to destroy eighty-five locomotives, nine hundred and fifty wagons and one thousand and fifty motor vehicles, as well as blowing up around thirty buses. Among them was the strategic Geroptamos railroad bridge, which was destroyed on November 25, 1943.

In the east and south-east, sabotage was automatically part of the domestic partisan struggle, which was centrally controlled from Moscow. The number of sabotage attacks on means of transportation and on industry working for Germans in the Ukraine, Poland and Yugoslavia cannot be counted, nor can the number of murder attacks.

K'erner J-f'ififweg's book 'Guerilla, War without Fronts' provides an overview of the strength and activities of the gangs that appeared in the occupied eastern territories.

As early as 29 June 1941, the Communist Central C o m m i t t e e had instructed all party organizations to immediately form partisan detachments in the event of an enemy occupation. Just a few weeks after the start of the Russian campaign, there were already

Belarus there were already two hundred and thirty-one small gang detachments totaling twelve thousand men.

By the end of 1941, the partisans were able to deploy more than ten thousand men in the Moscow area. Due to the crisis of the German Vorinarsch in the winter of 1941/42 and the miscarriage before Moscow, the Soviets gained time for the expansion of the gang war, which was particularly favored by our blitzkrieg. Hundreds of thousands of Russian soldiers had been killed by the advance of our tank units, who initially hid in the forests and villages and then joined the existing partisan units or formed new groups.

Thus, in 1942, partisan brigades of three hundred and fifty to two thousand men were formed under a central staff headed by the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Belarus, Ponomarenko, at the headquarters of the Supreme Command of the Soviet Armed Forces, together with partisan staffs on the individual fronts. As early as the spring of 1942, the gangs succeeded in taking control of large areas in the forest regions of Belarus and northern Ukraine, where they formed fixed centers and support pinnacles with the re-established Soviet administration.

Their operations were directed with ever-increasing success against the rear areas of our army groups, which were forced to withdraw forces from the front in order to suppress the Nazi invasion. In Belarus alone, in the period from July to September 1942, the gangs destroyed no less than ninety-seven transportation trains, four hundred and seventy-three
bridges, as many as one hundred and fifty-five motor vehicles, twenty-four tanks and other armored vehicles were destroyed and two hundred and two hundred and twenty soldiers and officers from the rear were murdered.

pThe development of the Russian partisan war in the third phase from the fall of 1942 to the summer of 1944 is characterized by an increased

The development of the Russian partisan war in the third phase from the autumn of 1942 to the summer of 1944 was characterized by an increased influence of the Soviet small war units [partisans] on the German liaison lines. In the winter of t942/43, for example, around 120,000 partisans fought against the Germans. The rails and breakthroughs of the German nadisdiub lines were blown up, small fortifications destroyed and enemy bases destroyed. The number of Russian partisans grew steadily, reaching a strength o f around 250,000 men by the end of 1943¡ in addition to a reserve of several hundred thousand men and thousands of members of smaller illegal resistance groups[®] ."

All in all, Soviet Russia achieved a complete victory with its partisan war, which was waged as a liberation struggle against a foreign occupying power. This war tied down the German forces, hindered the supply of the German front to a considerable extent and thus created adverse conditions for the victory of the Red Army.

The Soviets knew how to anchor the partisan struggle in the Russian people, to make it a matter of total resistance, of total war. In contrast, our own total warfare, which was demanded of our people far too late and too inadequately, was very different.

In Yugoslavia, the Communist Party called for continued resistance and preparations for a Partisan war as early as April 10, 1941, i.e. during the German pre-Independence war. On April 27 of the same year, Tito founded the 'Liberation Front' (Osvobodilna) in Laibadi. The first Tito gangs, made up of farmers, workers, students and pupils, were initially armed and equipped in a makeshift manner. They captured their first weapons during a treacherous raid on a German police station. A German soldier and motorcyclist with a masked rifle on his back

8 Werner Hahlweg, sGuerilla, War without Fronts", Stuttgart J968, page t23 ff.

was killed with an axe from an ambush by a Serbian assassin; the gang had thus obtained its first machine gun. A wave of attacks on police stations and municipal offices swept Serbia, and soon the partisans were sufficiently armed.

By the end of 194, they had already t a k e n control of a large area in western Serbia. On July 13 of the same year, there was an uprising in Montenegro against the Italian occupying power and further uprisings in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzogovina. The attacks by the Yugoslav gangs were also directed against railroad lines, bridges, warehouses and transports as well as against soldiers of the occupying forces from ambushes.

In December 1941, the first proletarian brigade was set up as a larger formation in eastern Bosnia, thus initiating the creation of a revolutionary people's army qTowards the end of the war, the Yugoslav partisan forces were divided into four armies of t0, 12, 7 and 14 divisions ...® "

Audi in Albania, the partisan struggle was waged successfully. By mid-1943, the underground units had grown to more than twenty battalions. The capitulation of Italy and the Soviet victories gave them a strong boost. By October 1944, they controlled around three quarters of the country, and by November of the same year they had it completely in their hands.

In the end, the Albanian partisan units comprised more than seventy thousand fighters.

In Hungary and Romania, active resistance was only

only when the Soviet forces were able to record their first successes in 1944.
first successes in 1944.

In Poland, the resistance movement "Service for the Victory of Poland" was formed on September 28, 1939, which was soon renamed the "Association for Armed Struggle". Although the Polish sub

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9 Werner Hahlweg, "Gueri11a, War without Fronts", page l3l.

Although the German ground army reached a strength of around **four** hundred thousand men by the middle of **1943**, it did not succeed in restoring the freedom of Poland in traditional partnership with the West.

"The test of the example is well known, the Warsaw Uprising against the German occupation forces on August 1, 1944, which ended after the hardest fighting on October 2 of the same year with the capitulation of the Polish underground army."

The suppression of the Warsdiau uprising, however, forced the deployment of strong German forces for two months, which had to be withdrawn from the front.

The following situation report by the Wehrkreiskommando/General Governemertt shows the tremendous complication of the nadisdtube for the front and the management of the rear areas of the *I?aztiszaen.*

Military District Command		Krakow,
Generalgouvernement	Secret	September 7, 1943

Dept. Ia No. 3700/43 geh.

Situation** in the Generalgouvernement in **August 1943

I. *Enemy action.* 2 enemy incursions from north-east and east-west Ridi- tung into the area south of Wlodawa and north-east of Warsdiau. No bombs dropped. t2 jamming balloons were found, S':laden was oidit.

II. *Bandits* - There were 6214 robberies, of which 5832 were by bandits and 382 by stronger gangs. 3 gangs were over 200 men strong.
Total losses of the soldiers: 68 dead, 84 wounded. Total losses of the legionnaires: 18 dead, t4 wounded.

10 Werner Hahlweg, "Guerilla, **Krieg ohne Frontm", page 136 f.**

The following claims were made.

a) On members of the Wehrmadit, Wehrmaditeinriditungen, customs border guards:

45 attacks on lone soldiers, posts, wadiums and patrols as well as vehicles, including the attack on the commander of Res. Div. 174, Geiieralltn. Renner, and 2 officers and 5 members of his staff.

3S attacks on harvesting points, which were repulsed.

b) *Am) Railroad camp.*

t. Transport train on Bilgoraj-Zwierzyniec line attacked by bandits, train guard killed in firefight, weapons stolen.

2nd SF train on Lublin-Rozwadow line near Zaklikow derailed by detachment of soldiers and shot at. t9 dead, t7 soldiers and 25 wounded.

3. Transport train stopped and shot at near I.ukow, 1 soldier and 1 railroad official wounded.

4. Freight train on Tsdienstochau-Kielce route stopped near Wlo- szezowa station and partially robbed. 1 man of the train escort wounded.

5. Freight train on Konskie-Kamienna route stopped and robbed by about 100 bandits.

6. Train of the Sd wefelkiesbahn attacked west of Bodzentyn station. Train crew fended off attack.

7. 9 track demolitions on roads: Krakatl-Zata near Ryczow (southwest of Krakow),

Krakow-Lemberg near Bogumilowice station, explosive device failed to detonate,

Krakow-Ausdiwitz, freight train derailed,

Zawada-Rawa Ruska, 2 attacks, freight trains derailed, Warsdau-Radom, passenger train hit a mine, no passengers,

Warsdiau-Legionowo

Warsdiau-West Gdansk station

Warsd au-Walkinia, freight train derailed.

8. Railroad bridge near Delatyn (south of Stanislaus) destroyed by Kolpak gang.
9. Passenger train Stojanow-Suszow (Lemberg-Lu& route) derailed.
10. At Kamienna station several wagons of peat dust destroyed by arson. destroyed by arson.

t1. At Jasiee station (l5 km northwest of Opatow) 6 barracks of a railroad service camp attacked, robbed and set on fire.

12th Teklino station (11 km south of Radomsko) attacked, per- "h and signal installations destroyed.

c) N "J Feriiipreeilfeii "iigrii:

78 Attacks by sawing o f f poles, cutting wires, destroying or deploying equipment.

d) doJ Companies, *post office, police and civil servants.*

1. 441 attacks on municipal offices, police stations and post offices. Contingent lists were destroyed and official seals stolen from municipal offices.
2. 209 raids on 1andvrirtsdiaft1i&e businesses (dairies, egg collection points, distilleries and cooperatives).
3. 160 raids on goods.
4. 798 Dresdimasdiines were damaged or destroyed by the deployment of u n i t s .
5. 43 raids on foresters and forestry officials.
6. 8 raids on banks and cashiers, during which large sums of money were stolen.
7. Premium warehouse in Radziemico (30 km south-east of Krakow) raided. Robbed were tO0 000 cigarettes, 100 liters of vodka, 100 kg of animal feed.

8. Smolarz sawmill (south of Parczew) raided twice and burned down.
9. t5 Reidis and Volksdeuts were killed, 27 wounded. 384 Poles in German service murdered or killed, 84 wounded.

III *Fires.*

In the tank farm of the Monopol distribution company in Warsdxau and in the Lipa impregnation plant (Krasnik district), considerable amounts of material were destroyed by fire.
115 fires on farmsteads, barns and grain stores.

13 Fire damage to wooden road bridges.

IY. Enemy propaganda:

Enemy propaganda continued unabated. HensdiriiYs with different content were distributed in all parts of the Gen.Gouv. In the Lviv district, enemy propaganda was at work to win over the Ukrainian people for the establishment of a free Ukrainian state [confusion propaganda].
Other leaflets called for Ukrainian self-protection against the communist danger.
For the first time, leaflets were found in the eastern legions calling on entire departments to defect and promising a full welcome and a month's leave.

V. Fighting:

The bandits were fought by the police and '3en- darinerie. Military police were deployed in 63 cases to provide support.
In the fight against the Kolpak gang in the OFK. Lemberg, in addition to the deployment of infantry troops from the military district, countless air force missions were carried out to reconnoitre and fight the gang. 1235 bandits were shot and 2325 suspects were arrested.

vi. Assessment of *the* dge:

Gang activity increased in August. Traffic congestion on railroads and roads continues to decrease. The general unrest is on the rise. The activity of all enemy forces in the country. The activity of all enemy forces in the country is an effect of the Russ. Russian offensive and the strong movements in the Ukrainian and Polish areas.

In the Galicia district, the Kolpak gang and the strong gang activity in the Ukraine had a significant influence on the mood of the population and provided a favorable breeding ground for the propaganda of Soviet and national Ukrainian agents. This is reflected in the decline in the previous willingness to work, in the non-delivery of grain contingents and in the marked restraint shown towards the SS Galicia Division being formed.

The nidiing of the Kolpak gang in the course of the past month has raised doubts among the population about the executive power and has led to bandits and politically restless elements acting more brazenly.

The emergence of stronger bandit activity in the previously uninhabited areas of Czestodiau, Radomsko and Petrikati deserves special mention.

In the Lublin district, the resettled area of Bilgoraj is a serious source of danger. The export of timber from the extended forests is only possible under military conditions. Only **60°/o** of the timber stocks of the timber year 43 are in the forest ...

Military District Command
Generalgouvernement

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t t **Bundesnrdiir - hliliiärardiir.**

In the following reports of the Secret State Police you can read how the saboteurs abroad proceeded in their individual actions.

On t2. August 194t the Secret State Police reported:

In April t941, 6 locomotives in Warsd au were rendered completely inoperable within a few days as a result of overheating and overheating of the water in the engine. The findings showed that the locomotives' fireboxes were completely burnt out and annealed. In this case 10 Poles were arrested for sabotage.

In Rejowiec, Lublin district, an act of sabotage was committed in the water pumping station at the railroad station in March t941. By rendering the pumping station unusable, the entire water supply to the station was cut off and all train traffic was paralyzed for a long time.

At the beginning of t941, a small vodka bottle was found at the railroad station in Radom while unloading a wagon with federal straw destined for the Radom army detention camp. The bottle contained incendiary material. The bottle also contained a glass ampoule filled with sulphuric acid and sealed with a rubber stopper. The sulphuric acid penetrates the rubber stopper and then ignites the incendiary material.

On March 29, 41, a fire broke out at the Karolev freight depot during the unloading of unprocessed flax. The cause of the fire was found to be a bottle filled with a dense liquid that had been placed between the flax cargo.

In March l94t, several goods wagons loaded with pressed straw caught fire in Warsd'au. During the unloading of the last wagon, a timed ignition was found between your press straw in intact condition. It was a potassium dilorate-silicic acid incendiary, &r housed **in an approximately 10 cm** long glass tube.

In September 1940, a tanker caught fire near Rosenbadi. Cause: a chemical-mediated time ignition device. The train came from Yugoslavia.

In several cases, fires broke out on hemp wagons coming from Yugoslavia. All the wagons were closed and sealed, so that flying sparks can be ruled out as the cause. Presumably, time fuses or flares with sulphuric acid and potassium dilorate were placed between the hemp charges. In Neu-Sandez on June 26, 1941, a wagon of a freight train loaded with gasoline barrels caught fire while entering the station. The freight train was carrying gasoline and was under military guard. The fire did not break out, but is probably due to sabotage.

In March 194t it was discovered that locomotives repaired in Nett-Sandez repeatedly had hot adis bearings after being put into service. The cause was found to be sand residue.

In October 1940, a railroad inspector found an inhibitor on the track on the Neu-Zagorz line (Russian border). In front of the Oslawa bridge in Neu-Zagorz, the wires to the signaling systems had been cut and the signal had been set to "free travel". An attack on a Uoisiedler train was probably planned.

On June 23, 1941, at the Voßwalde depot in the Grofi Strehlitz district, an explosive charge with a timed fuse was found on the cradle beam of the front left bogie of the Bender when some brake blocks were being removed from the locomotive running between Voßwalde and Czenstodiau. The explosive mass was a mixture of potassium dilorate with inert gas. The attack was probably carried out in Czenstodiau by members of the Polish resistance organization.

In November 1939, several attacks were carried out against oil trains from Romania. In all cases, the control valve cones and brake valve flaps were removed. The perpetrators were identified as Romanian or Hungarian gypsies who delivered the removed parts to the British secret service.

British secret service and were paid per piece. On t h e Basel-Chiasso transit route, the lower sides of the axleboxes on the German wagons were drilled through, so that the Cil could flow out slowly'°.'

On December 15, t943, the commander of the Sidier- heitspolizei and SD reported an act of sabotage at the Kowel power plant to the SS and Police Leader Luzk with a note to the Kriminal- Tedinis&e Institut in Berlin, which reads:

qI enclose a plate with blasting caps and detonator remnants found in the power plant in Kowel on November 20, 43, following sabotage of a power generation tower. I& ask you to make more detailed findings about the explosive material used and to inform me of the results of the investigation.

The reply to this, dated January 13, 1944, reads:

'The remains of the detonating device sent to us are parts of an English 'lead time detonator'. It was a detonator with a 3-hour duration.

I. A. (Dr.-Ing. Widmann)'°'

According to the Secret State Police report of September 26, 1941, there had already been extensive thefts of brake units in Romania at the end of 1939 by sending control valve parts for the air brakes. If, according to the results of the investigation at the time, these valve parts were stolen because they were made of semi-precious metals and could be sold in the scrap metal trade, it cannot be denied that the instigation for these thefts came from the British side, especially since it could be established that the British natural resources service was involved on a large scale throughout the Balkan region.

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12 Federal Archives, R 58, No. 274.
13 Federal Archives, R 58, No. 1051.

the establishment, training and equipping of 5abotage organizations.

After the occupation of Yugoslavia, the German security police found German railwaymen's uniforms, material for rail explosions and carborundum (Sd'mirgel) of various types in the building of the former British diplomatic mission in Belgrade.

In addition, printed instructions for railroad workers were available in German, Italian, Hungarian and Slovakian, showing exactly where and in what quantities the carborundum should be used to make locomotives and trains run hot and thus prevent them from running. Furthermore, as early as mid-1940, on the occasion of the dismantling of a sabotage and terror organization in the Ostmark and Yugoslavia, extensive material, in particular for explosives, had been provided, which was clearly of British origin".

It certainly cannot be claimed that this sabotage, directed either from London or from Moscow, brought about the German defeat. But in countless cases it disrupted and blunted the German war effort and threw sand in the gears. As a result, sabotage undoubtedly contributed to Germany's military defeat.

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14 Buod¢sar&in. R AB, no. 274.

Sabotage in the Reich territory

According to a report by the former mayor of Kassel, *Herbert Fraedrich*, an active lieutenant in the First World War, in March 1944 he gathered a captain of the security police, an employee of the Kassel police headquarters and two French prisoners of war who had been transferred to civilian status to form a resistance and sabotage group.

The organization, which covered the province of Kassel, worked in groups of five who did not know each other for better camouflage. Their task was sabotage in every conceivable form, establishing contact with the Anglo-Americans via the Messageradio, surveillance and spying on the population as well as preparing armed actions against authorities such as the secret state police and police headquarters as well as against party offices.

At the end of 1944, more than 100 groups of five iii were set up in the various work detachments of French prisoners in the province of Kassel, whose sabotage was primarily directed against the German armaments industry. In the Tiger tank construction of the Kassel Hensdielwerke, for example, a device was installed in the clutch of the tanks to p r e v e n t them from breaking down as soon as they were running at full speed in front-line operations.

In the motor vehicle repair industry, sabotage in the workshops caused the output of repaired Wehrmacht vehicles to fall to such an extent that at the turn of 1944/45 the special committee for repairing motor vehicles considered the closure of some companies and conscripted the owners and members of the workforce to other companies. In one company, the ordering of spare parts, which was initiated by the head of the sabotage organization Frnedridi persönlid, completely prevented the output of repaired cars for months.

A Miss Velten took on the task of establishing contact with a London transmitter via Strasbourg and arranging a keyword in order to be able to receive special radio messages from London. Shortly afterwards, weapons for the sabotage group were dropped in connection with air raids in the Mönchshof forest and behind Mount Hercules. Miss Velten also directed British air raids on a large artillery park, on the Bettenhausen paper factory, on other well-known industrial plants and on the Breitenbadi/Steinbrüdie SS camp - targets which were all then bombed with destruction.

On January 28, 1945, the leaders of the sabotage group
Fraedridt were arrested by the Secret State Police and their conviction w a s initiated

How exactly the Allied air force chose where and when t o attack is shown in two recent Swiss press reports. There is no doubt that some of the targeted attacks by the enemy air force were directed from Germany and that they caused untold damage.

Excerpt from pNeue Zürd'er Zeitung', Zurich, from t0. October 1944, morning edition:

pThe air war. Destruction of the Herisdiel locomotive works.

London, Oct. 9 (Exdiange) Aerial photographs over Kassel prove that the Hensd el-Lokomotivwerke, a leader in the manufacture of tanks and heavy armored cars since the beginning of the war

were completely destroyed. Almost all the buildings were either burnt out or demolished by explosive bombs.

Excerpt from the "pNationalzeitung", Basel, front October 9, 1944:

The bombing of the German tank factories.

London, Oct. 9, ag. (Reuter). It was officially announced on Sunday evening that two of the largest tank-manufacturing factories in Germany were hit and seriously damaged in the attack by American noble bombers on Saturday, according to photographs taken during the bombardment. The 'Liberators' who attacked the Hensdiel factory in Kassel, which probably manufactured almost all the German Tiger tanks, hit every building but one with both explosive and incendiary bombs, etc.'^.'

The Chief of the Security Police and SD Berlin noted under December 3, t943:

gOn December 3, 1943, 11:00 p.m., idt was informed by General Field Marshal Keitel by telephone on behalf of the Führer as follows: 'In the Hensdiel armaments works in Kassel and in the Maybadi works in Friedrichshafen, acts of sabotage were carried out in Tiger production by sprinkling iron filings or other sabotage agents into the bearings to achieve the effect of overheating. These acts of sabotage occurred during the testing of the new wagons.

Since, as far as I know, only the window assembly in the Hensd el works was carried out by

it is true that the charges were made in the Maybadi works. An investigation in this regard is said to have been carried out in the Maybadi factories and to have identified suspects ..."^.'

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15 Bundesardiiv - Militärardiiw. lb Bundesardiiv, R 58, No. 1049.

On April 18, 1940, the Chief of the Berlin Security Police and SD informed his subordinate offices:

p On 2Z. 3. 1940, a major fire broke out near Berlin in which valuable raw materials and ammunition with a total value of RM 3 million were destroyed. The military defense commissioner started an investigation into the cause of the fire without consulting the criminal and state police officers present. He also did not immediately disclose his whereabouts to the deployed head of the sabotage investigation squad of the Main Reich Police Office when he arrived so that he could continue the investigation on his own.

Upon immediate presentation by the Chief of the Security Police and the SD to the Head of the Counterintelligence Department of the OKW, the counterintelligence officer was removed from office after the facts of the case had been checked."

In the case of sabotage of submarine batteries, the head of the Kriminaltedinisches Institut in Berlin, Dr.-Ing. Widmann, wrote the following letter to the Reidissicherheitshauptamt Berlin on March 20, 1944:

'We have already examined the platinum pills mentioned in the report for 2 different places in our institute. We received the first ones in September 1943 from the BdS (Commander of the Naval Forces) in Paris, the second ones in February 1944. Paris, the second in February 1944 from the OKM [High Command of the Navy].

We have established that this is a very insidious means of sabotage. If the tablets are used in accordance with the instructions, i.e. only a single tablet of approx. 0.3 g weight per 25 liters of acid, the current capacity of the battery d r o p s sharply, based on our tests it can be assumed to about half the normal amount ... The pills are described in a supplement to the atlas 'Die feindlidien Sabotagemittel'.

I. A. Dr.-Ing. Widmann'-"

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17 Federal Archives, R 58, No. 274.

18 Federal Archives, R 58, No. t051.

Because of the explosion at the Sdilad tsdiiff qsdiarnhorst' on April 8, 1943, the Kriminaltedinisdie Institut Berlin sent the following reply to the superior Reiths-sidierheitshauptamt Btrlin on December 28, 1943:

We concur with the verdict given by the Chemical-Physical Research Institute of the Navy. If this judgment does not satisfy us in all details, we are not aware of any other possibility that better reflects the observed facts.

The observed and described esplosion effects are all those of a space explosion. Since under the given circumstances the natural occurrence of such an explosion cannot be seen, it is likely t h a t it was triggered by another explosion, perhaps that of a sabotage device. Since, on this assumption, the explosive device only had to trigger the space explosion, it could also have been considerably smaller than 5 kg ...

I. A. (Dr. Kallmeyer)'*'

In a letter from the Secret State Police, Bremen office, dated December 23, 1943, to the Criminal Investigation Institute in Berlin, it says:

qDuring the test run of a new submarine T 1097 at d-r A.G. Weser in Bremen, it was discovered that there must have been foreign objects inside the compressor. During dismantling, the sand contained in the envelope I was found and put aside. As the circumstances suggest an urgent suspicion of sabotage, it is requested that the sand samples contained in envelopes II and III be compared with sample I.

As it has not been established that the settlement of the Verdi&- ters has already taken place in Kiel, please, as far as possible within the scope of the

t9 Bundesardiiv, R 58, No. l65t.

If possible, p l e a s e pay particular attention to whether sample I could possibly be Baltic Sea sand. Samples II and III are Weser sand°0.°

In letters from the Secret Staztspolizei dated t3. March, March 51 and August 28, 1944, the following information is given about sabotage attacks:

qOn March 6, 1944, two freight cars loaded with hen and oat straw caught fire on the Pilsen-Eger line. When the bundled oat straw was pulled out, it was discovered that it was strikingly steel-blue in color at one point and that a ladia-like lump a p p e a r e d , which initially had the same color and turned gray after some time. The sdila'ken parts gave off a strong sdiulphurous smell, which soon evaporated ... The two wagons burned out completely. As they were running in 6th or 7th position behind the locomotive, flying sparks are unlikely to be the cause of the ignition according to previous experience, especially as the load was covered by tarpaulins …'

qOn September 1 and 6 lt. 44, sabotage attacks were carried out on the Friedberg-Miihr.-Ostrau railroad line and on the Oderberg-Mähr.-Ostrau railroad line. The evidence found at the scene and originating from the explosive device was transported by courier to the Criminal Investigation Institute at Gram- bow Castle near Sdiwerin i. Me';kl. on 10. 11. 44 …'

On July 26, 1944, at around 1:30 p.m., a wagon carrying 5800 kg of straw caught fire on the Pladen-Petsdiau branch line before entering Then- sing station, destroying a large part of the military's own cargo. Among the remains of the straw spread out to dry on the station grounds there, the enclosed cooled sdinur was found during the clearing work on August 1, 1944 ...°1'

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20 Federal Archives, R S8, No. 1051.

21 Biindeiardiiv, R 58, No. 1051.

The Secret State Police reported the following sabotage attacks in a press release dated August 12, 1941:

qOn December 30, 1940, a sabotage attack was carried out on the Anhalter Bahnhof, during which one wing of the station building was burned out and the baggage handling rooms were completely vandalized. This attack was a terrorist action by Polish resistance circles. Comprehensive state-political investigations have revealed that these opposition groups are also intending to carry out attacks on the baggage acceptance areas of larger railroad stations in the future.

On February 20, 1941, an infernal mine was found in an S-Bahn train in Berlin-Grünau and another on February 15, 1941 near the Balinhof in Katowice/OS. In the first case, the infernal mine found in Berlin was intended to destroy a heavily used means of transportation with no intention of destroying human life. In the second case, the fathers intended to carry out an attack on the Krakow-Berlin D train. In both cases, sabotage groups of the Polish resistance movement were identified as the perpetrators and clients.

At the Kohlfurtli and Mündien-Moosadi railroad stations, brake diläud e were repeatedly attacked and damaged in March and April. The number of brake damage incidents has increased recently.

In the district of the Regensburg Railway Directorate, there were accidents against oil trains in November 1939. Sand mixed with water was sprinkled onto the railroad tracks.

At the end of 1939/beginning of 1940, balls of sdiinirgel surrounded by resin were found in the axles of freight trains coming from the Ostmark and the Protectorate. After the resin mass was sdimelized, the exposed sdunirgel caused the bearings to run hot.

The Simmering repair works, Reichsbahndirektion Wien, reports that a di-medianized timing device was found in a passenger coach between the upholstery and the armrest.

ignition device was found between the upholstery and the armrest.

On l4. 6. 1941 at Singen station in an open carriage of an empty wagon of an empty freight train, 4 grenades *with* detonators were found. The wagons were to be sent to the Dogger ore mine i n Blumberg. It is suspected that the grenades were placed in the wagons to be transported to the blast furnaces together with the ore loaded in Blumberg°°°.' In a circular letter sent to all authorized offices of the state police, security police and SD, the Reidis-

The main government office stated on September 26, 1941, among other things:

Since the beginning of the armed conflict between Germany and the Soviet Union, the calls to railroad workers to carry out acts of sabotage have increased, especially on the part of Red agitator stations. These repeated calls and, in some cases, detailed instructions have recently led to increased sabotage activity, particularly in the Ostmark, the Protectorate, the German Government and the eastern territories incorporated into the Reich and in the Westmark, whereby the braking systems in particular were rendered unusable by cutting or removing the brake shoes and removing the sealing rings on the couplings. In individual cases, up to 20 brake blocks have been damaged on one train. Reports of such acts of sabotage were received from the state police (command) offices in Prague, Brno, Klagenfurt, Graz, Munich, Poznan and Breslau, the commander of the security police and SD in Metz and the commander of the security police and SD in Lublin.°

qIf acts of sabotage of the aforementioned kind did not result in any major accidents in the Reich territory, this is largely due to the conscientious conduct of the designated troops, who, however, in the occupied territories, in which

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2Z Bundesardiiv, R 58, No. 274.

In addition, the systematic use of such sabotage methods propagated by the enemy forces led in the long run to considerable disruptions and delays in transport, especially since the material for the braking system was extremely scarce anyway.

The High Command of the Wehrmadit, Amt AusVAbw, issued a situation report on September 17, 1941, a situation report on the following acts of sabotage in the first quarter of 1941:

qIn the Swinemünde naval hospital, fires were set in several places and at different times.

At the Senne army munitions plant, sdiarf< cartridges were found under blanks ...

On the destroyer 'Friedri& IHN', a short circuit had occurred in the cable of a gun group selector dialer, so that the sidings of a group burned out during a fire control exercise and the dialer was paralyzed.

Foreign objects (1 piece of wood, 1 pebble, twist fibers and welding residue) were found in the oil line or in the tank of a blocking brake, which clogged the fuel line ...

The pipeline for supplying a naval mock installation between Neuwähren and Raisdorf was cut by local residents using a wire rope.

During the overhaul of two diesel engines from motor vehicles of an Inf.Rgt., it was discovered that the oil holes between the cylinder head and the bearing block had been clogged by inserted iron pins. As a result, the entire upper suction was interrupted.

On board the U-bender 'Krefeld', during the voyage from Bruns-Büttelkoog to Wesermünde, it was discovered that the F.P. device was clogged due to the use of silage springs, which adjusted the degree of rotation of the dial.

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23 Bundesardiiv, R 58, No. 2Z4.

was paralyzed. Audi the control tube in the transmitter was defective.

At Ebenfurth station, an explosion occurred in an ammunition train for the Felixdorf air mine. Five wagons were destroyed. It is assumed that a thermite incendiary device was used ...

At Prossnitz Air Base (Moravia), water was found in the fuel tanks of five W 34 aircraft, and in one aircraft even 2201.

At the Dievenow naval air base, the covering of the rudder of a seaplane was pierced with a hard object.

In the exchange of gas masks from the Pütnitz naval air base company, four gas masks were found to have punctures under the eye rims, so that they would not have protected the wearer of the mask in the event of a gas attack ...

While dismantling a siren case at the Westerland Air Base Command, a sharpened piece of flat iron was found in two fields of a runway, which had already caused two holes in the runways.

The crude oil pump and the fuel line on the vibrator of the concrete distribution machine at Memmingen airbase were damaged. In addition, two wagons on which the construction machines were located were knocked off together with the sduning bushes.

At the Finsterwalde airbase, a Ju 52 was found to have had a lead lead pipe damaged at the base of the artificial horizon.

The air inlet nozzle of a reversing pointer was blocked by a hardened mass, so that the devices could not be used.

In the boiler and engine house of the Braunsdiweig aircraft repair plant, sand was thrown into the operating machine to render it unusable.

At the Sihwäb-Hall airbase command center, sand was thrown into the fuel supply line of the refueling system in the red wing of a

Ju 52, namely at the shut-off valve of tank 3, a piece of rubber s&laućh was found in the fuel supply line of the tank system, through which the fuel supply to tanks 4, 5 and 6 was obstructed, in some cases completely interrupted. The foreign body was absiditlidi iti the pipeline to endanger the ma- scfrine and its crew.

The cable of the undercarriage engine of an aircraft of the Finsterwalde air base command post was damaged at a displaced point ...

During a test run of the reddened engine of an HE 11 t E aircraft at the Breslau-Sdiöngarten airbase workshop, there were faults¡ the inspection revealed water in the injection pump and (lS 1) in the clean fuel tank.

Sø6oł4ge in *Œirtsc aflshetriehen.*

The Sunlight soap factory in Mannheim-Rhine suffered a loss of RM 600,000 due to a major fire and the resulting loss of production.

The Max Grunbadi & Co. company, Freiburg/Sa., suffered fire damage of I SO 000 RM. In addition, the production of defense equipment was interrupted by several weeks ...

At the company Land- und See-Leiditbau GmbH, Neumünster works, the canvas covering of an FW 58 aircraft was scratched in several places with a semi-sharp object ...

At the company Eisenwerk Lauffadi & Karlstadt, Karlstadt plant, metal plates were forcibly broken into an enameling furnace.

A fire at the Raudener Holzverwertung sawmill in Ratiborhammer caused a loss of 100,000 RM (fire damage) ...

At the Rei'fiswerke Hermann Göring', Watenstedt, the cables to two compressors were damaged and unburnable.

At the Rheinisdien limestone works in Wülfrath near Wuppertal, disruptions were caused to the track systems. Suspicion against Polish workers . . .

At the Junkers aircraft factory in As&ers1eben, two holes had b e e n drilled in the lines of the hydraulic system. At the Holstein & Kappen company in Dortmund, a worker failed to expose shells to the hydraulic test of t000 Arm. She also added unpressed shells to the pressed ones.

pressed ones . ..

On the Brodau estate in Neustad-Wolstein, a grain barn, an equipment shed and a control panel burned down. Damages more than RM 100,000. Verda&t against civilian Poles.

At the company Deutsdie Werke, Kiel, 16 nails were found in the sarid blasting machine. There was a delay very in

At the company A. Monfonts, Mas&inenfabrik, Munich-Glad- bad , a shed with wood stocks burned down.sdiaden 200 000.- RM. Dutch workers are employed at the plant.

At the Hibernia Wanne-Ei&el nitrogen plant, a worker leaked almost all the water from a waste heat boiler, so that a boiler explosion was possible, which would have completely destroyed the plant's incineration house. A production loss of 60'/+ of nitric acid would have been the result. The disaster was averted.

On a ready-to-ship HE 111 machine from the repair plant
Erfurt, the dummy cable was cut . ..

At the Vereinigte Glanzstoffwerke, Obernburg/Main, the operation of a combined alkalizing machine was repeatedly disrupted by foreign bodies (screws) being thrown into the pulp mass, as the 14 m long metal belt broke.

At the Reidisbahnbetriebswerk Wuppertal-Vohwinbd

three detonators were found under the coal when loading a locomotive. capsules were found under the coal. French prisoners of war were suspected.

At the "Emi1 Mayrisdi" mine in Giersdorf belonging to the Haniel & Lueg, a shaft burned down completely.

At the company Bayrisdie Sti&stoé(werke A.G., Piesterim, the Versudisanlage for a preliminary product of explosives exploded. Loss of RM 105,000. Loss of production RM 500,000. At the Mielec aircraft factory, the driving model for radiator cladding was heavily damaged by hammer blows on the smooth surface and at times rendered unusable. Perpetrators Polish workers.

In an air duct cellar of the Klötkner-Humbold-Deutz A.G. in Cologne-Deutz, the liditsdialter, controls, control panels of the electrical system, an overpressure valve of the ventilation system and other fixtures were destroyed by hammer blows. The air protection cellar was r e n d e r e d unusable as a result...

At the company Basaltwerke GmbH, Großsdilattengrün-Pedi- brunn (Bayr. Ostniark), iron parts (including a drawn shaft and a three-link coupling chain) were repeatedly discovered in stone breccias of the Sp1ittsd'otterwerk. The bre&er plant was temporarily shut down. Perpetrators 2 Belarusian prisoners of war ...

At the Pottendorf power station in the district of Baden N.D., the converter house and the power station's dado were partially destroyed by deliberate arson.

In the Odertalkokerei of Sdiaffgotsd -Benzin GmbH, Oderta), 2 tanks containing kerosene were destroyed by fire. Value of the tanks RM 300,000, value of the burnt kerosene RM 450,000. At the company Kar1 Deutschle, carton factory in Göppingen, the factory building containing pipe material, semi-finished and finished products burned down. u. finished goods, including Karnisdide&el. Total losses RM 145,000. Thousands of items were destroyed in the factory.

The naval turbine steamer "Bremen" (Sl 656 GRT), worth around 60 million RM, was completely destroyed by fire.

The fire destroyed the Kirfel & Kaiser company's electrical headquarters and the turbine house in Aad en. The company was shut down. 300 workers had to be laid off. Presumed sabotage by foreign workers.

On freight train 7853, Brmlau, atht brakes and in the storage box on the air filling stand two more silos were sabotaged.

Heavily burnt artificial wool was discovered between two bales of artificial wool mixed with wood shavings at the Karl Funder Tudi factory in Glandod (Carinthia). **The perpetrator** was arrested."

x-6eifeiningeri ***destroyed***

In a circular letter dated April 23, 1940, the Reidissi&erheitshauptamt (Reidissi&er Security Main Office) informs all the departments that since the outbreak of the war, acts of sabotage against Wehrmacht radio lines and cables have increased considerably.

On September 3, t939, the cable line of a Sd'einwerfer battery deployed near Dorsten was damaged. As the cable had been damaged and dismantled, sabotage was suspected.

On August 29 or 30, 1939, the connection to the battery was interrupted near Bork, district of Lüdinghausen. An inspection of the cable revealed that the wire had been cut. After centering, the two ends had been inserted into the ground and carefully sealed.

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24 Federal Ar&iv - **Military Guard.**

On t. 9. and 10. 9. t939 the cable lines of the Flak- Abteilung 146 Buer-Rosse were durthsdinitten in the evening hours. MÌt- te September 1939, the telephone line from the Flakbatie- riestelle 2/248 in Kirdihallen to a Sdieinwerfer was durthdinitten seven times within one wod e. Likewise, the line of the same launcher to BefeMsstelle 2/443 was rendered unusable three times due to leakage.

On 8 IO. 1939, the command and flight control of the 12th Flak Regiment 4 in Heeßen near Hamm were suddenly interrupted. It was discovered that three Peld cables had been damaged 20 meters from the switching station.

On October 9, 1939, a cable line from the southern exit of Ziegendorf nad Penning to the firing position of the 3rd battalion, which had been laid in front of the Danube-Regensburg anti-aircraft group, was cut at seven points.

On November 12, 1939, the underground cable to the field telephone cable of the camp troops was cut off near Sd wäbisdi-Hall near the office of Flakabteilung 2/117.

On March 18, 1940, the telephone line of the I. Batt.Res.Flak Abt. 2t t Brumby was destroyed in two places. The line runs with four wires, attached to thin masts about 2.5 m high, along the ditch of the Neugattersleben-Bruinby country road. The masts had previously been torn out at the two damaged points and the wires had then been cut. It is assumed that the lines were destroyed by members of the military themselves. In a number of other cases of sabotage of military cables members of the armed forces were identified as the perpetrators°*.'

The Reithsminister der Luftfahrt and Oberbefehlshaber der Luft- waffe reported in Jahresberiélit t940 of 25. 4. 1941 that 69 sabotage-damaged malfunctions were detected in flight operations in the troops nod 16 bet Herstellerwerke.

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25 Federal Ar':hiv, R 58, No. 274.

Aircraft malfunctions resulted from the presence of foreign objects and tools in airframes and engines, blockage of tanks, fuel or lubricant lines, lack of splits and safety devices, water in the fuel, Damage to airframes, engines, apparatus and aircraft equipment, damage to other movable air force equipment, weapons, ammunition, motor vehicles etc., as well as to air port facilities, ground equipment, buildings, stationary power and work masks, stationary cable lines etc.

Wehrkraftzersetzung

The following statistics from the Reiéhssid erheitshauptamt show how many illegal transmitters were used to sabotage the German war effort in the Reiéhssid area and in the occupied territories during the war. In total there were 246 transmitters, of which 174 could be identified.

In detail, the illegal transmitters were distributed as follows:

z) *Agitating transmitters from enemy countries: English*
agitating transmitters in

1. Norway	recognized:	1	made illegal:	1
2 Holland	recognized:	1	and made us guilty:	I
3. belgium	recognized:	2	usdiddly gemadit:	2
4. protectorate	recognized:	7	harmless gemadit:	S

b) *Since* the *resistance movement* egung:

1.)Yugoslavia	recognized:	4	usdiädlidi gemadit:	-
2. generalgouv.	recognized:	16	unsdiädlidi gemadit:	9
3rd protectorate	recognized:	38	rendered harmless: St:	38
4. holland	recognized:	3	unsdiädlidi gernadit:	3

c) *Sender* of the *E'*ei/tdspiana$e*:*

I. Soviet Union	erkxont:	63	uoschädlidt gemadtt:	17
2. england	recognized :	76	usdiädli& gemad't:	42
d) Amnteursender.	recognized :	33	made usdiädIi&:	26
e) *SioriJnder:*	recognized :	2	unsdiad1i& gemadit:	-
insgesamt:	**erkannt** *246,*		**unschädlich gem.** *174*[26*]	

Audi sabotage through self-mutilation and faking illnesses was widespread. A circular from the Secret State Police states:

Recognizing the extraordinary importance of the deception of illnesses as a means of liberation from military and labour service, the Stapoleitstelle Katowitz gave special attention to the execution of the decrees of the Chief of the Security Police and the SD dated 25. 2. and 10. S. 1944 - IV A 2 a - B.Nr. 2189/ 44g - and thus managed to achieve successes worthy of praise in this sector of sabotage.

In close cooperation with the counterintelligence officer as well as the official and company doctors, the examination of sick members of the company in the period from mid-May to the end of July t944 revealed 38 cases of faking illness.

Heinz Boberbach reports on how sabotage was carried out during the war in word and deed by means of Wehrkraffzersetzung in

'Messages from the Rer&°^', a selection from the secret reports of the SS secret service 1939-1944.

It says: 'In the Ostmark, the Marxists vowed to repeal the new November 23, ii the new provision on collective bargaining that came into force.

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26 Bunduardiiv, R 58, No. 274.
27 Bundesardiiv, R 58, No. 1058.
2ß Heinz Boberba'b, "Meldungen **ans dem** Rer&^, Neuwi'rd und ßerlin **19fi5,** Page 20 8.

order in the metal industry to opposing propaganda. - The KPÖ [Communist Party of Austria] yb am
27. 11. 1939, a leaflet is published in which this wage regulation is taken as an opportunity to agitate against the Reidi government. The workers are advised to demand clarification in all companies, to send inquiries and protests to the DAF officials and to reduce work performance. In addition, the KPO openly called for passive resistance to the war economy measures in the metal industry in the Ostmark. The factory walls were painted with communist slogans such as: 'Down with Hitlerism!' or 'Proletarians of all countries unite Europe!

Opposing propaganda (mainly through the distribution of flyers) was noted in Lohr m M., Burg Lengenfeld, Gelnliausen (Hesse-Nassau), Brad Kreuznach, Hacking (Ostmark), AsdiaSen- burg, Nuremberg, Donauwörth, Constance, Berlin, Halle, Bodenbadi and Freiwaldau.

From the Gau Salzburg it is reported that the fathers of the dissolved monasteries in Salzburg and Radstadt, who are standing around in the country, are disturbing the population - especially the peasantry - with inflammatory speeches and defeatist statements ...

While the Catholic clergy was fairly restrained in the first months of the war, it became more active in the last few months, especially under the influence of the papal encyclical of 27 t0. 1939, the attitude of the priests in various parts of the Rei& shows such a strong f3bereinstimmung that zenwale instructions must be available. The following is therefore a summarized presentation of the processes that have become known so far, from which uniform church guidelines can be recognized:

1. From various reports of statements, especially in internal church circles, at deanery conferences, etc. (some of which have already been reported). (partly already reported), it emerges that in several cases parts of the Catholic clergy declared that they would welcome it if Germany lost the war.

Germany would lose the war. They hoped that a victory for France and England would lead to a division of Germany into Catholic states such as Austria, Bavaria, the Rhineland, etc.

2. Since the treaty with Russia, National Socialism has been more widely opposed to Bols';hewism in the press etc. than before. According to the Church's view, this treaty only came about because the rei';hs government had allowed leading Communists, such as Thälmann, who had previously been held in concentration camps, to be set free.

3. As already reported, Catholic theologians in various parts of the country are listening to foreign radio stations. The nadiridts they broadcast are circulated within the clergy and spread.

4. The sdiledite jokes are used within the clergy to bolster the reputation of the imperial government and the leading penönlidics of the state and party.

s. In sermons, club lectures and other speeches, efforts were made to explain to the faithful that the war was a punishment from God for the 'moral depravity of the German people' ...

Once again, an act of sabotage committed by Polish prisoners of war deployed in agriculture was discovered. Two Polish prisoners of war were arrested in Königs- hofen in Franconia because they had thrown stones into the grain sheaves to damage the Dresden machine.

Opposition propaganda (mainly through the distribution of flyers) was detected in Cologne, Kiel, Döbeln, Breslaii, Suhl, Nuremberg and Crimmitsdiau ...

The Führer's words about camouflage with religion were particularly well received in Catholic areas of the Reich. Among the National Socialist comrades, the Führer's remarks were taken as the final warning to those clerical circles who, despite the war, were contributing to the sedition of the people through sermons and pastoral letters ...

The fact that the state provides 900 million Reidssmarks annually to the various churches has caused great astonishment in all circles.

The SD report of December 13, 1943, makes it clear that countless saboteurs in industry, commerce, and government offices throughout the country have withheld men fit for military service from the fighting front. The claim is:

gThe question of total war is a topic that is repeatedly discussed in wide circles of the population. From the military crises of the last few months right up to recent times, there has been a growing number of voices blaming the tense situation in the East and the complaints of many vacationers about the lack of weapons and ammunition on the allegedly inadequate conduct of total war. In many cases, the people's comrades in Anbetradit xersd iebener are annoyed by their approach of 'half-done measures' and see this half-measure as a fundamental mistake that strongly affects their hopes for a favorable outcome of the war. Indicative of such an attitude is the statement: 'If we lose, then we alone have the sd uld, because we are only fighting with our left hand'.

It is claimed that the proclamation of total war was not

The proclamation of total war was not followed by such energetic and far-reaching measures as most of the people had expected. The call for total war had in part remained just a slogan; many possibilities for total deployment had remained unused.

In the opinion of the people, a total war effort must be the goal:

1. The greatest possible increase in armament capacity,

2. The continuous replenishment and reinforcement of the fighting forces with able-bodied soldiers,

3. The protection of the homeland,

4. Ensuring that the population is fed and supplied with the
the population with the necessities of life.

There should be no other work and tasks besides this, because they would only serve the potential of forces geared towards total war. This is how the remarks of Reidisminister Dr. Goebbels in the Sportpalast at the beginning of this year were understood and welcomed ...

In the foreground of the critical statements are the UK sml-
measures. Here, the majority of the people take the view that, with the exception of the provision of selected specialists, there should be no UK positions. In reality, however, it can be observed that in many areas there are no young people working at home who actually belong to t h e fighting forces. According to reports from centralized rural areas, 'whole battalions' could be formed from the young farmers deployed there, which are now missing in the East.

Here in my village there are always only a few able-bodied men. They are mostly farmers. It should not be forgotten that this situation has an extremely negative effect on the mood of those farmers' wives who have been working their farms alone for four years now and often leads to bitter complaints. The people in the c o u n t r y s i d e are often of the opinion that many young farmers only owe their UK positions to their good
to good 'relations' with the local farmer leader.

In the private sector and in state and municipal authorities, a 'hoarding of labor' is often observed, which would be carried out by the superior authorities out of self-interest and with the common great goal in mind ...

Take a look around! In all the larger factories, there are still plenty of unavailable workers. In the B. works in G., in the large paper and timber factories in the M. valley, in the St. works in R., in the T. works in R., at the F. brewery. If you were to get all the commercial employees out of there, that alone

There would soon be a battalion, and in addition there are riodi many tedinis&e inspectors at B. and many workers in all the factories who are indispensable, but who are successfully retained by the companies. In addition, individual factory managers could be called in who are certainly available but who live their lives under the cloak of independence from the factory management. Is that total war? (foreman).

At the front, they are fighting against an overwhelming force, and the reserves are roaming around at home because the companies probably want to keep half a tribe together for the war profits. That is fundamentally wrong! (worker).

A 42-year-old civil servant in the upper middle ranks, previously employed in the UK, receives a call-up order, or a female worker who you don't want to miss is sent to the munitions factory. Then there's a lot of running around and phone calls to the higher authorities, the employment office, registration office, etc., just because you would have to work more.

In most cases, the view is taken that the ability of many employees to work is not affected by the call-up of UK employees:

It is in keeping with common sense to see every member of the people at the front and at home in the right place, which unfortunately has not yet been the case (Tediniker).

The view that the authorities, public law bodies and many professional institutions (e.g. the Reichsnährstand), including the NSDAP and some of its branches, were only covered superficially, was a big disappointment. The disappointment was occasionally expressed in the assertion that anyone who held an office with an authority or the NSDAP would not be conscripted, even if they were not registered.

The criticism does not stop at Wehrmacht offices at home. It was a widespread view that many military services had a manpower level that was far too high in comparison to their tasks ...

In almost every place with military service posts, the population audi cally pointed out soldiers who knew how to make life as a soldier at home very pleasant through their relationships with superiors. It was openly discussed that such conditions were probably only possible due to the reciprocal service provided by the soldiers to their superiors and that one hand was holding the other. For example, in one of the cities, a certain military registration office was spoken of as a 'supplier center'. In addition to four war veterans and two navy personnel, 80 percent of this office was staffed by 'suppliers' f r o m the following professions: Cigarette wholesaler, general agent for Juno cigarettes, tobacco wholesaler, cigarette shop owner, two colonial goods shop owners, wholesale merchant, paper wholesaler, dru'kerei owner, liquor dealer, restaurant owner, clothing shop owner, cheese and butter dealer. Similar conditions are criticized by the population in other regions, e.g. at a Fluko site in Bavaria, where over 50 percent of the workforce is made up of local business owners or sons of local business owners.
company owners^.'

The SD-Bert&t of t7. February 1944 again speaks of the deadly war°:

pRhnlidi, as was the case a year ago after the fall of Stalingrad, the population is again asking about the deeper causes of the unfavorable military development this winter ... Again and again, the same arguments are put forward as irrefutable proof that the war is not being waged with the necessary consistency on the German side ... The people's comrades are therefore of the opinion that the threat of disaster can only be averted by uniting and the rii'csidless use of all forces. The following statements are characteristic:

In terms of total warfare, Germany can only be a match for Russia.

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29 Heinz Boberba&, pMddungen am den Rei&', page 4G6 B.

country can cut this off. They don't ask for long there, everyone has to. Total war is on paper in our country. If it had been carried out systematically, the Soviets would not be where they are today. You have to hand it to Stalin, he is actually waging a total war, not a total war like we are.

30 Heinz Boberbadi, 'Messages from the Empire', page 491 f,

Eine der heimtückischsten Formen der Sabotage war die Vergiftung des Benzins. Dazu wurde von London aus, als Medizin getarnt, das Sabotagemittel „Voxaline" geliefert. Damit glückte es den Saboteuren, viele deutsche Flieger zu töten. Einige Pillen ins Flugbenzin geworfen, und schon stürzte die Maschine aus „unerklärlichen Gründen" ab.



Immer wieder mußten deutsche Soldaten an den Schienen heimtückische Sprengladungen entfernen. Leider gelang das nicht immer. Darum mußten viele Urlauber sterben, mancher Nachschub wurde zerstört, weil die alliierte Sabotage zuschlug.

Bekanntmachung!

DAS

STANDGRICT

hownthesupportofthe German

Aufbauwerkes in Luxemburg durch aufrührerischen Streik und Sabotage im Kriege folgende Personen zum Tode verurte t und die Einziehung des Vermögens angeordnet.

Dax, Michel,
Eisenbahnarbeiter, Ettelbrück

Professor Dr. math., Echternach

Thull, Johann,
Eisenbahnanstreicher, Ettelbrück

Heldezschel4L Czofl,

Dachdecker, Diekirch

Ferner wurden als Angeklagte der Geheimen Staatspolizei übergeben.

Die Todesurteile wurden heute um 6 Uhr durch Erschiessen vollstreckt!

Luxemburg, den 8. September 1942.

Der Vorsitzer des Standgerichts.

This German train in Norway fell victim to sabotage.

Wherever the German authorities discovered saboteurs, they cracked down hard, as this report from Luxembourg shows

beweist.

Sabotage by the July 20 conspiracy

There were two groups involved in the July 20 conspiracy, which differed considerably both in their choice of means and in their methods of action.

The first group consisted of those conspirators who wanted to overthrow Hitler with their own forces because they hoped to save Germany by doing so, and thus f o c u s e d on treason. The second group, on the other hand, consisted of members of the West who saw the military defeat of their own country as the sole prerequisite for overthrow and who therefore did not hesitate to reveal to the enemy all attack dates and operational plans as well as the status and development *of* armaments, thus sabotaging their own war effort.

This group of saboteurs is what *Hans* 2toi£Jefs, a German university professor of history and an assiduous defender of the armed forces, meant when he wrote:

'It was not only the threat of defeat that drove them to action, on the contrary, some of their leading men were convinced that a victory for Hitler would be the greatest of all human catastrophes. . .

Moreover, the opposition was in the exceptional position, or had been since the outbreak of the war, that the struggle for the liberation of the fatherland was tantamount to the struggle for defeat".

The treasonous conspiracies with the western allies and the pledge to try to overthrow Hitler meant sabotaging their own war effort, because the enemy was allowed to talk about the collapse of Germany from within. To the extent that the enemy's warfare was strengthened and boosted by years of treachery, Germany's own warfare became worthless. Sabotage on the grandest scale, however, was the betrayal of the attack date for the Western campaign by the conspirators Admiral Cansris, Obetst Oster and their helpers, although this did not lead to the failure of the campaign.

If one reads the memoirs of Colonel General *Heinz Guderian* about the disputes between the Army High Command and Army Group A under the supreme command of Colonel General von Rundstedt concerning the deployment plan for the Western campaign, one suspects that the conspiracy was trying to influence this operational plan.

Guderian writes:

qThe OKH - urged by Hitler to attack - intended to reapply the old so-called 'Sdilietfen Plan' of 1914. Although this had the advantage of simplicity, it did not exactly have the attraction of novelty. Very soon, therefore, thoughts turned to another solution. One day in November, I asked Manstein to come to me and explained his idea of advancing with strong armored forces through Luxembourg and southern Belgium against the extended Maginot Line near Sedan, to penetrate this fortified front and then to push the Durdibru& through the French border.

3t H;tns Rothfets, "Die deuts&e Opposition gegen Hiiler', Hamburg 1952, Seice t9l ff.

to complete the Austrian front. He asked midi to examine his proposal from the point of view of Paozermann. After studying the maps in detail and on the basis of his own knowledge of the terrain from the First World War, he was able to give Monstern the assurance that the operation he had planned could be carried out. The only condition idi had to meet was to commit a sufficient number of armored and motorized divisions to the operation, preferably all of them!

Mannsein then drafted a memorandum, which was sent to the OKH on December 4, 1939 with the endorsement and signature of Colonel General von Rundstedt. It was not well received there. The OKH initially only wanted to deploy 1-2 armored divisions for the attack via Arlon. This led to an exchange of ideas. I':h considered this approach too scliwadi and therefore pointless. A fragmentation of our already sd wadien armored forces would have been the biggest mistake we could have made. But this was precisely what the OGH was about to commit.

Manstein became urgent, but incurred the displeasure of the OKH to such an extent that he was appointed commanding general of an infantry corps. He asked that he be given at least an armored corps; his request was not granted. So our best operational mind went into the campaign with a third wave corps, the brilliant course of which was largely due to his initiative ...

In the meantime, an incident in the Luftwaffe forced the leadership to abandon the Sdilieffen plan. On January 0, 1940, a Luftwaffe officer flew over the Belgian border at night in a forbidden manner with important documents from which the planned deployment to Sdfieffen had been made and had to make an emergency landing on Belgian territory. It is not known whether he succeeded in having his papers destroyed. In any case, it had to be said that the Belgians and, in advance, the French and English had become aware of the rearmament.

Moreover, when reporting to Hitler on the occasion of his appointment as Commanding General, Manstein had had the opportunity to explain his views on future operations. In any case, Manstein's draft of the operation now became the subject o f studies, which were expressed in a war game in Koblenz on February 7, 1940.

Colonel General *Lothar* Rriid "fic also a d d r e s s e s the operational plan for the Wesdeldzug, stating that the offensive was planned according to the I k h l i e f f e n p l a n with the center of gravity on the quiet wing, although the conditions were now different. qFurthermore', according to Rendulie, effective countermeasures by the Allies were to be expected, which had to lead to a frontal clash. General von Manstein from the staff of Hecresgruppe A did not agree with this plan. He considered it advisable to lead t h e attack further south through the Ardennes, so that the Allies advancing towards Belgium could be surrounded. The Polge: Eri& von Manstein became inconvenient to t h e army high command, was removed from the staff of the army group and appointed commanding general of an army corps.

Hitler learned of this. He had Manstein's plan presented to him, immediately recognized its merits and ordered the creation of the offensive according to his wishes. The change in such a short time required a tremendous amount of work on the part of the general staff, as well as the necessary regrouping of the troops. The great edolg gave redit to this decision. Manstein's ridiculously grateful thanks came to fruition through the intuitive edasmng of the situation by Hitler. Here we have an example of decisive intervention by Hitler that led to success. On May 24, the battle in Belgium was over and the armies were preparing to attack the enemy forces south of the Seine. At the vol-

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32 Heinz Guderian, 'Erinnerungen eines Soldaten', Heidelberg t95l, page 79 f.

There could no longer be any doubt about the victory, nor that it would take only a short period of time to achieve it. This is also where Hitler's prediction at the beginning of August t939 about the short duration of the campaign came true^'.

The betrayal of the date of the attack and the old plan of action, which was well known to the enemy, were to bring about the failure of the western campaign, according to the conspirators' hopes.

The author *Fabian von Schlabrendorff* confirms this in his pamphlet "Officers against Hitler", in which he writes: "A section of the senior officer corps believed that the hour of salvation was upon us.

• < J e Hitler would be in the face of a German offensive against France. They firmly expected the offensive to fail. ..

During this time, Henning von Tres'kow [also an insider], who was then a general staff officer in the staff of Army Group Rundstedt, repeatedly stated that, according to the large majority of the German general staff and almost all army group and army commanders, the planned offensive against France would get stuck after a brief initial success.

Filled with this hope, Tres'kow explained to his friend Se labrendorff that "a strike against Hitler could only be dared with a chance of success if the German offensive had been pacified. It was psychologically impossible to lead the victorious German army against Hitler. The situation would be completely different if Hitler's offensive against the advice of his generals failed. Only a defeat of his own would break the barn in which Hitler held the German people and army. If a defeat had preceded this, it was not out of the question that military personalities who had previously stood aside, such as Rundstedt, could be won over to a military campaign against Hitler°"'.

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33 Lothar Rendulic, "So1dat in sturzendcn Reichen", Miinc en 1965, page 232.

34 Fabian von Sdilabrendorff, "Officers against Hitler", Frankfurt am Main 1961, page 48 d.

Canaris sabotaged the German war effort in Spain in a way that was almost decisive for the war. When he received orders from Hitler at the turn of 1940/41 to persuade Franco to agree to the deployment of German troops through Spain and the capture of Gibraltar, he acted in exactly the opposite direction and strengthened the Spanish state in its rejectionist stance°".

This behavior is confirmed by his co-author *Ernst von Weizsäcleer*, then State Secretary in the Foreign Office, who wrote in his memoirs: qHitler su':iite sdilieẞli& to involve Admiral Ca- naris, who was on the best of terms with the Spanish, in his courtship of Franco. Canaris, however, did not allow himself to be used in a deceitful deal with his Spanish friends. He advised them against it and for good reason°® ."

According to the revelations of the Englishman /'sn *Colvin*, a Spanish concession had been made in Berlin in June 1940 in the strictest secrecy, stating that Spain would give up its neutrality in due course and enter the war on the side of the Adisenmädites, provided that it was put in a position to withstand a British offensive through the supply of arms and grain. Plans for an invasion of Spain and an attack on Gibraltar were drawn up, and on October 23, 1940, Hitler met with Franco in Hendaye at the foot of the Pyrenees. Despite great efforts by the Spanish Minister of the Interior, Serrano Suner, brother-in-law of General Franco, who had prepared the meeting through discussions in Berlin, no agreement was reached.

Colvin's impression was that Canaris must have warned the head of the Spanish secret service, General Vigon, that Hitler would only bluff and that Franco would have to resist him. 'But there were', according to

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35 Zimmermann and }acobsgs, "July 20, t944*, Bona t952, p. 23s.

36 B£nSt von @eizsäcker, "Erionerungea", Mündten t950, p. 297.

Colvin, "still other means of communication. In Rome, Josef Müller [Canaris's henchman] showed up when Suner nodi was there and told him: 'The Admiral asks you to tell Franco to keep Spain out of this game at all costs. In your eyes it may seem to you that our position is the stronger one. In truth, it is desperate and we have little hope of w i n n i n g this war. Franco can be confident that Hitler will not invade Spain by force of arms ...'

His [Canaris'] adjutant, Lieutenant-Colonel Jenke, told me t h a t Canaris had thought it appropriate to discuss the situation in Germany and Spanish interests with General Martinez-Campos, the Chief of the Spanish General Staff, and that he openly advised Spain to remain neutral and defend its neutrality. . ,'°'"

This sabotage by Admiral Canaris had the most serious consequences for the German war effort. As the British fortress of Gibraltar could not be taken, the Mediterranean remained largely open to the Western Allies for the operations of their naval and air forces. The naval and air forces of the Italian ally proved far too weak to prevent this.

The German Wehrmacht was also unable to exploit this weakness due to the strain of the Russian campaign. The planned seizure of the British island fortress of Malta could not succeed because the nadisdiub could not be stopped.

In December 1941, the commander of the German submarine force, Amidral Dönitz, had to recall the last submarines from the Mediterranean after five boats had been lost in action against a single Anglo-American convoy without achieving any significant success.

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37 Jan Colvin, "Admiral Canaris - Chief of Intelligence", London t951, page 153 If.

As long as Malta could not be taken, however, Field Marshal Rommel could not be adequately supplied with supplies, especially supplies of tanks and fuel, so that his African campaign, which had begun so successfully, was doomed to failure.

When the military and political situation in Italy began to come to a head in the fall of 1942 and Field Marshall Albert Kesselring, Commander-in-Chief South, was talking about an Anglo-American landing somewhere in the Mediterranean, Canaris continued his sabotage by making contradictory predictions: From a particularly well-informed source, he first wanted to know about a landing of the Western Allies on the West African coast, only to then assume a landing on Corsica, followed by a landing in southern France and finally a landing in the Balkans. On the basis of its reliable report, the Führer's headquarters came to the certain assumption that the Allies would land in southern France, whereas Kesselring concluded from certain facts that a landing in North Africa was out of the question.

As is well known, the Allies then landed in North Africa on November 8.

In a report by *Karl Bartz*, General Dei&mann, then Chief of Staff of the II Air Corps in Sicily, confronted Caiiaris and wanted to find out more about the 'reliable' agent, but Canaris made excuses. .

Admiral Canaris, a master of deliberate deception and misdirection, aroused Hitler's disapproval with his false report.

In his memoirs, *Karl Dänitz*, who was clearly better able to assess Admiral Canaris than Hitler:

pThe German leadership had no idea whatsoever about the gigantic preparations that were necessary for the planned North African invasion, such as the consolidation of the large amount of space required and the loading of troops and material.

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38 Ksrl BattZ, "Als der Himmel brannte", Hanover t9S5, p. 142.

concrete reports. The German nadir and counterintelligence council under Admiral Canaris failed completely in this case, as it had not given the German submarine command a single useful piece of information about the enemy during the entire war."

On July 25, 1943, the German political and military leadership was completely surprised by Mussolini's stunt. This was possible because Canaris did not suspect anything tangible, although he was well informed about the situation in Italy thanks to his close acquaintance with the head of the Italian counterintelligence service, General Roatta, and his friendship with his nadifolger, General Amé. They did not believe the le officers of German command staffs who were reporting on Italy's imminent apostasy, because the news did not come from Cänaris, whose relationship of trust with his Italian colleagues was known. A few weeks later, on September 8, 1943, the apostasy had become a fact, and again the surprise at Führer headquarters was completely.

Au& Kesselring was completely clueless and asked Roatta what was really going on, to which the Italian replied blatantly that all reports of the capitulation had been made up. It was not until later in the evening that he called Kesselring to explain that the nature was correct and had taken him by surprise.

When Mussolini had been overthrown and arrested by vote in the Grollen Fasdiist Council, Canaris heard of Hitler's plans to arrest King Emanuel and Marsd'all Badoglio, whose assurances of loyalty to the alliance he could not trust, and to free Mussolini.

to free Mussolini. As J= Colvin reports, Canaris hurried to Italy himself under the pretext of s t r e n g t h e n i n g Italy's will to resist. But Lahousen, head of department

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39 Karl Dönitc, "10 Jaltre und 20 Tege", Bonn 1958, page 243.

in Canaris' office, told me that Canaris' actual intention h a d been to warn the Italians of the Führer's absidites.* Lahousen reports that a large formal meeting had taken place in Venice at the Hotel Danieli, that Canaris and Amé went alone to the Lido and were together for an hour and a half, during which Canaris informed his friend AmG of the kidnapping plans. When he returned to the hotel, Canaris told him that he had warned Amé and that Amé in turn had spoken to him in the same way. Surrender was in the air.

Italy was about to change sides.

The following day, Canaris and Amé met in the presence of their assembled staffs for the official agreement. The Italian told the Germans loud and clear that the brotherhood of arms was sacred and unbreakable and that Italy *was* determined to resist the onslaught of the Anglo-American forces on Germany's side to the utmost. Canaris listened with admirable seriousness in the presence of all the participants. Back in Zossen, Canaris sat at lunch with Ernst Kaltenbrunner (Head of the Reich Main Government Office) and Walter Huppenkothen (Senior Government Councillor of the same office) and entertained them with memories of Italy. Huppenkothen recalled and noted in his report how much Canaris emphasized that General Amé had personally assured him that he considered it impossible for Italy to undertake independent action to end the war.

The way in which Canaris tried to sabotage Mussolini's liberation from his captivity is revealed in a report by the Duce liberator, Hauptsturmführer der Waffen-SS Otto ffiorzeay, w h i c h appeared in the "pDeutsche Wooenzeitung" of October 5, 1973.

Skorzeny writes: pResearch into Mussolini's whereabouts proved to be very difficult: we learned nadi

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4s Jan Colvin, Admiral Canaris, Clief des Geheimdienstes', serce 243 f.

Some time later we learned that Mussolini had been housed in a carabiniere barracks in Rome during the first period of his captivity and had then been taken to the island of Ponza on an Italian warship, but had soon left this island again, also on a warship.

Then we found out from the German navy, through Captain Hunäus, who was the only liaison officer stationed on the island of Santa Maddalena, an Italian seaport, *that* a prisoner of war, Mussolini in fact, had arrived on the island. After my briefing at the German naval headquarters in Rome, I sent my SS Untersturmführer Wagner, who spoke perfect Italian and was disguised as a simple marine, to Captain Hunäus. One day, completely out of the blue, we received an order from the Führer's headquarters to prepare a falsdiirm operation to a small island near Elba, as Mussolini was a prisoner there. This order from the Führer's headquarters can practically be traced back to Admiral Canaris, who had received the order from his Italian colleague Amt. I was able to convince General Student that we should definitely ask for an audience at the Führer's headquarters in order to contradict this order and convince Adolf Hitler that our firm opinion nadi Mussolini was on the island of Maddalena.

Meanwhile, iii had carried out a reconnaissance flight over Maddalena in a Heinkel. On its return to Rome, the MasAine crashed into the sea with its engines on fire, and we were missing for two days and the entire crew and idi were declared dead.

I& then flew back to the Führer's headquarters in East Prussia with General Student, and in the meeting, which was attended by Adolf Hitler, Reidismarst General Göring, Foreign Minister Ribbentrop, Grand Admiral Dönitz, Field Marshal Keitel, Reidisführer SS Himmler, Colonel General Jodl, General Student and myself, I had to report on the progress of our negotiations. In my lecture

Adolf Hitler explained that he was now convinced of the validity of our investigations and asked me whether I had already worked out a plan for the liberation of Maddalena. I then presented this plan, which had been worked out by myself and my adjutant Karl Radl with the German naval command in Rome and personally approved by General Student.

Idi requested the subordination of sedis Sdinellboote and two so-called clearing boats of the Kriegsmarine, the latter to transport two Kornpanien of the Waffen-SS brigade from Corsica to Santa Maddalena. Idi himself and my adjutant would make what might be called an official visit to the fleet and then surprisingly set sail again at dawn, but in reality they would dock at a mooring below Villa Weber, where Mussolini was being held prisoner, and storm the villa to free Mussolini ...

A few days later, we arrived at the war port of Maddalena as planned, and during a personal reconnaissance, which I carried out together with Lieutenant Wagner, disguised as a simple marine, I discovered to my horror that Mussolini had been carried off early that morning in an Italian sea rescue plane.

By a great coincidence, over the next few days I visited, together with General Student, a German seaplane squadron s t a t i o n e d on Lake Frassimeno, north of Rome, and there we discovered that this Italian sea rescue plane had landed on this lake a few days earlier, on the same day that I was in Maddalena, and then an ambulance left.

A few days later, the Police Attad é Kappler intercepted a radio message signed by General Gueli, addressed to the Italian Ministry of the Interior, in which this Italian general reported that the security preparations for the sports hotel on Gran Sasso had been completed. This gave us a new lead, and my ad-

jutant Rad1 and I worked out a new plan for the **Gran** Sasso operation, which was discussed daily with General Student and approved by him ...

In the meantime, the second undertaking was also being pursued because of the possibility of Italy's secession from the Adise, namely the securing of the leading Italian personalities. General Student himself wanted to land at the royal palace with cargo ships in order to arrest the king there. I& myself **was to** occupy the royal palace in Rome with my soldiers, reinforced by two companies of the first paratrooper division led by Major von der Heydte, and secure Crown Prince Umberto there.

Events moved faster, and on September 8, 1945, around 1:00 a.m., Italian radio announced that the Italian government had concluded an armistice with the Allies. At the same time and on the next day, the seven Italian divisions stationed around Rome were disarmed by all available German troops after light fighting.

So much for Skorzeny's report.

The fact that the Italian king and Crown Prince Umberto could not be arrested in time was undoubtedly due to the deception of Canaris, who assured the Führer's headquarters to the very end that Italy would continue to fight loyally alongside Germany under Badoglio's leadership. Thanks to Canaris, the traitors in the Italian army had gained time to prepare for their defeat and bring their king, the crown prince and his entourage to safety. Towards mid-January 1944, the enemy advanced against the Garigliano section of the southern France with far superior crows and made strong incursions, p u t t i n g the German 10th Army at great risk. In his distress, Feldmarséhall Kesseking clung to a message from Canaris that a landing of Allied troops in the rear of the German southern front (in the Rome area) was out of the question. In a difficult situation, Kesselring gave the order to send two

divisions to the hard-pressed Fmnt on the Garigliano, t'm to bring it relief and to prevent the roll-up of the red wing of the 10th Army on the southern front.

Three days later, the Allies landed in the rear of the German front, in the Rome area near Nettiino. Canaris' message had been wrong again.

Canaris sabotaged the German Mediterranean front with false reports, deceptions and misdirection until it collapsed completely and had to be abandoned.

When the German offensive came to a standstill outside Moscow in the winter of t940/4t and the mood there was gloomy, Canaris returned to Golvin's Berid t from the Russian front to travel to Bern, where he once again visited a Polish lady whom he had brought from Poland to Switzerland with her children. To this woman, whom he knew to be in friendly contact with Englishmen, he explained: "If the Russian army is disorganized and exhausted, so are we. Our supplies are exhausted, and our means of transportation are absolutely inadequate for supplying such a large army so far forward. Even if Russia's situation is sdileeht, it can dodi sthwerlidi be more séhled than our own.'

That Canaris also conspired and sabotaged in the Balkans is clear from everything we have heard of him so far. Although he was able to prevent Bulgaria from joining the Ad Senmädi on t. March 1941, he became effective in the interests of Yugoslavia.

JoseJ Li psst', the last Polish envoy to Germany, told Colvin "that Canaris had sent a warning to the Yugoslavian government about Hitler's ordered, niditious attack on their capital ... It cannot be assumed that this was an invention of the Pole. The Botsdiafler assured me that the Yugoslav General Staff was fully aware of the warning *Canzris* had given.

Colvin asked a senior British naval officer, Capt. J. Hillgarth, what he knew about Canaris's reports. 'I don't think they ever did us any particular harm,' was his reply. pMy friend H. C. O'Neill Strategicus remembered seeing some reports of Canaris nash Wawell's victories over Graziani in the desert. 'He greatly overestimated the number of Wawell's traps,' Strategicus told me. 'Canaris should have known exactly how many or how few divisions we really had in the Middle East at the time. Now that you tell me that Canaris w a s working against Hitler, I have found an explanation for a lot of t h i n g s I was wondering about."

"On July 2, 1940, Keitel gave the order to have the plan for the 'Sea Lion' operation (invasion of England), which had already been laid down in his basic lines, worked out in detail. The preparations were to be completed by mid-August. Mülter hurried to Rome and passed this information on to the British.

Canaris' reports about England, however, had an unrealistic tone. They considerably overestimated the strength of the British defense groups when they suggested that there were up to 30 divisions, of which only 20 were fully operational. In fact, however, there were no more than 16 divisions available for the defense of the invasion area in September ...

He had neglected to report on the rearguard action of the British Isles in **June** 1940 and had portrayed the British as much stronger than they actually were."

In the spring of 1939, when Canaris again believed he had to fear the invasion of Switzerland by German troops, he again warned the Swiss government, according to a message from the press officer of the Swiss embassy in London to Colvin.

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41 Jan Colvin, qAdmiraĺ Canaris, Chief of the Secret Service", page 202.

42 Jan Colvin, Admiral Canaris, Oief des Geheimdienstes^, page 151 f.

Na& the 20th Juli t944, Canaris and his staff chief Oster were imprisoned. It is reported that Oster showed an excellent mental attitude and a high degree of human decency in prison, that he stood up for his actions and never failed to incriminate others.

In complete contrast to him, Canaris, when confronted, blamed everything on Dohnanyi and Oster. Indeed, he even denied that Oster was his chief of staff. When he accidentally bumped into Strünck in the Dusdir room, he whispered to him: 'Blame everything on Oster and Dohnanyi! Strüntk was horrified by this imposition. He was utterly dismayed and called Canaris' behavior sdiamless. Strüntk could not believe that Canaris wanted to dump everything on his friend Oster.

But all the denial and shifting of all blame onto his friends and co-conspirators was of no use to Canaris when in the fall of 1944 Colonel Oster's armored scaffold was found in the armored locker of the Army High Command in Zossen and in the spring of 1945 Canaris' two thousand page diary was found in another armored locker.

A mass of records was found that incriminated the conspiracy of sdtwersteos with high treason, treason and sabotage of the German war effort.

Fifty-two notebooks contained military espionage reports from German agents abroad. These reports, processed and coded by Dohnanyi's office, had often been falsified by changing or omitting a number or a letter, so that the Wehrmacht did not receive the edited reports.

The diaries proved that Canaris had reported the invasion of Denmark and Norway to the dunes in advance and had revealed the date of the French offensive. Likewise the day of the invasion of southern Slavia.

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43 Karl Bartz, "Die Trag%ie der Deutsdien Abwehr", Salzburg 1955, page 2t2.

Canaris sduieb about it: Together with Dohnanyi, he had audited State Secretary von Weizsäcker. Together they discussed what to do. Weizsäcker explained that he had already been informed of Hitler's intentions regarding South Slavia. The result of the conversation was the decision to warn the South Slavic military attaché Vladimir Vauhnik. Vauhnik was warned of the attack by telephone during the night, without having any idea who was making the call. This was on April 2, 1941, and it was also stated in these diaries that Canaris was to talk to the Russians via Stokholm.

Canaris was presented with a report written by his own hand. He denied his own handwriting and shifted all blame to his staff, just as he c l a i m e d to be solely responsible for the fact that many reports of German espionage arriving from abroad were falsified before they were forwarded for evaluation.

Although Canaris was convicted by his own actions and by the statements of those involved, he stubbornly denied it to the end and put all blame on his subordinates.

On April 8, 1945, Canaris and Oster were tried by a court martial.

The determination with which the conspirators of July 20 worked towards supporting Germany's Allied opponents and thus sabotaging the German war effort is demonstrated by the actions of *Helmut GraJ von Moltlee.*

This representative of the Kreisau Circle had already accepted Germany's unconditional surrender at an early stage. Moltke had deliberately sought contact with resistance groups in the occupied countries' and understood this as a practical European policy'.

In 1942, he had told an English acquaintance that he and his friends were prepared to help the victors to achieve peace.

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44 Karl Bartz, "The Tragedy of the German Defense", p. 216 If.

to win. He also stated that they wanted to "help win the war" and made concrete plans to realize these goals in Turkey at the end of 1943.

The group he represented, he said, considered 'an undoubted military defeat and occupation of Germany to be absolutely necessary for moral and political reasons. Based on this premise, it regarded the Allied demand for unconditional surrender as justified and prior negotiations on peace terms as impossible …'

"If the Allies' - according to Moltke - were in a position to land in France and push through to Germany in a large, single operation and occupy Germany as soon as the Soviet troops had reached the Tilsit-Lemberg line, for example, the group was willing to support a military operation by all means, e.g. through the corresponding behavior of larger German troop units. . ,[4^]"

The extent to which some of the Versdiwörer were prepared to assist the enemy in the war could hardly be expressed more clearly.

A versatile member of the resistance with good connections abroad was the journalist *Rudol) Pechel,* then head of the magazine "Deutsd e Rundsd au'. He established links between resistance groups that had not previously existed. For example, between Goerdeler and Hermann Maaß, the former managing director of the pReichsverband deutscher Jugendbünde°, and thus to Wilhelm Leuschner, between Goerdeler and Stürmer and between other opposition circles. He had contact with military circles through Colonel Siegfried Wagner and General Olbridit. Likewise to the military defense of Admiral Canaris.

Through this connection he achieved, as he reports, that he was that he was declared "gunabkömmlidi" when he was called up for military service.

45 Walter Sdimitt-Henner and Budifieim, pDer deutsdie Widerstand gegen Hitler", Cologne-Berlin, page 69 f.

although, as a former reserve officer, he was absolutely obligated to serve. He was strongly supported financially by men from the Bosd' company, without whose help it would have been impossible to get the "Deutsche Runddiau" through. In 1936, he met Carl Goer- deler, who published some highly critical essays in his Zeit- sdirift.

It was not enough for him to lead an academic fight against National Socialism, which is why, after years of quarantine in Germany, he resumed his travels abroad to Switzerland, France and England in 1936, where he had many German and foreign friends.

pI& had pointed out to friends abroad, he wrote, that the planned occupation of the Rhineland would immediately become impossible if only the smallest military step was taken.

'In August t938 I succeeded in informing a high French diplomat and some men in England through Heinrich Baron in Paris, who received the nadiridit from me about Switzerland, that Hitler had announced the invasion on t. October 1938 that Hitler intended to invade Czechoslovakia. The efforts of our foreign friends to persuade the governments to act were unsuccessful.

I was then in London in March, April and May 1939 and pointed out Hitler's war plans with impeccable evidence. All this was done in collaboration with Hans-Erid Haack and a man who, thanks to his position in the military defense, *his* outstanding gifts, his hatred of Hitler and his relations with foreign *officials*, greatly assisted our work. It is Captain (ret.) Hans Rit- ter, an old World War II officer in the German army ...

During my three visits to London, I spent a lot of time with the former Reich Chancellor Dr. Heinridi Brüning and was able to enjoy his wise advice, and Hermann Rausduiing came from Paris to London to speak with me ...

Despite the fact that the war made contacts outside extremely difficult, we found ways and means to maintain them. Heinrich Baron again played a role in this after his liberation from French prisons, as did Hans Eridi Haak until he was drafted into the military.

Despite increasingly intensive censorship during the war, Rudolf Pediel continued his journalistic struggle in the 'Deutsdien Rundschau', which led to his arrest by the Reich Security Main Office on April 8, 1942. One article was so aggressive that British radio read it out on its German broadcast and a Swiss newspaper printed it without comment. As he himself explained, the underlying reason for his arrest was his treasonous activities abroad. His friend Hermann Rausdining kept a careful diary of the conversations he had with him in London, which he left behind in Paris when he had to leave the country after the breakthrough of the German armies.

On December 15, 1966, the official publication *"Foreign Relations of the* United *States - Diplomatic Papers" was* published in Washington, officially confirming the links between the German resistance and the Allies. Among other things, the publication contains a memorandum from the then deputy head of the American secret service, Brigadier General Magruder, dated May 16, 1944, which was sent to the American Department of State. In it, Magruder reports on the proposals made by representatives of the German resistance to the Allied High Command on how American troops could occupy Germany more effectively ...

At the beginning of April t944, the envoys spoke with the OSS representative in Bern and suggested a settlement between this German opposition group and the Western Allies. The group expressed its willingness and readiness to negotiate,

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46 Rudolf Pediel, 'Deutsdier Widerstand', Züridi 1947, p. 289 lf.

Hitler and the Nazis. They declared their conviction that the time in which a successful undertaking could be carried out was rapidly shortening. They said they were the only group that had enough weapons and enough influence in the military to achieve the goal of overthrowing the Nazis.

The group noted that the generals now in command in the West, especially Rtindstedt and Falkenhausen, would be prepared to give up resistance at the front and support the Allied land operations as soon as the Nazis had been exposed. They argued that similar arrangements could be made for the reception of Allied airborne troops at strategic points in DentsÖiland ...

In May t944, about a month after the emissaries' April visit to the OSS representative, they received an oral message from the opposition group by courier. It was reported that the group was prepared to support Allied units in penetrating Germany if the Allies agreed that the Wehrniadit should continue to hold the eastern front.

In detail they proposed: Three Allied airborne divisions were to land in the Berlin area with the support of the local army commanders. Larger at phibis landing operations were to be undertaken at or near Bremen and Hamburg. Landing operations in France were to follow. Previous German units in the Mündien area would isolate Hitler and other high-ranking Nazis on the Obersalzberg.

It is reported that the opposition group believes that Germany has lost the war and that the only chance to prevent communism in Germany is to suffer the occupation of as much of Europe as possible by American and British forces before the Eastern Front collapses.

The envoys who had remained in Switzerland replied to the Courier that a discussion of the plan would have no purpose.

because of the clause concerning the Soviet Union ... They described the group's preconditions as unrealistic and considered the core of the proposal to be only the plan that the American and British forces should establish themselves in Germany before the Russians arrive ...

One of the envoys of the opposition group admitted his lack of confidence in the political courage of the German generals on the basis of previous experience and said that the Allies would do well to ignore their proposals if they were confident of an early victory and a complete occupation of Germany. The OSS representative in Berne is convinced of the reliability of this means on the basis of nadifor- stances and previous experience. The representative is of the opinion that there are some German generals who would like to liquidate their responsibility for the war by cooperating in the construction of an Anglo-American bulwark against the pressure of the Soviet Union in Europe. He is convinced that the two envoys are in contact with such a group.

It is doubtful whether the 'group would have the decisiveness to act effectively at the appropriate time, and knowing the problem of relations with the Soviet Union in the accomplishment of any plan in which the group might be involved, he considers that the group's activity might nevertheless be useful in uri- tinating the morale of the highest authorities in the Wehrmacht".°

Rndol Pect'ef reports aud about a strong communist Group, which was led by Anton Saefkow, Franz Jakob and Baestlein and was filled with the non-communist circles of the resistance. Its members included communist and social democratic workers and men and women from the middle classes. In thirty Berlin industrial companies, most of which worked for the armaments industry, company groups were set up to organize the resistance.

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47 "Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung", IS. December t966.

with other resistance groups in Hamburg, Leipzig, Dresden, Magdeburg and other cities. They eagerly collected money and raised large sums through the sale of scarce goods for the development of illegal work. pThere were audi connections with Sweden47a

qThe resistance group [Saefkow-Jakob-Baestlein] had m a d e preparations for the final battle. They secured weapons and ammunition wherever they could. Through connections with their friends in the army, they also succeeded in supplying weapons and ammunition to resistance fighters in the subdued European countries.

In November 1943, the active insider *General Heinrid:i von Stiil pnagel,* military commander in France, established links with the French Resistance, which in countless cases shot our soldiers from ambush and carried o u t bomb attacks on German military and civilian administration offices. Stülpnagel's liaison was Dr. Hans Buwert, who had been in charge of the provisional management of the Ha&ette Group, the largest French publishing house, since April 1941. Dr. Buwert had made the acquaintance of Count Dohna, whom he knew from Prague, with the retired lieutenant colonel Dr. Caesar von Hofa';ker, cousin of Count von Staufferiberg, who put him in touch with Stülp- nagel at the end of 1942.

Dr. Hans Buwert reports: 'In November 1943, at Stülpnagel's instigation, id' made contact with the French Resistance. The aim of the negotiation was to persuade the combat units of the French Resistance to adopt a conciliatory stance towards the new German government in the event of the fall of the Hitler regime and, if necessary, to take action within the framework of the events that followed the coup d'état in the political and military development of France.

4Zs Rudolf Pcdiel, pDeucsdier Widerstand', page 93 f.

48 .2for money i&tu the denn&en antifascist resistance movement 1S33 to i945-, page l5t.

The development resulted in a certain degree of cooperation with the French Resistance. The formation of a new diplomatic representation was planned for Vithy, to be headed by Caesar von Hofa&er ...

A French representative from London was even called in for these negotiations.

from London was called in. The outcome of these negotiations was extremely satisfactory. The partners, of whom of course I only knew the noms de guerre, were later found by chance, provided they did not perish, and confirmed the negotiations he had conducted with me in Paris.

It was General von Stülpnagel who, on July 20, 1944, sabotaged the German Security Service, which was keeping the French Resistance in check and s a v i n g the lives of German soldiers, by having 1,200 members of the Security Service arrested in Paris and imprisoned partly in the Wehrma&t prison in Fresne and partly in the casemates of the old Fort de L'Est. The arrest operation by shock troops of the army's security regiment succeeded because it was justified with the feint that the SS had put up a fight against Hitler. Following the arrest, according to the orders of the overseer von Stülpnagel, the Standgeridite were to convene to try the higher SO leaders.

Cher the Standgerid tsverfahren sdireibt von Sdiramm:

pAtidi this must be said here for the sake of truth and the completeness of our Beridite: In the yeast of the f-'cole Militaire, the accommodation of Wadi Regiment No. 1, the sandbags were also sd on at midnight, in front of which those SD leaders were to be shot, over whom the appointed stand- geridit of the resistance forces would perhaps nodi have pronounced the death sentence at dawn. This prepared bullet trap was opened in the early hours of July 21 [as the assassination attempt on Hitler and the

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#9 WifldmRierronSAramm "Dgr20.jWi nPanF,BAdW6riéoMol95, *Se'ce* 23 f.

had been destroyed], nodi before the troops were to line up in all haste.
hurriedly removed°.°

A key figure in the conspiracy was *Dr. Hans Bernd* Ciseei "s, who was sent to Switzerland by Canaris and Oster after joining the Abwehr to liaise with England and America.

According to the report of the European representative of the American secret service at the time, Gisevius had been sent to Switzerland by Canaris and Oster as a trusted friend of the latter in order to establish contact with the foreign countries that were to help with the conspiracy against Hitler ...

In the course of my activities in Switzerland I met several other Germans who had the same general attitude as Gisevius. These people thought that a victory of Nazism and the eradication of freedom in Europe and possibly in the whole world would be a far greater catastrophe than a defeat of Germany.

They were even of the opinion that a rebirth of Germany
could only be achieved by defeating Hitler ...^""

Audi confirmed *to Allen Dulles* that the insurers in the German army had ensured that Holland, Belgium and other countries that had to reckon with the German invasion had been warned in good time.

The meetings with Dulles generally took place once or twice a week late at night in Zurich or Bern under the protective cover of the Swiss blackout and served to keep the German resistance movement in constant contact with foreign countries as well as to provide the Americans with the most secret information, which was passed on to Washington by cable.

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50 Wilhelm Ritter von Sdiranim, "Der 20. Juli in Paris", page 227 f.

St Allen Weish Dulles, qVersdlwörung in Deutsdiland', Ziiridi t948, page t74 f.

At the beginning of July 1944, Allen Dulles learned all the details of the plan to assassinate Hitler from the conspirators Gisevius, Strün'k and Wätjen, which he reported to Washington on July 12. And shortly before Staulfenberg's arrest, he was informed that the resisters had declared their willingness to surrender unconditionally to the US and British forces as soon as Hitler was overthrown°°.

One active connection that the resistance had in Sweden was with the Wallenberg family, the well-known Swedish bankers. Markus Wallenberg senior, the head of the family, had been in close contact with Brüning during his time as chancellor and also with Goerdeler. After Wallenberg's death, his son Jakob continued the friendship. Goerdeler gave him his views on the situation in Germany and shared his plan for the overthrow of the National Socialist regime.

In November 1941, Goerdeler told the Swedes about the German defeat at the gates of Moscow.

In November t941 and April 1942, Goerdeler came back to Sto&holm and suggested to the Wallenbergs that they get in touch with Churdiill, with whom Goerdeler had already been in contact before the war began. He wanted the Allies t o agree to peace from the outset if he and his co-conspirators succeeded in making Hitler a prisoner and overthrowing his government. The Wallenbergs, who had very close ties to the British, categorically told Goerdeler that there would be no advance negotiations.

Goerdeler was back in Stockholm in February 1943 and May 1943. He knew that Marc Wallenberg was in London and again asked him to g e t in touch with Churchill. Goerdeler was asked to draw u p a memorandum containing all the points that the new government was prepared to accept, such as the punishment of war criminals, compensation for war crimes, and the compensation of war victims.

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52 Allen Welsb Dulles, "Ver-&wörung in Deutsdiland", page 189.

sdiäden, disarmament, democracy, etc., which he gave audi with all de- tnits. In it, Goerdeler wiins'Iite that, in view of the national conflict, the Allies should stop bombing German cities in order to show the German people their friendly attitude towards the new government. He also asked that Berlin and Leipzig be sealed off as much as possible during the next few days, as the central organization of the resistance movement would be based there.

In August 1943, Goerdeler had several meetings with Wallenberg.
talks in Berlin. He informed the Swede that all preparations for a state strike in September were now complete and that it was intended to send a certain Fabian von Sdilabrendorff to Stockholm immediately. Wallenberg agreed to this and wanted to inform the Allies, as soon as the coup had been brought about, that a German was in Stmkholm as a representative of the new government, but not to negotiate - as Dulles explained in his letter - but only to obtain advice from the Allies on what the new government should now do to bring about peace.

There were no further contacts with Wallenberg to report on possible assassination plots, until the connection ended on July 20 with the arrest and execution of Goerdelen and most of his associates. Dulles commented: qFrom Sweden, as well as from Switzerland and even from Spain, Turkey and the Vatican, the conspirators had to learn that they could not rely on any promises from the Allies. That they had to act, if they were prepared to do so, without being able to talk about better peace conditions, but only out of the unconditional obligation to keep the peace.

to clean up their own house°°°.'

The rebuff that the conspirators received for their sabotage of their own criminality was lowly but more than just.

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53 Allen Welsä Dulles, "Versdiwörung in Denn&land', p. 193 f.

The news of their betrayal had been obtained from their friends in the enemy camp.

The stream of news flowed only in the direction from Germany to the enemy abroad. country to the enemy abroad. Before the Second World War, there was hardly a warring nation that was supplied with political and military news from the enemy camp in such an uninterrupted manner as the Allied opponents in East and West. The conspirators were solely concerned with the overthrow of Hitler's regime. They were only interested in the intentions of the enemy abroad insofar as these could be conducive to their plans for overthrow. For their British and American interlocutors, the German conspirators were only of interest as a source of information, which they exploited to the benefit of their governments and peoples.

The then Chief of Staff of the Army, Colonel General *Franz Halder*, who belonged to the conspiracy but insisted on the dishonorable treason, made a clear statement after the war about treason, betrayal of the country and sabotage of his own warfare, which Peter Bor reproduces in his sdirift conversation with Halder. It reads:

"It is said that Confucius began his work with the 'riclitization of concepts' at a time nidits nadis to ours. For us, this means that we should not avoid the complex of treason and treachery, but rather address it and ask what it really means. Treason, the fight against a particular regime, in the ranks and with the means of one's own people, in order to help this people, in order to help the fatherland, was not considered to be a noble cause in times that were still bound to legitimacy. Accordingly, it was not punished with imprisonment or jail, but with imprisonment.

Treason, which fights the existing regime by involving the enemy, is different - it must essentially be directed against the most legitimate thing a person has, against his own people. Weld's deplorable state of mental confusion must have dictated that German men, in their hatred of the tyrant, would turn

could talk about serving the fatherland by joining forces with the enemy, by betraying military secrets! In their zeal and blindness, they overlook the fact that the enemy takes advantage of betrayal, but has always betrayed the traitor. How could the betrayal not be even greater among those who have been betrayed, among their own countrymen? ... You have to think of this when you hear someone boasting after the catastrophe that they had passed the military information to the enemy. The transmission of an attack stariine, for example, to the enemy is, needless to say, of no use. Because the attack will be carried out according to plan. However, if the enemy has been underridden and is therefore prepared, thousands of his own soldiers who leave their positions and advance on orders will pay with their lives for this lack of conscience

Sabotage on the Eastern Front

We know from two officers who were deployed on the Eastern Front in the staff of Army Group Center that they were capable of sabotaging the German war effort by any means necessary. They were the 1st General Staff officer Major General Henning von TresAow and the orderly officer Lieutenant J<6iun *von Sd:il0bTenndorff,* both of whom were the most active members of the July 20 conspiracy. of July 20.

In his report "Officers against Hitler", von Sdilabrenndorff expressed his commitment to their sabotage with cynical candor, writing: "Our most urgent task was to prevent Hitler's success under all circumstances and by all means, even at the cost of a severe defeat of the Third Reich."

In his report, which he had published in Züri'f' in 1946 by the German-American Gero von Gaevernitz, during the war an employee of the already quoted European representative of the American secret service Allen Welsh Dulles in Switzerland, Schlabrenndorfi gives an exhaustive insight into the preparations for assassination attempts on Hitler and for the overthrow, whereby he does not forget

54 Fabian von Schlabrendorff, 'Officiere gegen Hitler', Zurich 1946, page 47.

to show off his acts of treason in addition to his sabotage audi
his acts of treason.

The fact that he was appointed as a judge to the Federal Court of Justice, the highest German court, after the war, as a lawyer who had been charged with treason, is certainly something that should have been expected of another nation.

Von Sd'labrendorff now reports that he traveled to England shortly before the outbreak of war to seek out Lord Lloyd, to whom he had access thanks to a new connection spun by the conspiracy. 'I was able to inform him', he reported verbatim, 'that the outbreak of war was imminent and was to be initiated by an attack on Poland, whatever mediation proposals might be made. He was also able to tell him that the British efforts to win over Russia would be thwarted because the signing of a treaty between Hitler and Stalin was imminent. Hitler wanted to keep his back clear through this treaty°5."

Lord Lloyd asked him to pass on both messages to Lord Halifax, the British Foreign Secretary at the time, which Sdilabrendorff had no objections to. At the same time, he had a glittering meeting with Winston Churchill at his country estate south of London.

When he returned to Germany in the summer of t939, he met Colonel Henning von Trcsckow, who, according to him, was one of the most capable general staff officers,

qWe had a long and detailed conversation. It ended with the joint statement that duty and honor demanded that we do everything possible to bring down Hitler and National Socialism at the first opportunity and thus save Germany and Europe from the danger of barbarism^."

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55 Fabi "n von Schlabrendorff, Of6ziere gegen Hitler", Züri':h, 1st edition, p. 33.
56 Fabian von Schlabrendorff, "Officers against Hitler", page 33.

One such opportunity to overthrow *Hitler* was already available before the Western campaign, when General von Hammerstein was given supreme command of an army on the Rhine. Von Hammerstein, an outspoken opponent of the national socialist regime and known in insider circles as the 'Red General', had been dismissed in 1934 at Hitler's instigation because cf was suspicious of his close ties to the Marxist trade unions. The plan of the conspiracy was to induce Hitler to visit the army of Hammerstein in order to document the military strength of the Third Reich on the Rhine during the campaign against Poland. Gerieraloberst von Hammerstein was determined to arrest and overthrow Hitler on this occasion.

Sdilabrendoifi took it upon himself to inform the British of Hammerstein's plan. September 3, 1939, when the British declaration of war had broken out the hostilities between England and Demand, he took it upon himself to inform the British of Hammerstein's plan. Although the British embassy in Berlin had already been evacuated, he managed to capture the first embassy councilor George Ogilvy Forbes, whom he knew well, at the Hotel 'Adlon', Unter den Linden, between one and two o'clock in the morning and get rid of his traitorous mission.

This meant that the expectations cherished by informed British circles and the German press were soon to give way to great disappointment. A few days later, Hitler, who was known to have a keen sense of personal danger, canceled his promised visit to Ham- memein's army and ordered Hammerstein's retirement.

At the beginning of l94t, Tres&ow, who had meanwhile become the first general staff officer of Army Group Center on the Eastern Front, obtained the transfer of Sdilabrendorlf to his staff as orderly officer, which ensured the daily cohesion of these two friends until Tres&ow's death.

and Lyon was carried by the one idea of leaving no means untried to bring down Hitler and his system^".

This declaration already demonstrates the sabotage of these conspirators and their co-conspirators in the staff of Army Group Mirte, which consisted of subordinating the front service to their plans for overthrow and assassination from the beginning of the Russian campaign until July 20, 1944, and grossly violating their soldierly duty as general staff officers of the front.

A military leader is doomed to failure without the full commitment of his staff officers Ia, Ib, Ic, etc., who are responsible for tactical combat operations, f o r supplying the troops with weapons, ammunition, clothing, rations and much more. And when such sabotage was carried out by staff officers in Army Group Center on the Eastern Front, in which operational plans and movements crucial to the war were constantly betrayed to the enemy, the end could only be defeat.

Nadi Sdilabrendorff's characterization von Tres':kow had the special gift of imposing his spirit on the environment. pHe used his entire personality for the political struggle and was one of the first in the history of the German resistance movement.

Assuming that the first prerequisite for a successful campaign against Hitler w a s
gung.«
to put the right men in the right places, Tres'kow endeavored to place qofficers with a decent attitude, an anti-socialist stance and with the power of decommissioning in key positions within his sphere of influence, which primarily extended to Army Group Center. Only then would the conditions for action be created® '.

This is how the counts Hans von Hardenberg
Hardenberg and Heinridi von Lehndorff Generalfeldniarsd all

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57 Fabian ron Sdilabrendorfi, "Ofbziere vs. **Hitler«, Seite 43.**
58 Fabian von Sdilabrendorfi, .offinierr against **Hitler«, Seite 46.**

von Bo&, who was commander-in-chief of Army Group Center at the beginning of the Russian campaign, as adjutants with the task of influencing him in the spirit of the conspiracy. However, the adjutants were unsuccessful.

After the German army suffered its first setbacks in the battle for Moscow and the Yers':hwörung believed to be experiencing the first signs of the coming defeat, Tm-
'kow considered it appropriate to speak to the commander-in-chief himself and to describe Hitler as the sole culprit for the situation that had arisen. But Bo& didn't let Tres&ow finish speaking and he left the room running and trembling with anger: 'I will not tolerate the Führer being attacked. I& will stand in front of the Führer and defend him against anyone who tries to attack him.

The following staff officers were recruited for Trestkow's circle of inspectors:

Colonel Berndt von Kleist, who, like Henning von Trm&ow, came from the Prussian First Guards Regiment of Foot and, in the words of Sdilabrendorff, liked to have a character of great clarity ... An outstanding military B1i& enabled him to predict events of which others had hardly any idea. His tireless diligence contributed to making him indispensable at his post".

General Freiherr Rudolf von Gersdorff. qHe was equipped with a bright, sharp mind. Above all, he was characterized by an unparalleled perceptive faculty.'

Colonel Sdiulze-Büttger. Audi was a personality. He surpassed most of his age in operational ability. He had been adjutant to Colonel General Betk for several years when the latter held the post of Chief of the General Staff.

Lieutenant Aleaander von Voß, second in command of the Durd'sduiitt l'e bt ... The 20th of July and its aftermath caused him to end his life'.

Major Ulri& von Oertzen, 'who knew like no other how to organize and, guided by iron diligence, to bring order to the greatest confusion with an intellect far above the average'.

Captain Eggert, , who stood out for his calmness and consistency.

Oberleuuiant Hans Albrecht von Boddien. 'His knowledge of human nature and his never-failing instinct for the things of human life, which can only be handled with tact and sensitivity, was second to none.

Von Sdilabrendorff m a d e every e f f o r t to maintain constant contact with the resistance circle in the homeland beer and in Berlin and kept them up to date with repeated flights from Russia to Berlin. He briefed General Oster on the military situation in Russia and the political situation in the frontline army, while Oster informed him about the homeland and the political situation in the world. It goes without saying that the State Secretary of the Foreign Office, Freiherr von Weizsäcker, was often called upon to receive political information from the State Secretary, who gave a detailed account of the military situation.

In addition, he maintained contact with our intermediary living in Berlin, through whom we were in contact with England°°°'.

Sdilabrendorff learned from Oster that the commander-in-chief in the West, General Field Marshal von Witzleben, was planning to lead a military campaign against Hitler from France. However, to the great chagrin of Tres'kow and Sd'labrendorff, support for this plan from the army in the east could not be assured, as neither the commander-in-chief of Army Group Center nor the commanders-in-chief of the other army groups could be won over to the cause.

S9 Fabian ron Sdilabrendorf, "Offiziere gegea Hitler', Seicr 52 if.

No support was to be expected from the member of the resistance Generalstabsdief Hal- der. Lieutenant-Colonel von Voß, who had Witzleben sounded out by Halder, gave the oath that the Chief of the General Staff was in agreement with everything for his person, but that he himself could do nothing, as he could not rely on Brau- diitsdi.

Unfortunately, this plan fell through because Witzleben wanted to undergo an operation before the plan could be carried out and, while he was in hospital, was cut off by Hitler's orders.

The head of the military economics and armaments office, General Georg Thomas, a member of the resistance since 1938, supported the plans of the Versdiwörurig from a military economics and armaments point of view. In the late summer of 1941, he visited two army groups on the Eastern Front and explained to the two chiefs of the general staff, General von Sodenstern and General von Greifenberg, that it was absolutely necessary to end the war as soon as possible. Both generals were allegedly unsympathetic to General Thomas's ideas, but had no influence on their commanders-in-chief.

Accordingly, the disintegration of the Eastern Front on the part of the conspiracy was already underway in the first phase of the Rufiland campaign. In addition to General Thomas audi, the General Quartermaster of the Army, General of Artillery Eduard Wagner, and the Chief of the General Army Office, General Friedri& Olbridit, were also in the spotlight.

Colonel General *Heinz Guderian*, who with Panzer Group 2, consisting of three armoured corps, five armoured divisions, three modernized infantry divisions, an infantry regiment, a cavalry division, an anti-aircraft regiment and a group of close combat aircraft on 5. The army, which had advanced to the Tula-Kashira area (about a hundred kilometers south of Moscow) on November 5, 1941, requested winter clothing in various phases of the advance.

alu of the nadit from 6 to Z. October', according to Guderian in his memoirs, the first snow of this winter fell. If it didn't stay for a long time, it turned the paths into bottomless dykes in the usual short time, on which our vehicles could only move at a slow pace and with excessive wear and tear. We repeated our earlier request for winter clothing, but were only told that it would be allocated in good time and that we should refrain from unnecessary reminders. I then sent several more reminders, but did not see them arrive at the front that year.

qThe Commanding General of the XXXVIII. A.K., Heiririci, sudite midi (on October 29] and described the dire supply situation of his troops, who, among other things, had not been able to receive bread since October 20.'

qThe movements of the troops were facilitated by the rust that set in during the period from November 3 to 4, but this was offset by the frostbite from which the troops began to suffer ..."

On November 6, I flew to the front, my impressions of this flight are reflected in the letter below: 'For the troops it is a torture and for the cause a great pity, because the enemy is gaining time and we are getting deeper and deeper into winter with our plans. So I'm in the mood to talk. The best of wills falter in the face of the elements. The unique opportunity to lead a great Sdilag is slipping away and I don't know if it will ever return. God only knows how it will be mod. We must hope and not lose heart, but it is a tough challenge at the moment …' "

pOn the morning of November 14, I visited the 167th I.D. and spoke with a number of officers and soldiers. The supplies for the troops were excellent. There was a lack of dress shirts, boot covers, seams and, above all, pants. A large proportion of the men walked in drill pants, and that at 22 degrees Celsius! Stockings and boots

Socks and boots1 were urgently needed. At lunchtime at the 112th I.D. the picture was the same. Our men had put on Russian coats and fur hats and could only be recognized as German soldiers by their insignia. Whatever clothing supplies the tank army had were immediately sent to the front. However, it was only a drop in the bucket.

Eberbad had about nodi 50 tanks in its proud brigade. The number of tanks of three divisions should have been 600. The icy weather caused great difficulties, as the chain tunnels had not yet arrived. As a result of the cold, the optics fogged up; the ointment to prevent this had just not arrived. The tank engines had to b e started by lighting fires under the hulls. Some of the fuel froze and the fuel became thick. And these troops lacked winter clothing and glysantin°°.'

'The icy cold, the miserable accommodation, the inadequate clothing, the high losses of men and material, the miserable lack of fuel make warfare a torture, and the longer I go on, the more I am depressed by the enormous burden of responsibility which, despite all the sweet words, no one can take away from me.

... Now, if the combat situation permits, I want to go to Army Group [Center] on Sunday to give a talk on shaping the near future, about which there is no word. I don't know how people will think about it, but I don't know how we are supposed to be back in order by next spring …' (from a letter dated 21. 11. 1941)".

How the people of Army Group Center, who were responsible for the entire nadi- sdiublidi, the members of the conspiracy

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60 Heinz Guderian, pErinnerungen eines Soldaten', Heidelberg 1950, page 212, 222 f. and zzs.

61 Heinz Guderian, "Erinnerungen einer SOldAten", page 228.

Guderian could not have known when he wrote his memoirs that the generals around Tres&ow were planning everything. If these gentlemen had thought of the Na&s&ub for the front troops instead of the fall of Hitler, they would certainly have found ways and means, with the help of their friends and acquaintances in the OKH and OKW, to at least supply the fighting troops with winter clothing, be it through special operations with motor vehicle columns or with air transports.The abnormal Russian cold, according to Guderian's report (p. 242), caused twice as many casualties from frostbite as from enemy fire.

On December 20, l94J, Guderian flew to the command h e a d q u a r t e r s in Rastenburg, where he was received by Hitler in the presence of Keitel, Sduriundt and several other officers. After questions about the operational situation had been discussed, Hitler and Guderian had the following argument about the more than inadequate supply of the troops:

I [Guderian]: 'Of course it is my duty to alleviate the suffering of my soldiers as best I can. But that is sd who, because the men still have no winter clothing and most of the infantry are walking around in drill pants. Boots, underwear, hand shoes and heads are either missing completely or are in dismal condition.

Hitler r o a r e d : 'That's nt&t true. The General Quarters

'The master has told me that the winter clothing has been allocated. Idi: 'Freilidi is assigned it, but it hasn't arrived yet. Idi followed her route closely. She is now at the station in Warsdiau and hasn't been able to get anywhere from there since Vienna due to a lack of locomotives and blockage of the tracks. Our requests in September and October were brusquely rejected,

and now it is too late.

The Quartermaster General was called in and had to confirm my statement. Goebbel's clothing campaign at Christmas 1941 was the result of this spying. Its results were no longer in the hands of the soldiers in the winter of 1941/42."

It will never be fully clarified whether it was only a complete misunderstanding of the enemy and the Landdiaft or not deliberate sabotage that led to the catastrophic clothing situation of the German troops on the eastern front in the winter of 1941. In any case, the lack of supplies of winter clothing for the soldiers was a decisive factor in the war and severely hampered German plans. The main reason was probably that it was assumed that the eastern campaign would be over by the beginning of winter. Colonel General *Halder,* Chief of the General Staff, wrote in his diary on the twelfth day of the Russian campaign: 'It is probably not too much to say that the war against Ruhland will be won within 14 days.

Colonel General *Dr.* Ute tdu/ic states: "We were filled with bitterness and resentment that no provision had been made for the winter. The assessment of the situation by the Chief of the General Staff of the Army, General Halder, contributed to this. In his entry in the diary of the Army High Command in July **1941**, he said that it was becoming increasingly clear that his prophecy that the war would be over in a few months was false. Any company commander at the front would have taught him **better*'.**

In a letter dated December 8, t94l Guderian sdwieb:

We are faced with the sad fact that the upper command has overstretched the bow, did not want to believe the reports about the declining fighting strength of the troops, constantly made new demands, did not make provisions for the harsh winter season and was now surprised by the Russian cold of -3ö degrees. The strength of the troops was no longer sufficient to carry out the attack on Moscow victoriously, and so, on the evening of December 5, I had to decide with all my heart to abandon the battle, which had become hopeless, and to return to a previously selected, relatively short line, which I hoped would be successful with the rest of my strength.

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62 Franz Halder, pKriegstagebu& II I', Stuttgart 1964, page 38.

63 Lotlur Rendulic, "Sold t in stürzendm Rer&en", Mündien l96S, page 278.

to be able to hold nodi ... The losses, especially in terms of sickness and frostbite, were enormous, and even if hopefully some of these casualties will return to the troops after some rest, this is not to be desired at the moment. The loss of vehicles and equipment due to frost damage exceeds all expectations ...

I would not have believed myself that a war situation that was too brilliant could be so verbalized in two months ..... If the decision had been taken in good time to disband the troops and deploy them for the winter in a suitable line for defense and housing, nothing dangerous could have happened. So everything is a question mark for months ... It's not about me, but about much more, about our Germany, and I'm afraid of that".

The reports of Colonel General Guderian give an idea of the devastating effect of the failure of pßi&t- forgotten staff officers in his command oath alone due to the lack of winter clothing.

In the fall of 1943, the author himself was a nadisdiub officer in a mou'rized infantry division and has seen from his own experience that one can master things with prudence, determination and, above all, some talent for improvisation, even under the most adverse conditions, if the will is there. This will was certainly lacking in the staff of Army Group Center at the time, otherwise it would have been possible to get the winter clothing, which according to Guderian's remark to Hitler was blocked in Warsaw, to the front through special missions, especially since, according to Sd'labrendorff's report to Army Group Center, only outstanding general staff officers with very exceptional skills belonged to the staff.

You can also sabotage by doing nothing, by letting things run their course. These omissions are the least of the sabotage of which the failures in certain staffs on the eastern front and in the upper echelons of the army are guilty.

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64 Heinz Guderian, "Memoirs of a Soldier", p. 236 f.

command of the army and the OKW were g u i l t y of. *David* frping shows what a single man can achieve if he has the will to do so using the example of Generalfeldmarsd alle Erhard Milch, Inspector General of the Luftwaffe, about whom he writes in his book 'Die Tragödie der Luftwaffe'. his book 'The Tragedy of the Luftwaffe':

pNow the harsh winter of 1941/42 had arrived in the east and brought additional losses to the army. Milch's own efforts in March 1941 had spared the Luftwaffe the worst - airmen and ground personnel were not very well equipped for the Russian winter. But like the army, the air force had also b e e n hit by a catastrophe: only 15 percent of the 100,000 air force vehicles in the East were in working order at the beginning of January t942. The cold-start procedure for airplanes and motor vehicles invented by Luftwalfen engineers had not caught on, as the army, SS and the Luftwaffe had all ignored this simple procedure for combustion engines (dilution with a little gasoline), although the Luftwaffe itself had demonstrated it to Hitler in Redilin in 1939.

Since the Redilin demonstration, the army had twice relied on the
He had been advised of the cold start method, but had repeatedly rejected it until November 10, and only then was this method approved by the OKH and OKW. When he heard of this delayed order, Milch exploded: 'If an order goes out from an authority about the winter start on November 10, then it takes ad t vodien until it is around in Deutsdiland. Now imagine that on the eastern front!

Unfortunately, the Luftwaffe, as he jent eduhr, had told the army in its motor vehicle reports. 'If our people want to rely on the army, then I can feel sorry for them,' said Mil& bitterly.

He ordered an investigation and found out that the Quartermaster General [Versdiwörer Wagner] had only published his own 'Instruction Sheet for the Operation of Motor Vehicles in Winter' on October 10, 1944, and that the following print had been published for a month.

'Motor vehicles in winter' was published a month later. Supplements on special measures followed in January and February 1942.

The army's losses of weapons and equipment on the eastern front were immense in the winter."

But what was the situation on the front in front of Moscow at the beginning of December 1941?

kau? Let Colonel General Guderian speak again: qAgainst the threat from the flank and rear and the immobilization caused by the abnormal cold.

the abnormal cold caused by the threat to the flank and rear and the immobility of the troops, it was decided in the nadit from December 5 to 6 for the first time in this war to break off the attack, an isolated attack, and to take back the far advanced parts into the general line of the upper Don-Sdiat-Upa for defense. No resolution of the war up to that point had been as pleasing to me as this one. The agreement of the Ansidites with my chief of staff, Liebenstein, and with the oldest commanding general, Frhr. von Geyr, did not help ...

The situation was not only so serious for my 2nd Panzer Army. In the same period from December 5 to 6, the 4th Panzer Army under Hoepner and the 3rd under Reinhardt, which had reached within 35 km of the Kremlin to the north of Moscow, had to cease the attack because they lacked the strength to reach the major objective, which was only a short distance away. With the 9th Army, the Russians even went on the attack on both sides of Kalinin.

Our attack on Moscow had failed. All the sacrifices and efforts of the brave troops h a d been in vain. We had suffered a disastrous defeat, which in most cases had a disastrous effect due to the rigidity of the Supreme Command, because the men of the OKW and OKH in distant East Prussia, despite all the reports, had no idea of the true situation of their troops.

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65 David Irving, "Die Tragödie der Deumhen Luftwa$c', Verlag Ulliteia GmbH, FrankfurtfMain t9Z0, page 212.

in the Winter War. This ignorance led to ever new challenges ...

Dodi back to Tula. In the following days, the XXIV Panzer Corps succeeded in disengaging from the enemy as planned, while strong pressure from Kashira affected the LI II.A.K. and the
XXIXVII Panzer Corps in the night from December 7 to 8 Midlailow was destroyed by Russian attacks with considerable losses of the t0. (mot.) I.D. was lost. On our right, the 2nd Army lost)e1ez that day; the enemy advanced on Liwny and reinforced itself in front of Yefremov ...

On December 9, the enemy extended its success at Liwny
in the area of the 2nd Army and captured parts of the 45th I.D. The LXXXVII Panzer Corps of the Triein Army withdrew to the southwest; the XXIV Army r e p e l l e d Russian attacks from Tula ...

On December 10, Russian outposts were observed near Kastornaya and Yelets. In the 2nd Army, the enemy extended its incursion and overran the Liwny-Tsdiernova peninsula ... On December 11, the corps of our Red Nadibarn p u s h e d further west. Yefremov was threatened and was abandoned on D e c e m b e r 12 ...

On December 13, the retrograde movements of the 2nd Army continued. The 2nd Panzer Army's intention to hold the Stalino-Gorsk-Sdiat-Upa line could not be realized under these circumstances, especially since the 112th I.D. no longer possessed the necessary resistance force to withstand the attack by fresh Russian forces. . .°®°

Although the commander-in-chief of the army von Brand its& and his general staff chief Halder were convinced that they had crushed the Red Army in the first large-scale defensive clashes, we lost the battle for Moscow. This was possible because our front was not only exposed to the Siberian cold of the Russian winter as a result of

66 Heine Guderian's'Memoirs of a Soldier', page 235 f.

the Siberian winter as a result of criminal negligence and deliberate sabotage.

When the traitor Dr. Rid'ard Sorge from the German embassy in Tokyo reported to Moscow and Stalin was informed that the Japanese would not attack in the Far East, the disaster was total. The exhausted, half-frozen German soldiers were met by the well-rested, well-equipped divisions of the Soviet army of the Far East, which were thrown onto the Russian western front in express transports. Eridi Kern describes the details of this momentous betrayal in detail in his documentary "Verrat an Deutsdiland" and "So wurde Deutsdiland verraten".

In November J941, Generalfeldmarsdiall von Kluge took over
took over the supreme command of Army Group Center in place of Bob, an appointment that appealed to the Versddiwörer because Kluge was a more accessible nature in terms of the Versdtwöiung than Bo&.

Tresckow fought a tough and protracted battle for the new commander-in-chief to win him over to the conspiracy. No one can know this better than Schlabrendorlf, who reports: 'Anyone who has seen at close quarters with what a face and with what intensity Tresckow wrestled for Kluge, can sympathize with the sd were of the two and a half J- *- long battle.
because".

Here we are talking about a battle to win over the commander-in-chief for the conspiracy, as if there had been no other battle during the two and a half years mentioned in the middle section!

The fact that the commander-in-chief of Kluge tolerated the defeatist activities of the Hodi and national traitors in his staff for months and years, which were certainly not unknown to him, is his part in this guilt. He must have known that a troop led by pessimistic and treacherous staff officers could not be successful in the long run.

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67 Fabian von Sdilabrendor4, "Offiziere gegen Hitler", page 61.

and should never have allowed those disruptive forces like his predecessor von Body to arise in the first place.

S&labrendorff goes on to describe the extent of Kluge's influence by Tres&ow:

qIn the long run, Kluge succumbed to his influence. Freilidi only succumbed to his influence. It was not without mockery that he often called Tresckow the clockmaker who wound up Kluge's 'clock' in the morning so that it ran and ran throughout the day. But only Tresckow was able to wind this 'clock' again when it had run out. Unfortunately, it ran out quite often. It's hard to imagine what turn things would have taken if Tresckow had been with Kluge at the decisive hour of the Staatsstreid on July 20, t944. He would probably have succeeded in forcing Kluge onto the wrong track and holding him there°.

Tres'kow managed to get Kluge to agree to receive the civilian head of the resistance circle, Goerdeler, at his headquarters on the eastern front for a meeting.

Sdilabrendorff was once again in Berlin to deepen his previous contacts with men of the resistance and to establish new ones. Through Easter he m e t with Reicbsgeriditsrat von Dohnanjri in the Canaris office, with Baron von Guttenberg, with Justus Ddlbrüik and through the latter with the brothers Dr. Otto and Hans John, who were all active members of the resistance. Sdilabren- dorff suggested to Dr. Goerdeler that he come to the headquarters of Army Group Centre to talk to Kluge and Tres&ow. Goerdeler agreed immediately, and his friends in the OKW, Canaris and Oster, provided the necessary credentials.

Goerdeler's meeting with Kluge and Tres&ow in Smo& lensk in 1942 was a great success for the Versdiwörer. Nadidem Goerdeler and Tre "kow si& about the further prepara

68 Fabian ron Sdilabrendorf, "Officers against Hitler", page 61.

sdinelly agreed on the further preparations for the state strike, Goerde)er allegedly found a willing ear with Kluge, as Tres&ow had made the necessary preparations with his commander-in-chief.

After this success, Sdilabrendorff saw it as his task to bring Trestkow audi together with Bek. Around the same time, he met General O1bri&t, the head of the General Army Office under the commander of the replacement army, who was prepared to use his official powers within the replacement army to overthrow Hitler. An agreement was reached between Goerdeler-Olbri': t- Tres'kow with the result that Olbricht undertook to make military preparations in Berlin, Vienna, Cologne and Munich in order to wrest the mat from National Socialism as soon as the first attack on Hitler's person had been carried out.

The killing of Hinter was only intended to be the initial spark for the planned be the second step. And the second step had to be the occupation of the most difficult points of the Reidi capital by the military forces. He presented the most important questions to the head of the movement, Colonel General Bak, and received the answers from him. Nad' Sdilabrendorff's report, O1bri&t and Oster were the two conspirators who had drawn up and laid the first serious plans for the seizure of the Mad't within the Reich. At the lcnth meeting between Olbrid t and Tres&ow t942 hacte Olbridit nod adit Wod'en requested to prepare the plan for the occupation of Berlin, Cologne, Mündien and Vienna in cooperation with Oster.

In order to clarify the final preparations for the state conflict, triggered by an assassination attempt on Hitler, a meeting between the conspirators on the Eastern Front and their Berlin friends was scheduled to take place in Smolensk, at the headquarters of Army Group Center, rather than in Berlin as usual. To camouflage this meeting, Admiral Canaris, who of course could not be absent here, organized an official flight from Berlin to Smolensk and travelled there with many members of his staff.

office to a large meeting of the military officers working in the naval service.

The decisive conversation, however, took place in a small room, attended by General von Tresckow, Reichsgerichtsrat von Dohnanyi and the ordinance officer Oberleutnant von Schlabrendorlf. Tresckow informed the Berlin friends of the intention to attempt to assassinate Hitler in the near future, while Dohnanyi reported on the preparations for the state strike in Berlin. Ways and means of mutual understanding were determined and a code was drawn up that was only understandable to those directly involved. Then they parted again to end the late evening with a drink together in a large circle.

Tresckow's assassination plan was to induce Hitler to visit the headquarters of Army Group Center, which was located in a forest camp near Smolensk. Thanks to his acquaintance with Hitler's chief adjutant, General Sdimundt, the Besudi was scheduled for the first few days of March 1943 and, after several cancellations and promises, was finally set f o r March 13, 1943.

The commander of a cavalry regiment set up at the headquarters of Army Group Center, Freiherr von Boeselager, who belonged to the conspiratorial group and could rely on his officers and men's dia- tors, is said to have been determined to eliminate Hitler with his unit. But Kluge was not prepared to allow the assassination on the grounds that neither the German people nor the German soldier would understand such an act at that time. They would have to wait until the unfavorable military developments made it necessary to eliminate Hitler.

For this reason, Tres&ow and Schlabrendorff had decided to carry out an assassination attempt against the will of their commander-in-chief, in the expectation that Kluge would join them after the attack had been completed. The plan was made not to shoot Hitler, but to kill him in his plane using a smuggled-in

Hitler in his airplane with a smuggled-in bomb, thus faking a plane crash and avoiding the psychological disadvantages of an assassination attempt.

The second general staff officer in the staff of Army Group Center, Colonel Freiherr von Gersdorff, inconspicuously procured English explosives. English explosives and detonators had the advantage over the German ones that the detonation was completely silent and could be set to the desired time of explosion. In order to be absolutely sure of the effect of the explosion, two explosive devices were used and transformed into a package for camouflage, which resembled two cognac bottles in shape. And the package had to be sealed in such a way that the detonator could be set off without damaging the packaging.

Hitler arrived with his escort in two aircraft and landed at Smolensk airfield, where he was met by Kluge and Tresckow. The meeting with Hitler took place in the room of General Field Marshal von Kluge, in which the army leaders of the army group took part in addition to Tresckow.

After the meeting, a meal gave von Tresckow the opportunity to ask Colonel Heinz Brandt, Hitler's accompanying officer, if he would do him the favor of taking along a small package with two cognac bottles for Major General Helmuth Stielf, head of the Operations Department in the OKH. Brandt good-naturedly agreed.

After lunch, Hitler, accompanied by Feldman- sd all Kluge and Tresckow, drove to the airfield. Von Schlabrendorff was waiting there with the entire bomb package. After Hitler had unsuspectingly said goodbye to the officers of Army Group Center and turned around to board the plane, von Schlabrendorff activated the detonator and handed the package to Colonel Brandt at Tresckow's suggestion. A few moments later, the plane took off for the flight to East Prussia.

The insurrectionists waited in feverish anticipation, who had their friends in the OKH, especially General Friedridi Olbrid't and

Major General Hans Oster, had been informed of the explosion. The acid bomb was designed and the ignition set in such a way that the firing pin had to be eaten free in about 30 minutes. The machine had to explode in the air.

Soon the half hour had passed and there was no news. After two hours, however, the headquarters in the Wolf's Lair reported that the Führer's plane had landed safely. The dispatchers were faced with a conundrum. Their main concern now was to prevent the discovery of the failed landing. Tresckow immediately called Colonel Brandt, explaining that a mistake had been made and that he did not want to hand over the package. It was clear from Brandt's agreement that the attempted attack had not been discovered.

Pretending to be on a military mission, Schlabrendorff flew to headquarters the next day in a courier plane and exchanged the bomb with Colonel Brandt for a package that actually contained two bottles of cognac. The unsuspecting Brandt returned the bomb to Séhlabrcndorff. On the train to Berlin, Schlabrendorff opened the parcel with a razor blade and found that the acid had leaked out properly, had gnawed the wire and the sealing pin had fallen forward. For some unknown reason, the primer had not ignited and both charges were intact.

Shortly afterwards, Tresdsow learned that on March 21, after the official ceremony in the Berlin Zeughaus, Hitler would be visiting the display of weapons looted from Army Group Mitte on the occasion of Heroes' Memorial Day. Audi Göring, Himmler and Keitel were expected to accompany him. Tresckow immediately contacted the counterintelligence officer of Army Group Center, Rudolf Christoph Baron von Gersdorlf, and asked him to carry out the attack. The insider Gersdorff drove to Berlin, received the rearmed explosives from Sdilabrendorff in a hotel and lurked in front of the armory with a bomb in each pocket. Even before Gersdorfi had the bomb

before Gersdorfi could arm the bombs, he learned that Hitler would not be walking through the exhibition for thirty minutes, but at most for ten. However, the detonator was set so that it would take at least five to ten minutes to explode.

Once again, Tres'kow waited with his watch in his hand at the headquarters of Army Group Center in Smolensk for the explosion, which never happened. When the radio announced Hitler's reappearance at the end of the war, it was clear that it had once again failed.

All these failures could not discourage the resisters, especially as they came to the conclusion that if the attack had succeeded, the implementation of the coup would not have g o n e smoothly, because the interaction between the resistance circle of the frontline army and the replacements did not work as promised.

In order to eradicate this mistake, Tres&ow pretended to be in urgent need of a longer rest as a result of the "exertions and excitement" of the Russian campaign. He was believed and was granted several months' leave of absence. However, he did not take the cure, but went to Neubabelsberg, between Berlin and Potsdam, to stay with his sister, where he stayed for ten full weeks°°°.

Thus we see the extraordinarily capable General Staff officer of Army Group Center spending many decisive days and weeks not at the front, but at home, where he continued to work intensively for the conspiracy. Firstly, it was necessary to carry out the general staff preparatory work for the planned state strike, secondly to clarify the political aims of the state strike, thirdly to influence the field marshals and generals close to the resistance circle and fourthly to prepare a new assassination attempt.

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69 Eberhard **Zeller,** sGeist der Freiheit / Der 20 J. Juli", Miindia 1952, p. 211 If.

70 Fabian von Sdilabrmdorff, .Officers vs. Hitler", **Page** Z8.

In addition, the hatred of Dohnanyi and the co-conspirator Pastor Bonhoeffer meant that time was pressing for a national strike. Audi had to fill a large gap that had arisen around this time as a result of Oster, the previous leader of the resistance movement, having been put out of action.

Oster's successor was found in the person of Colonel Grnf Sd enk von Stauffenberg, who made it his task to make the military preparations for the seizure of Berlin, the military, political and economic center of Germany. Major Ulridi von Oertzen, a member of the staff of Army Group Center, was placed at his disposal as a tres&ow who, after the division of Sdilabrendorff, possessed great aptitude and experience in the field of military operations. And because of this exceptional aptitude, Oertzen was more suitable for the interests of the conspiracy than for those of From qstauffenberg and Orrtzen under the leadership of Tres&ow. days and nights of work, they drew up the plan in the form of orders, which to the occupation of Berlin by military forces on 20 J li.

should"."

Sdilabren- dorff confirms on page t00 of the small book edition of his sdirift that Tres&ow had taken his ten-week vacation in the summer months of 1943, when the sdiladit around Kursk, which was very costly for us, was underway: The basic preparations for the four tasks [as explained above) w e r e practically made in Berlin in the summer months of t943. The deed of July 20 was based on these preparations.

July 20.

The war would undoubtedly have taken a different course on the eastern front had some decisive general staff officers of the army fulfilled their soldierly duty as well as the death-defying soldiers and their brave front-line soldiers. The efforts of the loyal staff officers were recognized in many

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7t Fabian von Sdilabrendorff, 'Officers against Hitler', page 92.

cases were thwarted by the sabotage of their traitorous colleagues.

Hundreds of thousands and hundreds of thousands of interpreted soldiers had to pay for this sabotage with their lives.

The Stalingrad sdlicksalssdilad t is usually presented officially as if the total incompetence of the top leadership had caused this tragedy.

Nadisteheride entries in the war diary of the Wehrmad't leadership staff show that Hitler recognized the danger point in this now war-decisive battle very early on:

g9. September 1942

In Army Group B, the Don front is to be expanded and unified as much as possible; furthermore, reserves are to be drawn from the Sulingrad area behind the Don front and army artillery is to be deployed there, as the Führer is expecting strong enemy attacks against the front of the Italian 8th Army in the coming winter in order to push through to Rostov.

l6. September 1942

In view of the expected enemy attacks against the Italian 8th Army, the Führer orders that the 22nd Panzer Div. and the 113th Inf. Div. of the 6th Army be moved immediately behind the Italian advance°°°.'

There is no doubt that the 6th Army was supplied with tanks, ammunition and fuel from the very beginning. The supply of this army, which was at the focal point of the battle, was in the hands of Colonel i. G. Finckh. He was later executed after being involved in the July 20th conspiracy.

The official entry in the war diary of the Wehrmaditfühungsstab of October 26, 1942 reports on the precautionary measures for the 6th Army: 'The Führer once again expresses his concern about a major Russian attack, perhaps a winter offensive, in the withdrawal of the allied armies across the

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72 Helzriuth Greinor, pDie oberice Wehrmaditiführung", page 409 f.

Don on Rostov. One of the reasons for this concern was the strong enemy movements in this area and the bridge-building over the Don that had been carried out in many places. The Führer ordered the deployment of LuItwaifen field divisions as 'corset bars' in all three allied armies. This would free up the divisions deployed at the front and they could be deployed as reserves behind the front of the allies together with other supplied units.

These instructions were not fulfilled, or only to a limited **extent**. In any case, the **XXXXVIII** Panzer Corps under Lieutenant General Heim stood in reserve behind the Romanians. He had two intact armored divisions at his disposal.

On l9. On November 9th, the Red Army, having made the best artillery preparations, crashed into the 3rd Romanian Army and completely overran the Romanians. They crumbled into the icy steppes. But the Red Army pushed through this gap with twenty-four battle-hardened units. Now the hour had come for Lieutenant General Ferdinand Heim, who had been ordered into readiness for this operation.

The British military historian *William Cr* tig reports on what happened next: "At last the German High Command did something to protect the flanks. The **LXXXVIII** Panzer Corps, which was a good 80 kilometers southwest of the dangerous Russian bridgeheads near Kletskaya and Serafimovitsdi on the Don, received urgent orders to advance into the threatened sector.

Under its commander, Lieutenant General Ferdinand **Heim,** a good friend and former Chief of Staff of Paulus, the **XIXXVII** I. Corps set off to the northeast with rattling tank tracks. But after only a few kilometers, the column came to a halt again because several **tanks** caught fire. Others kept misfiring and eventually came to a complete halt. Medics, who were now sent to check the

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73 Helmuth Greirter, pDie oberste Wehrmaditsführung', Seice 415.

vehicles had sdinell found the cause. While the tanks stood unused behind the front line for a long time, mice had taken up residence in the vehicles and chewed through the insulation of the electrical cables. As a result, the XXIXVIII Corps only rolled into its new location several days late and at breakneck speed. It was severely diminished; only 32 of the 104 tanks of the 22nd Armored Division were operational.

Nobody informed Hitler about the state of the **reserves."**

The situation was becoming increasingly threatening.

XXIXVIII Panzer Corps, William Craig continues: øGeneral Heim advanced only slowly, reaching Blinov without coming into contact with the Russians. Offensi&tlidi Heim was not aware of the situation. He was unable to make contact with the Romanian forces under General Midiael Lascar, who were still offering resistance. Heim withdrew to the south, to Riditung Tsd ier. The field police arrested him on I-fitler's orders and handed him over to a criminal court in Germany. Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel saved his life. He was expelled from the Wehrmadit atis.'

The failure of the Heimsdien Panzerkorps and Hermann Göring's unfulfilled promise to supply the 6th Army from the Lull iäglidi with 500 tons of ammunition and rations were the main German reasons for the Stalingrad tragedy. There is no doubt that Göring took his mouth too full.

In view of the widespread sabotage, it is difficult to believe in the Russian mice that destroyed the insulation of the electrical cables in the German XXIXVIII Panzer Corps.

At the very least, informing the High Command about this grotesque situation is a negligence that is unacceptable in view of the consequences.

Z4 William **Craig, 'The** Sdiładir **around Stalingrad', India 1973, page 140** f.

When the military situation on the eastern and western fronts became increasingly threatening in the summer of 1944, von Tres'3tow sent Lieutenant Colonel von Boeselager to Kluge, who had meanwhile become commander-in-chief in the west, with the order to persuade him to open the front in the west and to fight against Hitler rather than against the British and Americans'°'.

Kluge replied that, although he was Commander-in-Chief West, he was not in any way sidier of his staff and felt so constrained that he could not do anything on his own. He could not arrange for Tresdiow or Sd labrendorfi to be detached to him, as had been proposed.

Schliefilid had taken the initiative to eliminate Hitler on Stauf- fenberg, which led to the assassination attempt of July 20. Tresckow committed suicide on the Eastern Front immediately after July 20, and Schlabrendorff was arrested by a staff officer on August 20, 1944.

When Schlabrendorff was interrogated by the Secret State Police, he also testified about Tresckow, as can be seen from the Kaltenbrunner report of November 2*, 1944*, whereby, in contrast to the descriptions in his pamphlet 'Officers against Hitler', he painted a rather unflattering picture of his friend. So he explained during the interrogation:

qGenerally people sdiimed about von TresAow because they thought he was very ambitious and believed that he wanted to ingratiate himself nad' the top. Personally, I had the feeling that he was a career madman°°."

pLieutenant General Heusinger described Tresdiow as a 'very clever but also ambitious officer' who embodied 'the type of intellectual, in the true sense of the word'. Von Tres':kow is undoubtedly one of the drivers and the 'evil spirit' of

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75 Fabian von SdilabrendorE, "Off£ziere gegen Hitler', page 136.

76 qspicgelbiid einet Versdiwörung", Kaltenbrunner-Bwi&t, Stuttgart t96l, $page 478.

Putsdiist circle. Stauffenberg occasionally referred to Tresckow as his teacher".

Fsd labrendorff witnessed the extraordinary activity that Tresékow developed in the weeks *following* the July 20 attack. As an example of how Tresckow subordinated everything to the plans for the attack, Schlabrendorff mentioned Oertzen's dispatch to Berlin. It took place at the end of June/beginning of July 1944, during the Soviet summer offensive and although Oertzen was urgently needed as la of a corps division ... Tresckow put his own car at his disposal, and Wlabrendorff had to arrange for a Fieseler-Stordi to be brought to Warsaw and for a silo car to Berlin."

The Kaltenbrunner report of t1. September 1944, the Versdiwörer's attempts to establish audi contact with Army Group South are documented. Through the mediation of Baron von Palombini, Goerdeler met with General von Collwitz, who was leading a pan- corps in Army Group South at the time, at the Hotel "Adlon" in Berlin in the fall of 1943. Colonel Wagner, who was acquainted with Baron von Palombini from the Stahlhelm era, was also present at the meeting. Goerdeler briefed von Collwitz in broad strokes on the situation as he saw it, with the intention that von Collwitz would interest General Field Marshal von Stein accordingly. However, von Collwitz was skeptical as to whether this would succeed.

A further attempt was made by transferring the colonel to a new position. i. G. Schultze-Büttger. Sdiultze-Büttger was adjutant to Generaloberst Bek from fall 1935 to fall 1938 and from December 22, 1941 to February 27, 1943 Ia/op. with Army Group Center. Before he went to Army Group South, later Northern Ukraine, as 1st General Staff Officer, he was appointed by Tres&ows durdi Oster

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77 Mirror image of a conspiracy", Kalcenbrunner-Beridit of September 7, 944

78 Sdilabrendorfi's statement of August 28, 1944 in "Spiegelbild einer Versdiwörung", Smte 39s.

to Bek. He was informed by Beck about the overall situation in a way that left no doubt that von Tresckow wanted him to be influenced in a certain direction before he joined Army Group South.

Beck expressly requested that he inform Field Marshal von Manstein of his views on political and military development.

Sd ultze-Büttger, who had talked to Tres'kow i n detail about all the plans in progress at the time, declared himself that "he had been under the influence of Tres'kow".

According to your Kaltenbrunner-Beridit of t8. According to the report from September 1944, General Zeitzler, then Chief of t h e Army General Staff, was the driving force behind von Tresckow's transfer to Army Group South after his aforementioned long leave. There he took over a regiment as commander, where he was again called upon by General Krebs and Colonel General Weiss, who had trained him as a general staff officer and was particularly fond of him, as Chief of the General Staff in Army High Command 2. Here in AOK 2, Tres&ow continued his intrigues.

At the end of January 1944, Colonel Sauerbrudi suffered an injury during a bombing raid while soldering and was assigned to Group I of the AHA (General Army Office) at the instigation of his friend Stauifenberg. Due to his desire to be transferred back to the front troops, he received a new assignment as Ia of the 4th Panxer Division in March t944. He sent Stauffenberg a letter from the front in which he drew his attention to the fact that they had received very poor replacements and that the reason for this was mainly to be found in the diligent training activities of the replacement [army7°].

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79 Kaltenbrunner-Beridii of l8. September 1944 in a mirror image of a vcr-sdiwötung", page 401 ff.

It can be admitted that due to the great losses in the East at that time, the training objective could not be achieved due to a lack of time. But it must also be noted that no well-trained, enthusiastic replacement could be expected from a replacement army whose leading officers, like the Tres&ows in the central sector of the Eastern Front, spent more time and effort preparing for assassinations and subversion than for their actual service to the troops, thus making themselves guilty of sabotage in this sector.

Staufienberg had a position from which he had a precise insight into the military workings of the German army. He was also in a position to exert a not inconsiderable influence on the organization of the replacement army', as Sdilabren- dorfi^ ridnig describes it

In November 1943, Feldmarsdiall Mildi quoted figures that showed that the replacement army for the front would end up in the mentioned li':ht. Irving reports on this:

qOn November 8 [1943], Hitler finally admitted that there was a MUST ratio in the distribution of army personnel between fighting troops and echelons. He ordered the OKW to investigate the actual situation and invited Admiral Dönitz and Göring to Rastenburg on
November 24 to Rastenburg to discuss possibilities for reinforcing the army's fighting troops.

The day before this meeting, Göring asked Mildi to inform him of the details. Mil'h repeated his assertion that of the 8.3 million men in the army, less than two million were actually on the fronts: 'On the eastern front,' he said,
260,000 men of infantry'. If only he were given a free hand, he could muster two million soldiers and lead them to the front units'.

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80 Fabian **von Sddabrendorä, "Officers against** Hider", **page** t03.

81 David Irving, **'The Tragedy** of the German Air Force', **pp. 332 f.**

When the OKW ordered further numerous call-ups to the army in October 1942, Mildt and Irving were in disagreement:

.I believe that nodi is not 20 percent of the infantry at the front, 8O percent is somewhere in the rear.' On another occasion, Mildi guaranteed: 'If you free my hand, I would free a million German soldiers who could all go to the front. I would also be prepared to give 500,000 men to industry as workers ... "

The way in which the need for spare parts for motor vehicles, which was caused by the summer periods and generally poor road conditions in Russia, was replaced on a large scale by sophisticated and targeted sabotage is described by a former spare parts officer, Mr. Oskar *Brendel* from Murnau, who in July 1942 was given the task of bringing the production volume of the domestic motor vehicle industry into line with the spare parts requirements of the Eastern Front.

A survey he carried out of the central spare parts stores (ZEL) revealed that of the pistons, which were among the most important spare parts, size 0 was almost exclusively kept in stock, while the oversizes 2 and 3 were mainly used for the front repair of motor vehicles. Size 0, on the other hand, could only be installed in the new vehicles of the domestic suppliers, where it was missing because it was located in the spare parts stores behind the front.

This deliberate mismanagement led to a large proportion of the pistons of size 0 being diverted from production to the ZEL, which caused a considerable delay in the delivery of new motor vehicles, while the pistons that could not be used were stored in the ZEL and the front repair of the motor vehicles was delayed for weeks, often even months, in the army cold vehicle parks (each army group had at least one such park with a repair workshop) because the required pistons were not available.

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82 David Irving, 'The Tragedy of the German Army', page 247.

pistons of sizes 2 and 3 could not be obtained. As a result, not only did the front lack the trucks that were particularly important, but the vehicles still in use were overburdened, causing further damage.

The rapporteur describes this situation literally as "a sophisticated and deliberate sabotage" and adds: "On the basis of my report, the Sadi employee responsible was only accused of planning. Bendlerstrasse covered for him."

In the spring and summer of 1943, as the quartermaster on duty for the Kempf army detachment, pan- coper group Raus, the gleidie officer noticed that the wagon with the lubricants was missing from almost every second train on the gasoline trains coming from Romania. A detailed investigation revealed that the lubricant wagons usually had to be discarded immediately after the Romanian border because the bearings were running hot. Sand was repeatedly found in the bearings.

This was well-organized sabotage with great effect, because a lack of lubricant, i.e. too little or stretched lubricant, led to premature breakdowns of tanks and vehicles. By deploying train guards and providing replacement wagons at the border stations, the shortage was finally eliminated.

Furthermore, in the summer of 1943, this officer discovered deliberate misdirection of ammunition trains that had already taken place at the home stations. Since it was not possible to stop this sabotage through the so-called official channels, he took remedial action himself by deploying particularly energetic subcontractors who ensured that the ammunition trains, which were mainly loaded with tank ammunition, were forwarded to the front at the home stations.

Where were the army and army group staff officers responsible for supplies in these cases of sabotage? Well, we know from the staff officers of Army Group Center, from the Verséhwörcrn Tresckow, Schlabrendorff and the many others that they worked non-stop for assassinations and the

They certainly did not have time to constantly check on the Rediten because of front-line spare parts deliveries and other nad sdiub services.

In the spring of 1942, complete chaos threatened to break out in the transportation system. The OKW had simply had tens of thousands of coal wagons converted into low-loaders for the transportation of guns and vehicles to the front, as not a single one of the actual low-loaders had been returned; hundreds of locomotives had been damaged in the winter because no precautions had been taken for the extreme cold. When the wagons were unloaded, nobody bothered to send them back. As a result, more than 150,000 wagons were now clogging up the roads behind the eastern front and new, fully loaded freight trains could not make any progress ... In Germany, the crippling coal shortage threatened to bring the armaments factories to a standstill: At least 70,000 coal wagons per day were needed to maintain capacity. In a few weeks, many large factories would grind to a halt.

The only solution that General Gehrke, the OKW transport chief, could offer was to tip the wagons and their loads off the rails to clear the tracks and send the locomotives back to Germany in convoy. This could not be very useful for either Germany or the fighting front.

In this threatening situation, Hitler remembered the two men who had already mastered similar situations. Speer, who had developed and produced a heavy anti-tank gun in just a few weeks, while the Army Ordnance Office had taken months to do so, and Milde, who had saved the situation in southern Norway in 1940 and saved the Luftwaffe from ruin. pHier were the men who, just like idt [Hitler], had used the word

Hitler had them both come to him together with a young railroad operations manager, whom Speer had named to him, and gave them a long lecture on the necessity of overcoming the transport catastrophe.

the need to overcome the transportation catastrophe ... The transit times had to be shortened and unloading had to be accelerated by using prisoners of war. All senseless journeys were to be avoided. Hitler ordered rolling stock to be brought in from the occupied territories: "Here the German interest takes precedence without reservation." Primitive rolling stock and simple locomotives had to be built and the state of repair of existing equipment had to b e improved. In order to achieve all this, he said, he would dismiss Kleinmann as state secretary and replace him with Dr. Gan- zenmüller; Speer and Mil';h were to be given full dictatorial powers over the entire rice transport system ...

pThe war must not be lost because of the transportation issue. It must therefore be solved." Mildi and Speer solved it in a few throws ...

"Much has already been said about the 'great expanse' of Russian space," Mildi mocked, "but these are the distances!" He ordered ZO,000 wagons to be made available daily for coal transportation before any more wagons were given to the Wehrmacht. He noted that the OKW had stockpiled thousands of railroad wagons in order to be able to transport troops across the Reich in the event of an Allied invasion. "That could happen in a year," he admitted ... "But the coal needed to save Siemens or AEG from being shut down today is not being transported." After a discussion with Dr. Ganzenmüller and Speer, Mildi announced to his staff: "So far they've been arguing about 400 wagons; yesterday we ordered SO 000 wagons^.'

A note in Goebbels' diary reads: "The Führer has awarded Dorpmüller and Ganzenmüller the Knight's Cross of the War Merit Cross - Dorpmüller for his failure, Ganzenmüller for his extraordinary achievements, which at certain times were directly decisive for the war."

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83 David Irving, "Tragedy of the German Air Force", page 226 f.

Vergeblich versuchten die Reichsbehörden immer wieder, die Bevölkerung vor Spionen und Saboteuren zu warnen.

Mit dem Heer der Fremdarbeiter aus allen Teilen Europas, meist brave Arbeiter, schmuggelten die alliierten Sabotagezentralen in London und Moskau bestausgerüstete und geschulte Saboteure nach Deutschland.

There were many skilled saboteurs, especially among the Osiars. As they w e r e almost exclusively employed in the armaments industry, they had dangerous opportunities to for sabotage.

Plans for military sabotage were carefully drawn up for the individual countries in London, as this plan from April 16, J943 d e m o n s t r a t e s .

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Belgique.

On September 7, t942, Mil& Hitler reported on the work of Central Planning in the Führer's headquarters in Winniza, not failing to chalk up some unpleasant truths to the sdilafmützen or saboteurs in the OKW or OKH. pHe complained that enormous sums were being spent on armaments and that almost 40 percent of the money was being wasted.

When he returned to Berlin, he said angrily to his colleagues: 'Whether it is impossible to bury a glass or a pot of cod is completely irrelevant to these people (he meant the OKW). They don't care at all if thousands of families have to code in B1edibü&- sen. But they themselves must have everything: ten million razors are produced for the Wehrma&t every year and twenty to thirty million Zalin brushes! All in all, we only have half as many soldiers! Twenty to thirty million combs, the same number of hairbrushes and so on. But do you think the population can buy combs or hairbrushes today? The military alone cannot win the **war**, only the entire German people can... When the (responsible officers of the OKW) get their orders from the Führer, they don't carry them out, they do what suits them and the result is this mess. These are the latest nadiridites that I report to you from the Führer's headquarters

The manifold failures of parts of the OKH and OKW in supplying the front can certainly not be explained by our lack of experience. Not at all, because in the high military offices and departments there were generals with first-class qualifications, for the most part coupled with experience from the First World War. Unfortunately, however, too many of them belonged to the conspiracy, who did not give their best because they did not want a German victory.

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84 David lreing, "Die **Tragödie** 'ter Deumhen **Luitwa&e", page** 238.

The following overview is intended to show in which offices and departments of our military leadership insiders were active.

Canaris, Wilhelm, Admiral, Head of the Foreign Office/Abwehr OKW Oster, Hans, Major General, Chief of Staff to Admiral Canaris and Head of Department III in the Office Abroad/Abwehr OKW

Hansen, Georg, Colonel (retired), Head of Foreign Department in the Office of Admiral Canaris OKW

Admiral Canaris

Großcurtb, Helmuth, Colonel (retired), Head of Department II in the Office of Admiral Canaris OKW

Admiral Canaris

Dohnanyi, Hans von, Reidisgeri&tsrat, in office in Dept. 111 of Admiral Canaris OKW

Thiele, Fritz, Lieutenant General, Chief of the Na'óri&tenwesen OKW

Thomas, Georg, General, Head of the Military Economic and Armaments Office Armaments Office OKW

Meiéhssner, Joachim, Colonel i. G., Head of Organ Dept. WFSt. (Wehrmaditführungsstab) OKW

Klamroth, Johann-Georg, Major d. R., WFSt. OKW

Halder, Franz, Colonel General, Chief of the Army General Staff OKH Heusinger, Adolf, General, Chief of the Operations Department of the Army OKH

Stieff, Hellmuth, Major General, Chief of the Organizational Department of the Army OKM

Klamroth, Bernhard, Colonel i. G., Organizational Department of the Army OKH

Lindemann, Fritz, General d. Art. at the General Staff Department of the Army OKH

Wagner, Eduard, General d. Art., Quartermaster General of the Army

Count von Stauffenberg, Claus, Colonel (retired), BdE Chief of Staff OKH

Klatising, Friedridi-Karl, Captain, Adjutant to Count von Stauffenberg

Haeflen, Werner Albred t von, retired senior libelant, OKH

Orderly officer with the BdE

KH

OKH

Fellgiebel, Erich, General of the Nadiriditentruppe OKH
Gehlen, Reinhard, Colonel i. G., from t. 4. 1942 Abt.-Ltr. Foreign Armies East, previously Head of Group East in the Operations Department of the Army OKH
Frhr. von Roenne, Alexis, Colonel (retired), Group Leader of the Foreign Armies East Division OKH
Olbricht, Friedrich, General d. Inf., Chief of the AHA (General Army Office) OKH
Wagner, Siegfried, Colonel, Chief of Department AHA OKH
Merz von Quirnheim, Albred t, Colonel i. G., AHA/Staff OKH Bemardis, Robert, Colonel i. G., AKH/Staff OKH
Hayessen, Egbert, Major i. G., AHA/Staff OKH
Freytag-Loringhoven, Wessel von, Colonel i. G., Head of Dept. of the Army Dept. OKH
Sdirader, Werner, Colonel, Group Leader of the Army Affairs Department OKH
Rathgens, Karl-Ernst, Retired Colonel, in the Army General Staff
Smerid, Günther, Colonel i. G., Adjutant to the Chief of the General Staff of the Army OhH OKH

If you add to these 30 people those who were not exposed as followers and accomplices, you have an idea of the extent to which our military leadership was already torn apart by resistance at the beginning of the Eastern campaign.

The overview shows that the Versdiwörung was by far the most strongly represented in the Army High Command. It is also striking that it was the heads of the most important offices and departments there who belonged to the resistance, for example in the Operations Department, the Organization Department, the Office of the Quartermaster General, the General Army Office, the Reserve Army, the Army Affairs Department and the Naduid Tent Troop.

In the High Command of the Armed Forces (OKW), the heads of the foreign defense, intelligence, military administration and armaments offices were part of the conspiracy.

In the army, almost the entire top military leadership was affected by the conspiracy, with the exception of the Chief of Staff, von Brau'fiitofi, who issued a clear rejection of Halder's opposition.

In contrast to the army, the air force under Göring was just as unencumbered by sabotage at the top level as the navy under Raeder and Dönitz, while the spirit of sabotage and betrayal was more or less alive in the various staffs of these two branches of the Wehrmacht.

Thus we encounter sabotage mainly in the army's high command in the 'Mauerwald' headquarters, twenty kilometers from the 'Wolfssdianze' headquarters, in the headquarters of the commander of the German army in Bendlerstraße in Berlin, on the Eastern Front in the Central and Southern Army Groups, at the Western Command, at Army Group B (Normandy), at the Military Commander of France in Paris and at the Wehrma'htbefehlshaber of Belgium and Northern France.

When Adolf Hitler took over the command of the army himself as Supreme Commander of the German Army on December 19, J94l, he was confronted by the underground conspiracy more resolutely than before. It is certain that Hitler, famously equipped with a keen instinct for penal danger, which had saved him from many assassination attempts, sensed the well-disguised inner hostility of the general staff. And it is natural and u n d e r s t a n d a b l e that he reacted with mistrust. This c r e a t e d a dangerous rift at a time when only iron resolve and disciplined unity were the order of the day.

The true motivations of this group of verses for their subsequent resistance were made clear by none other than the victim and leader of the Reidisarbeitsdienst, Konstantin Hierl, who himself had been a member of the German General Staff for many years and was able to judge the inner mental state of the active officer corps from his own experience. *Konstantin éfierf* writes in his work Ulm Dienst für Deutsdiland':

Incidentally, I have come to the conclusion that the contrast in the military-political situation was by no means the only reason for the planned state strike against Hitler and, in the case of the majority of the conspirators, probably not the main reason. In my opinion, it was the political attitude against the leader of the national socialist revolution that was the more or less decisive driving force for most of the conspirators. It was a struggle of the 'patricians' against the 'plebeian tribunes of the people'."

Elsewhere he wrote: "Despite all the differences in the motives and goals of the individual men of July 20th, it seems to me that for most of them the dominant driving force was a hatred of Hitler arising from the strongest ideological or political differences, but in some cases also from personal hostility. This hatred of the atmosphere in which the insiders planned and acted. Fanatical hatred usually blinds the mind and numbs the conscience.

This is the only way I can explain why honorable and intelligent men went on such a disastrous erroneous path and took such a wrong turn^."

In the briefing on July 24, which took place in a small circle, Adolf Hitler, who was carrying his right arm in a sling, officially referred to July 20 for the first time, according to the report by brik *Kern*.

July 20.

"I gave the German people back their military sovereignty," he explained, "and thus restored their reputation in the world after the unworthy dictates of Ver- sailles. I took over his old officer corps as it was, left it its tradition and ennobled it. I promoted the officers professionally and economically as and where I could. Idi recognized and rewarded their achievements. I promoted and rewarded them. I offered comradeship to everyone who reported to me.

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86 Konstantin Hierl, "Um Dierut für Deutsdünnd", Heidelberg 1954, Seim 145 fl.

sdiaftlich the hand shaken, and now - idl has to have every officer up to the general, who sdudits me, first examined in the antechamber to see whether he is not bringing some murder instrument in his briefcase to kill me, like this Count Stauflenberg, who could do no better than t o put a hell of a mask under my desk in order to sd ape me and his comrades out of the world in a sneaky way.'

Hitler's mistrust was now so exaggerated that he practically trusted almost nobody&T '.

Colonel General *Heinz Guderian*, who on 2t. Heinz Guderian, who was entrusted by Hitler with the d u t i e s of Chief of the Army General Staff on July 2, 1944, gave the following assessment of the far-reaching effects of the assassination attempt on Hitler:

pWhat effect did the assassination attempt of July 20 actually have? The man who was targeted was slightly injured. His physical condition, which was not the best anyway, was no longer impaired. His mental equilibrium was disturbed forever ...

. . In particular, the general staff positions of the OKH were almost completely refilled. Some of the previous post holders had been injured in the assassination attempt, such as the Chief of the Operations Department, General Heusinger, and his first assistant, Colonel Brandt, some were suspected of complicity and had already been arrested, some were known to me from their previous activities and were undesirable as employees, and some had never seen the front and had to be replaced for this reason.

After completing the interview with the OKW officers, I went to report to Hitler around noon. He made a rather shaken impression; one ear was bleeding a little from the other.

8Z Erich Kero, 'AdoIf Hitler and the War', PreuBisdi Oldendorf 1971, page 399 1.

His right arm was almost immobile due to a twist and lay in a bandage. Mentally he was surprisingly calm when he received me. He entrusted rni& with the duties of Chief of the Army General Staff and explained that *he* had not been on good terms with my predecessor Zeitzler for some time. Zeitzler had placed his portfolio at his disposal five times; this was not acceptable during the war and he could not grant the generals in charge more rights in this respect than the men at the front. They could not resign or take leave if something did not suit them. He formally forbade me to present him with any resignation papers.

The conversation then turned to personnel matters. My wishes regarding staffing in the OKH were approved. The staffing of the most important front commands was discussed. Here I remarked that the new Commander-in-Chief West did not have a fortunate hand in leading large armored units and that I should therefore consider using him elsewhere. Hitler interjected: 'And by the way, he is an accomplice to the assassination! Keitel, Jod1 and Burgdorf all three remarked that Field Marshal von Kluge was 'the best horse in the stable' and that one could not do without him despite his complicity. My attempt to remove Mr. von Kluge inconspicuously from the Western Front had thus failed. But since Hitler was obviously far better informed about the attitude of the Field Marshal von Kluge than I was, I refrained from any further action on my part ...

The development of the situation up to July 20, 1944 ... was devastating. In order to help, the OKH first had to be made operational. This central office of the Eastern Front was in desperate shape. My predecessor had decided to move the O K H to the M aybach camp near Zossen near Berlin. Essential parts were already there, such as the Quartermaster General with all his organs, the Wehrmacht and Army Transport Lef and numerous other important departments. Most of the national connections had already been relocated. Alis East Prussia could

It was only with great difficulty that the talks on the front and on the national organization of the entire army, which was the responsibility of the OKH, could be conducted. The first decision that had to be made was about the future headquarters of the OKH. He opted for East Prussia, where Hitler and the OKW remained. The dismantling operations already carried out in Zossen had to be completed immediately ...

. . Idi appointed General Wen&, who was currently Chief of Staff at Sdiörner, as Chief of the Operations Department, but soon expanded his position to Chief of the OKH Command Staff and, in addition to the Operations Department, placed the Organi- nations Department and the Foreign Armies East Department under his command in order to place the entire operational apparatus in one hand ... The Foreign Armies East Department was retained by the proven Colonel Gehlen. Colonel Topf became Quartermaster General in place of General Wagner (Versdiwörer), who had committed suicide.

If Guderian had known at the time that Colonel and later General

If Guderian had known at the time that Colonel and later General Gehlen was a member of the Ven':hwörung and that he had been complicit in sabotaging his own war effort, he would certainly not have given him the 'Abteilung pFremde Heere Ost'.

We only learned that retired General *Reinhard Cehlen*, who from the end of **1939** to the beginning of October 1940 was the personal staff officer of the General Staff of the Army, Gerieralobent Halder, and until his appointment as head of the Eastern Army Division on April 1, 1942, worked within the Operations Department of the Army, belonged to the circle of conspirators of July 20 from his memoirs 'Der Dienst' (The Service).

Through these we learn from him that he had already had an exchange of ideas with von Tres&ow in the winter of 1941/42, whom he knew well from the War Academy and with whom he came to the conclusion that the Russian campaign and thus the war was doomed.

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88 Heinz Guderian, pMemoirs of a Soldier', page 308 If.

not because it could not be won politically and militarily, but because the constant interventions of the supreme leadership (Hitler) resulted in a chain of political and military elementary failures, which had to lead to the loss of the campaign and thus of the war. When we asked ourselves how this development could be prevented, logically there was only one way: the elimination of Hitler^.

In his memoirs, Tres&ow did not reveal whether he was of the opinion that Hitler's victory should be prevented at all costs and by all means.

The type and consequences of sabotage as *practiced by* traitorous abductors can be demonstrated by the sdiladit in the Kursk arc in the summer of t943 (with the de&name gZitadille'), which went very well for us and before which Gehlen himself wrote the following assessment of the situation:

On the next day, *July* 4 [1943], iii dealt with the 'Zitadelle' operation at length and presented the following assessment: pFrom the point of view of the overall war situation, the Zitadelle operation can no longer be justified on any grounds at the present time. The precondition for a successful operation is to be seen in two prerequisites: the strength and the morale of the troops.

Both of these conditions were met at the time of the originally planned start of operations; now, according to the current enemy picture, neither is present. The Russians have been expecting our attack for weeks in the areas in question and have done everything in their power, both by expanding several positions in succession and by deploying the appropriate forces, to intercept our attack at an early stage. It is therefore hardly likely that the German attack will be successful.

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89 Reinhard Gehlen, 'Dfr Dienit', Mainz-Wiesbaden 971, page S7.

90 Reinhard GeM-o, 'Dcr Dienst', page 87 f.

Gehlen's assessment of the enemy situation and the way it was portrayed is by and large unacceptable, and the siege around Kursk had to be lost.

But why were the preconditions for a successful suicide mission, the moment of surprise and our superiority in strength, no longer given? General Gehlen of course knows the answer exactly, but he does not say it in his memoirs. It is and can only be: because the operational plan for Operation qZitadelle' was betrayed to Moscow early on, namely as early as April 20, 1943, by means of radio spying from Switzerland. The Soviets were able to prepare for our attack by building up very strong defensive positions and by deploying superior forces in good time.

And why could the German operational plan for the citadel be betrayed? - Well, because Canaris and Gehlen, who were in charge of counterintelligence and responsible for it, did not take the obvious and tremendously important steps to spy on the traitors in the OKH or OKW, where they were sitting en masse. They had to know and did know about the permanent betrayal, like General Halder, who testified in a trial in 1955:

'Almost all deuudien attack actionsA were known to the enemy immediately after their planning in the OKW, nodi before they landed on my sdireibtisdi, by' betrayal of a member of the OKW. Clogging up this source was impossible throughout the war.

Canaris and Gehlen had certainly learned in the summer of 1941 that on August 10, the troops of General Hoth had captured a divisional command post of the 16th Soviet Army east of Smolensk, in which the Secret Field Police had, to their great astonishment, found two OKW slave plans among the subordinates.

9t Paul Carell, "Scorched Earth", Berlin 1966, page 84.

and a copy of an order issued by the Kremlin to favor the second plan over the first.

They were also certainly aware that the Secret Field Police in Bryansk had found an exact copy of Colonel General Halder's Plan I at another Soviet command post, which he had only presented to Hitler in Rastenburg on August 18, 1941.

In both cases, this was documentary evidence that there were traitors in the top military leadership of Germany. It would have been the indispensable duty of the defense leaders Canaris, Fellgiebel and Gehlen to use all means at their disposal to destroy these German saboteurs, no matter who was under suspicion.

Paul Carell reports on a drastic case of sabotage through the non-disclosure of a highly important report.

In the summer of 1942, an agent transmitter was located and dismantled in the Warsaw suburb of Otwo& nad langem Sudten. Two former Polish officers, Captain Arzyszewski and Lieutenant Meyer, as well as their most adverse collaborators were arrested. The two Polish officers had been dropped from a Soviet airplane with the FallsAirm in the summer of 1941 south of Warsdiau. A transmitter and 2500 dollars were in their luggage. Their mission was to set up a spy ring for military intelligence and to transmit the information to Moscow by radio.

The captain constantly traveled around the country and collected the information. The lieutenant operated the transmitter. The code and almost s00 duplicates of the radioed messages sent to Moscow could be deciphered by the enemy. And what *sids* presented to the eye after deciphering was breathtaking. The military secrets these two agents had gathered in the hinterland of the German front within a year were unimaginable. The radio reports gave a complete picture of the German deployment for the summer offensive in 1942.

But not only the deployment, but also the objectives, operational planning and transports of corps and divisions were precise and ri&tly forgivable. The Red General Staff had tired of recognizing the focal points of the German spring offensive solely from the information provided by its two Polish radio agents. And all for 2500 dollars!

What did the German OKW do in response to this alarming finding? Did the lesson from the Otwo& nid t case have to open the eyes of the German military leadership to the dangers of soldier radio agents, the new and typical agent species of the Second World War? Was it not obvious that the Warsdiauer Ring was not an isolated case? Did the experts rush to the Führer's headquarters with the material they had found in order to report back to Hitler and the High Command?

The summary report of the German radio defense, which cracked the Warscbauer ring, never came under the eyes of Adolf Hitler. General Eri& Fellgiebel, the head of the Wehrniadit-Nadiri&- ten liaisons at the Führer's headquarters, gave it to the Funkabwehr on the grounds that it was too long to present to the Führer. When a shortened version was submitted, it was described as too 'alarming'; it was said that the submission would "only upset the Führer".

The extent of the sabotage carried out by some of the Verse conspirators is shown b y Tres&ow's attempt in the summer of 1944 to persuade Field Marshal von Kluge, then Commander-in-Chief of the West, to open the front to the Western Allies without a fight.

On the Eastern Front, too, treasonous links were established between part of the Verséhwömng and the Bo1sd'ewistisdien aid workers from the Nationalkomitee Freies Deundiland.

J. F. Taylor reports in his book "The July 20, 1944" that he ondilußreidi:

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92 Paul Carell, "Scorched Earth", Berlin 1966, page 85.

93 Fabian von Sdilabrendorfi, "Officers against Hider", page 136.

pLeusd ner [designated as Goerdeler's Vice-Chancellor by the condemnation], after his conviction by the Vo1ksgeri&tshof
- at a time when he had nothing more to gain or lose and therefore had nothing more to add or to lose, said the following: During his second meeting with Be& (military head of the conspiracy) in Jer 1943
the former Chief of the General Staff had asked him whether and for what
the time for which the coup was to take place, explained to him that a soldier was no longer necessary; there were now enough trusted people in command positions on the eastern front so that the war could be regulated until the collapse of the regime.

The fact that the National Committee and at least some of the representatives of the Gleidie Zid followed the Zid was shown by the many close relationships between them and the couriers coming from Moscow. This is confirmed by audi Gisevius in his Budi pBis zum bitteren Ende', vol. 2, as J . Taylor quotes.

In his publication, J. F. Taylor reports: qUnderstandable.
like things happened on the eastern front. The troop leaders and general staffs repeatedly affirmed their units in Soviet prisoner-of-war camps and then turned up in the Moscow National Committee 'Free Germany' and the 'Bund Deiitnher OfRiere'. The losses of men and material increased, not only due to the loss of the units concerned, but also due to the increased danger to the intact Nadiba units as a result of the front lines that had been opened up.

Only the defection of Majon i. G. Kuhn to the Soviets
to confirm the hitherto vague suspicion that it was not just a matter of individual decisions by the troop leaders concerned, but of organized processes. Kuhn was a confidant of General von Tresdtow, who in turn had been one of Stauffenberg's predecessors in the staff of the reserve army and shared the political ideas of General von Tresdtow. General von Tres-

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94 J. F. Tajrlor, "Der 20. Juli 1944", Bremen 19fi8, page 5/.

ckow was Chief of Staff of Army Group Center, which collapsed completely in the second half of 1944".

The former governing mayor of Hamburg, C.
Vincent Krogmann, was told the following by a reliable acquaintance
the following:

I knew an officer who was a courier at the army high command. He lived in the same house as my parents in East Berlin after 194S. When I returned from prison with my wife to visit her now widowed mother, the officer invited me for a chat. What I heard from him almost made my blood run cold. He explained about his troop: 'We felt a strong connection with the aristocracy because of the way we felt. We hated National Socialism. Who was Hitler? Where did he come from? The people should never be put on the map. A cult of the people was practiced. Only people who can be accepted by the nobility can be authoritative.

Idi was already in England before the war, we had a group of men we trusted there. We hoped that England would go to war against the Nazis sooner. When the war broke out, I was in England several times, which I was able to do as a courier. For the war in the East, our orders were to ensure the defeat of the Nazi army in Russia. However, the British promised us that they would declare war on the Russians if they crossed the German border. It was a great betrayal on the part of the British not to have kept their promise.

We had to make sure that this war w a s not won in the East. However, we had to be able to wait for the most favorable situations. It had to be impenetrable. The rapid deployment of troops had to be prevented. It had to b e possible for the Russians to advance. We had to

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95 J. F. Taylor, "July 20, 1944", page 16 f.

good that everyone thought the bow was overstretched, and they were to stick to this opinion. Victory in the east was possible, but as soon as the Russian roller rolled, there was no stopping it, and the groundwork was laid. The five million soldiers deployed there were not allowed to return. That is the guarantee that a similar movement will never again arise in Germany.

The cross-connections between the anti-communist July 20th Yersdiwörung, or rather a fanatical part of it, and the bolsdist Nationalkomitee Freies Deutsd land are still largely unexplained. However, the fact that there were some wires running in the underground that were connected to the German part of the East
front-line soldiers must unfortunately be assumed.

Sabotage on the invasion front

The Normandy invasion in the summer of 1944 was certainly the last decisive battle of the Second World War that could have sent Germany to military defeat if the invasion had been successfully repelled.

All military experts put forward the same arguments for the failure of the defense, such as the enemy's dominance of the air and sea, his strong superiority in land forces and the stubbornness of the commander-in-chief of the German Wehrmacht, Hitler. Of our senior military leaders during the war, only Colonel General Heinz Guderian, in his memoirs, went beyond criticism in the strategic and tactical field to point out political influences, by which he meant those subversive forces of conspiracy that were very active on the invasion front.

But who were these forces and where did they stand when Field Marshal Erwin Rommel took over the supreme command of Army Group B at the beginning of 1944, which was solely responsible for the defense against the invasion?

Let us follow RiHer *Wilhelm von Schwamm,* advocate of the conspiracy, who in his writings "Rommel" and "The 20th of July in Paris", describes the events in the West at the time in detail and frankly.

and authentically reported: pAs early as the summer of 1943, the conspiracy in Paris, which was already in germination there, began to take shape with the military commander in France, General Heinridi von Stülp- nagel, and members of his staff. The Berlin Front s u c c e e d e d in recruiting its activist Count Fritz von der Sdtulenburg, who h a d already urged the resistance to act soon in 1943, as a first lieutenant on General von Unruh's so-called 'Helden- klau-Kommission', which was supposed to 'comb out' the army and stage and supply the front with new troops after the heavy losses of men at Stalingrad and Tunis. Thanks to his good connections, von der Sdtulenburg was then inducted into the commission that had to deal with the West. He was then able to stay there for months, not in order to flotzumaAeri soldiers for the front, but to win friends for the conspiracy in the staffs of the military commander of France and the commander-in-chief of the West. pThe count," said Ritter von Sdiramm literally, "first wanted to get an overview of the attitudes of the senior officers and officials in these staffs and then to supply the Berlin resistance circles with new collaborators. Of course, he then also had to ensure that they could remain with their departments°°°.'

This happened at a time when all forces were supposed to be concentrated on defending against the expected invasion! However, all of these recruitment drives, meetings, planning and preparations were ultimately nothing more than subversion of military strength, sabotage of the defense of the Reich.

Von der SÖiulenburg's enterprise was a complete success. The resistance group around Stiilpnagel, who felt particularly close to the military head of the resistance, Colonel General Beck, in Berlin, soon included the following officers and officials:

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96 Ritter Wilhelm von Sdiramzri, Der 20. Juli in Patij', Bad Wörishoftn 1953, page 16 f.

Lieutenant Colonel d. R. Dr. Caesar von Hofacker, cousin of Count von StauJfenberg and constant courier between Paris and Berlin,

Dr. Gotthard von Falkenhausen, nephew of the military commander of Belgium and Northern France Commander of Falkerihausen,

Oberregierungsrat Freiherr von Teu':hert,

Kriegsverwaltungsrat Walter Burgatzky, Dr. beifahrt,

Dr. Kleeberg,

Regierungsrat Dr. Horst, brother-in-law of Lieutenant General Hans Speidel,

Dr. Thierfelder and Dr. Hans Buwert.

They also included various senior officers of the command staff of von Stülpnagel and the well-known writer Hauptmann Ernst Jünger.

Jünger was brought into the command staff of the military commander by Speidel in the summer of t941, when he was nodi Chief of Stülpnagel's staff until he w a s temporarily transferred to the Eastern Front as Chief of the V Corps. Speidel's successor as Chief of Staff of the Military Commander was Colonel i. G. Kossmann.

After Speidel's return from the Eastern Front on April 15, 1944, to become Rommel's Chief of Staff, he and Kossmann soon agreed that they should bring their commanders-in-chief, Rommel and Stülpnagel, together. pThe resistance against Hitler', according to Ritter von 5kliramm, 'and the political plans in the West received a completely new impetus'.

In the staff of the commander-in-chief West Feldmarsdiall von Rund- stedt, the conspirators and confidants included:

the Chief of Staff, General of the Infantry Blumentritt,
the 1st General Staff Officer, Colonel Bodo Zimmermann,
Major d. R. Dr. Bririk
and from June 25, 1944 Colonel (retired) Eberhard Fin'kh.

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97 Ririer Wilhelm **von** Sdiramni, "Der 20. Juli **in Paris", page 45.**

At the end of June', reports von Sdiramm, the Resistance Group in the Army High Command sent one of the most valuable of its conspirators to France: it was Colonel Eberhard Fin&h, until then Chief Quartermaster of Army Group South on the Eastern Front, who was transferred to the West on his own initiative.

This is the same Finckh who had been accused of sabotage on the on the Eastern Front f o r sabotaging the rear.

The opinions of the Berlin and Paris groups initially differed on foreign policy issues. In Berlin, the plan was once to send the former German ambassador in Moscow, Count Werner von der Sthulenburg, through the front line of Army Group Center, which was then led by Kluge, so that he could negotiate with Stalin personally. In France, on the other hand, a solution under the leadership of the Western powers was only being considered, a concept that then found increasing support in Berlin. In pursuit of the Western idea, or rather illusion, Stülpnagel had already s e n t his co-underwriter Dr. Hans Buwert, who had been negotiating with the French Resistance, to Ma- drid and Lisbon in February 1943, with the task of finding out through guarantors how the Western Allies had taken up the peace feelers that had been launched from Berlin at the time. As is well known, the contact w a s negative. Churdiill is said to have accepted the armistice offer favorably, while Roosevelt categorically rejected it, as for him at the time it only meant unconditional submission to audi

Russia.

After Sthramms' victory, the position of the opposition, which had hitherto existed, changed, and this happened for one overwhelming reason: in Feldmarsdiall Erwin

98 Ritter Wilhelm von Sdirani i, "Der 20. Juli in Parn', page 63 f.

Rommel not only a comrade-in-arms, but soon also an active leader'® '.

Just as it was possible for Tres&ow to influence his commander-in-chief in the sense of the conspiracy in the middle section of the eastern front, Speidel succeeded in winning over his commander-in-chief Rommel for the resistance.

According to *Hans$ peidel,* "the subject of the first discussions at the Fe1dmars'hall were, among other things, the thoughts of the former Lord Mayor Dr. Gördeler, which had been conveyed to **the Chief** of the General Staff [i.e. himself] by Lord Mayor Strölin on April 4 in Freudenstadt. At the end of 1943, Gördeler had asked Strölin to contact Rommel. The latter was to be convinced that Hitler and his regime needed to be eliminated in order to save Germany and Europe. The Lord Mayor of Stuttgart [Dr. Strölin], whom the Field Marshal had long held in high esteem as an energetic and determined man, had referred to his first meeting with Rommel in February 1944. In it, the possibilities for changing the regime and ending the war had been discussed. Briefings from the military side, including from Colonel General Beck and the Quartermaster General, General of Artillery Wagner, completed the picture.

The judgments agreed that ways and means to end the war should be found without delay

ways and means of ending the war should be found without delay, before the inevitable catastrophe put an end to any possibility of negotiation. The first delimitation of political thoughts resulted in complete agreement between Commander-in-Chief Rommel and Chief [Speidel], whereby Rommel, in his own spirited manner, spoke about Hitler's excessiveness in human, military and state sparring and his negation of European ideas and humanitarianism.

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99 **Ritter** Wilhelm von Schramm, The July 20 in Paris', page 3t.

A series of essential meetings followed. Almost daily, leading personalities from the Reithe came to talk in the oasis of the Rommelsdien staff, far from the clutches of the Gestapo, and to find ways to rescue them ...

In the first days of May, Ernst Jünger, a captain in the staff of the military commander Frankreidi, presented his peace strategy, the ideas for which he had already developed in the winter of 1941/42. Fddmarsd all Rommel was deeply impressed by his ideas, in particular the constructive reconstruction plans with the demand for a United States of Europe in the spirit of diristlidier humanity. He envisaged the publication of this historical and human document on a broad basis in due course ...

Lord Mayor Dr. Strölin, Stuttgart, had on t4. April nodi, Lord Mayor Dr. Strölin, Stuttgart, had expressed the wish for a joint expedition of the Feldmarsdiall with the former Foreign Minister Baron Constantin von Neurath, so that his foreign policy experience could be utilized ...

However, a trip by Rommeh to Neurath and Strölin would not have gone unnoticed by the secret police. For this reason, Rommel authorized his Chief of the General Staff [Speidel] to conduct the exchange with Freiherm von Neurath and Dr. Strölin. It took place on May 27, 1944 in Freudenstadt and served to exchange information between the West and the homeland. The Chief of the General Staff first spoke about the military situation before the invasion. On behalf of the field marshal, he asked what thoughts were being given at home to saving the German people from destruction ...

Lord Mayor Dr. Strölin pointed above all to the central problem of Hinter's personality, with which foreign countries would not make any political agreements. Only its elimination would make a new, creative policy possible. But action would have to be taken immediately - before the invasion. For holding the front was a precondition for all absidites. In his opinion, only Feldmarsdiall Rom- me1 could be considered for the overall military leadership.

me1, who was not only popular in Germany as a fair personality and great soldier, but was also recognized abroad as a chivalrous military leader.

Both men asked that an urgent appeal b e made to Feldmars';hall to make himself available for the rescue of the Reich, whether as commander-in-chief of the Wehrmacht or as im- mediate head of state ...

The possibilities of entering into talks with the Western Allies were also discussed: via the Vatican, via the British ambassador in Madrid, Sir Samuel Hoare, and via Swiss connections. Exploratory talks had already been initiated with the other side via Rome, Madrid and Lisbon, but had been unsuccessful ...

Preparations for the reconnaissance of the homeland and the front were largely determined. In a second meeting, the connection between the resistance camps was established more closely and a direct route with Rommel's command post was determined, which proved successful and remained undetected.

The Field Marshal approved the content of the discussions and informed Baron von Neurath and Dr. Strölin that the preparatory measures had been initiated and that he was ready for any operation without any personal claim.

According to Speidel's report, "on May 15, 1944, Rommel and Stülpnagel held an in-depth discussion in the presence of the two chiefs of staff in a country house in Mareil-Marly near St. Germain about the measures necessary to end the war and overthrow the National Socialist regime.

After an overview of the political and military situation, the theoretical and practical preparations were defined in detail ... The Quartermaster General of the Hee- res, General of Artillery Eduard Wagner, came to coordinate the

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100 Hans Speidel, Invasion 1944', Tübingen 1949, page 8J fi.

the necessary measures in the west at the command post of the army group. He briefed Rommel on the active resistance forces in the Army High Command, on the calendar preparations for an uprising and, for the first time, on the earlier attempts to assassinate Hitler. The field marshal countered the intentions of the atten- tists, as he did not want Hitler to be martyred. His train of thought was to arm Hitler's person with reliable tank units in order t o bring him before a German court …"[101]

Speidel continues: "As a result of all the consultations, the following ideas were set out in the form of a mobilization calendar with the substantial cooperation of General of the Infantry Karl Heinrich von Stülpnagel:

West: Establishing the conditions for a ceasefire with Generals Risenhower and Montgomery, without Hitler's participation. Feldmarsdiall Rommel was called in for the negotiations: General of the Infantry Karl Heinridi von Stülpnagel, General of the Armoured Forces **Freiherr** Leo **Geyr** von Sdiweppenburg, Lieutenant General Dr. Hans Speidel, Lieutenant General Graf Gerd von Schwerin, Vice Admiral Friedrich Ruge, Lieutenant Colonel d. Res. Dr. Caesar von Hofa&er.

The following negotiating principles for a ceasefire were envisaged: Evacuation of the occupied western territories, return of the western army behind the Siegfried Line, handover of the administration of the occupied western territories to the Allies. Immediate cessation of the enemy's bombing campaign against the homeland. Your armistice
- not an unconditional surrender - should be followed by negotiations for a peace that would point the way to order and not chaos. - Feldmarséhall Rommel expected that the Allies would give such a chance ...

Home: Arrest Adolf Hitler to bring him before a German court for trial. Execution by the resistance

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101 Hans Spendet, " Invasion t944", page 83 f.

forces in the Army High Command, or by the armored units to be brought in ...

Overthrow of National Socialist tyranny. Provisional takeover of government power in Germany by the resistance councils of all social classes and estates under the leadership of Colonel-General Beds, Lord Mayor Dr. Goerdeler and the former Hessisian Minister of the Interior and trade union leader Leusdiner ...

East: Continuation of the battle, for this purpose holding a shortened eastern front in the approximate line Danube estuary, Carpathians, Lemberg, Weidisel, Memel. Immediate evacuation of Kiirland and other fortresses.

Preparations should be accelerated so that action could be taken before the start of the invasion'^.'

That was the hopeless illusion of the conspirators, who must have known long ago that the Allies intended their war not only against Adolf Hitler and his regime, but against the entire German people.

pAny thought of negotiations with the opponents," said Colonel-General *Heinz* Giiderion, "as a whole or separately with the East or West, was rendered pointless from the outset by the demand for unconditional surrender, which w a s made jointly by all our opponents.

The political goal of the Anglo-Sadis went far beyond that of the internal German resistance to eliminate Hitler. Through their great war, they wanted nothing less than the elimination of the political and economic power of the German people. This political and *economic goal* determined the attitude of the enemy leaders in the course of the war. The plans of the

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102 Hans Speidel, Invasion 1944", page 91 f.

103 Heine Guderian, "Memories of a Soldier", page 335-

The enemy forces were only interested in the plans of the Versd wörung insofar as they could be useful to their war effort.

Audi the Versdiwörer on the invasion front knew the enemy's

This attitude was not only evident when B'ission *Churäiill* made the following official statement about July 20 in the British House of Commons on August 2, 1944, after the failed assassination attempt:

gNot only are the once proud armies being pushed back on all fronts, but tremendous events have also taken place at home, which must shake the confidence of the people and the loyalty of the troops to their very foundations. The most violent personalities in the German Reich are murdering each other or silencing it, while the armies of the Allies, filled with rage, are t i g h t e n i n g their ring ever tighter. These events in Germany are manifestations of an inner illness. As decisive as they may be, we must place our trust not in them, but in our own strong arm and in the goodness of our sad e.' Sefton Delmer, the head of the British psychological warfare against Germany, w a s much more open about those who fell for the Allied propaganda and showed how - despite everything they did - the perpetrators were incredibly naive. Sefton Delmer writes: gWe knew that the generals w e r e becoming i n c r e a s i n g l y exasperated by the consequences of Hitler's interference in their strategy. gWe noticed more and more 'peace feelers' being put out, and these efforts came from men who claimed to be in agreement with the Allies.

generals.

For some time s&on we tried not only to speak in the name of this 'military militia opposition', but endeavored to give its leaders the kind of encouragement that the 'white propaganda' as the of£cial voice of the Allies could not give them.

'white propaganda' as the of£cial voice of the Allies could not give them. We wanted to m a k e them think that they only needed to overthrow Hitler and then we would be ready for peace negotiations. For example, when the 'Frankfurter Zeitung', which was apparently published by the

German West Germany, I had an editorial in it about the need to overthrow Hitler and set up a German peace government.

'Are the Western powers ready for peace negotiations?' the article asked. 'We believe that we can answer this question in the affirmative on the basis of initial preliminary contacts between German military circles in the West and the enemy. But we must act with finality!

It seems to me quite possible that the generals saw this campaign by the Calais soldiers' radio station as an underlining of their dream of a revolt against the Führer, which would then be followed by a separate peace with the West. Of course, a separate peace with the soldiers was out of the question. But if 'Calais' succeeded in persuading the generals to rise up against their supreme warlord by constantly emphasizing the priority of the eastern front, I would have no qualms of conscience. A general putdi, whether it was successful or not, even if a general conspired against Hitler, would accelerate Hitler's defeat. And it turned out that our efforts were also rewarded here.

In September 1944, when I spoke to Otto John, the only survivor of the general conspiracy who had managed to escape abroad, I learned from him that the conspirators had actually heard our broadcasts and had interpreted them exactly as I had hoped. I am sorry that the generals had to lose their lives on Hitler's meat hook. But I can't say that I f e l t any remorse because I had wrongly raised their hopes. After all, these men and their families had been the first patrons and promoters of the Hitler movement. They were the beneficiaries of his Third Reich. And they only rose up against him when it became clear that his war of conquest was doomed to failure."

1o4 Already Oelmer, pDie Deuudien und idi', Hamburg 1961, page 529.

While the conspirator Speidel openly discusses the political preparations for the coup in his pamphlet, he is very reticent about the military preparations for it. Only on page 7l of his report, where Rommel's operational plan to combat the invasion is mentioned, can we read: "For political reasons, it seemed expedient to the field marshal to have reliable armored units available for any coming events. events.'

We learn from *Wilhelm Ritter 'non Schramm* what was actually meant by this remark qreliable armored units for possible future events'*:*

qHitler never came to France before the invasion. He did not come in April and he did not come in May, as was expected and as he had repeatedly announced; he postponed his trip from one date to the next ... Aud the high staffs in the West, who knew Hitler do'3i, had not talked about it.

So the unexpected happened, that it was not possible to act as planned before the invasion. There was no opportunity to arrest Hitler in France, as Rommel had no doubt planned ... But it was not to be. It is quite possible that his demonic 'inner voice' warned Hitler against the planned journey to the West. If in the last years of the war *he* only rarely ventured out of the threefold circle surrounding him, it was of course due to his advancing illness and the suspicious way in which a man like Bormann now guarded him.

So it was the beginning of June t944 and Hitler had still not come. On June 6, however, the Allies landed on the northern coast ...

In the second half of June, the situation on the landing front became increasingly serious. The Commander-in-Chief West, Field Marshal von Rundstedt, made an urgent appeal to the Führer's headquarters for one of the key personnel to be sent to the front.

sönlidlkeiten zur Ausspradie na';h the West should come. Hitler himself appeared at this. He arrived unexpectedly, accompanied only by Jodl, the chief of the Wehrmaditführungsstab, a few junior officers and a small bodyguard. As the fall of Cherbourg was already imminent, he had decided to travel to the bunker site at Margival, north of Soissons, on June. Rundstedt and Rommel with their general staff chiefs had been ordered to give him a lecture and to ensure that the Angle Americans could land and quickly turn their beachhead into an operational base ... The conversation, which the two field marshals had begun with such great expectations, ended in a monologue by Hitler ...

Rommel was p r e s e n t e d with a surprising opportunity on this day. He had said with all his might that no one from the Führer's entourage, the Wehrmacht High Command, the LuRwaffe or the Kriegsmarine had ever been seen at or at least behind the front. That was true, as we soon realized. Shortly before the return journey, Lieutenant General Schmundt, Hitler's chief adjutant, suddenly turned to Speidel and told him to organize a trip for Hitler to Laos on June 9th. He told him to prepare a trip by Hitler to La Rod e-Guyon or another suitable location for June 9th and to order front commanders from the various services and branches of the armed forces to go there. The Führer would then speak to them personally.

One can imagine the satisfaction with which Speidel heard this news and the fierce smile with which it was received by Rome! For once, there seemed to be an opportunity for the kind of solution that the resistance forces had had in mind from the very beginning: Not assassination, but arrest! The fact that Speidel visited Stülpnagel on the return journey via Paris and informed him of the discussions and of the imminent 'front ride' by Hitler may indicate that mart intended to seize this opportunity. It was a pre-alarm for the military commander. Otherwise, the necessary mail measures were taken immediately.

taken immediately. It can be assumed that Hitler would have been Rommel's prisoner on June 19.

would have been Rommel's prisoner ...

However, a truly unique grotesque event in the history of war was to put an end to all plans and preparations: Hitler did not come, neither to the front nor to La Roche-Guyon. When Speidel called Blumentritt the next morning, he was astonished to learn that the Führer had left WH again. Blumentritt was unable to tell him the reason, but he soon found out. The cause of Hitler's sudden return to Berditesgaden was: one of the wing bombs that had long since been dropped from the front at 11:40 p.m. on June 15.

)aut war daybudi Ob. West - had suddenly changed direction and had fallen near Margival. No damage was caused and there were no casualties in the bunker city. Nevertheless, Hitler had decided to cancel his stay in the West and return to Brr':h-tesgaden, perhaps urged to do so by those around him. However, it is possible that he was also m o t i v a t e d by other intuitions, for when his life was threatened, he had, as we know, the scent of an animal.

With the Führer's sudden return to Berditesgaden, a great hope was buried. Now, for the time being, it was no longer possible to bring about a political turnaround without violence, to establish the persecution of nihilism in the country and then to allow the authorities t o carry out their duties properly ...

Adolf Hinter's fludit from Margival undoubtedly had a strong rudimentary effect on Rommel. It deepened the rift between the two men even further ... Lange was pressing ...

So in the last few days, the Field Marshal went to the front with very specific internal intentions. Not only does he want, as always, to see what has been said and encourage the commanders-in-chief and commanders in their soldierly resistance, h e now has compelling reasons to speak to them in private. For all the diplomacy that characterizes the 'desert fox',

he can no longer hide his conviction. He reported on the meeting in Margival and pointed out that, given the circumstances, independent action in the West might become necessary ... Rommel was now in complete agreement with many front commanders ...

The great unknown was of course still the behavior of the SS units, since by 1 July the staffs of the I. and

II. SS armored corps under the leadership of the commanding generals Sepp Dietrich and Hausser had already been deployed ...'^"

When Hofaéker returned to Paris on the evening of July 9th from an important meeting with Rommel, he reported to his co-conspirators in joyful excitement that 'Rommel could not be stopped, he would have preferred to defeat him'.

Hofadter asked me" - according to the conspirator Baron von Ten-Chert - "to immediately obtain a draft of a letter from Rommel to the Allied headquarters. It was to give notice of the intention to cease hostilities on his own initiative, to contain no conditions, only in the form of a request for honorable treatment after the capitulation, and to maintain secrecy until the possibility of execution had arisen. The letter was completed no later than the same evening - aosgezeidinet formulated by Bargatzky'^.'

The letter was to be written by a medical officer during a planned exchange of wounded soldiers in the American sector across the main battle line. However, the plan was thwarted by Hitler's mistrust, which had been aroused by the exchange of captured German nurses for American wounded soldiers.

From the above report by Sthramms, it is clear that the "reliable armored units for possible future events", of which Speidel spoke, should not only be available in order to protect the

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105 Ritter Wilhelm von Sdiratnm, pDer 20. Juli in Paris', page 5Z ff.

106 Riner Wilhelm von Schratnm, soer 20. Juli in Pacis", page 77 &.

The German government was not in favor of supporting the coup from the West triggered by Stauffenberg's assassination attempt on Hitler, but rather in favor of arresting Hitler in France as soon as he w a s trapped there. Colonel General *Heinz Guderian,* the then Inspector General of the Parizertruppen and later successor to Colonel General Zeitn- ler in the Office of the General Staff of the Army, refers in his "Memoirs of a Soldier", he refers to Speidel's statement and provides an insight into the deployment and deployment of the pan- cer and armored infantry divisions on the invasion front, whereby he does not hold back his criticism by stating:

In Army Group 'B' [Rommel) there was a lively atmosphere. As rii':cally as one must recognize the efforts, one must on the other hand regret that Rommel was unable to show any understanding for the question of mobile reserves. The major operation with mobile forces on land, which was our only chance in view of our hopeless inferiority in the air and at sea, was not considered possible by him and was therefore neither sought nor facilitated. In addition, Rome - at least at the time of my visit - had a preconceived idea of the probable landing site. He assured me several times that the British and Americans would land north of the mouth of the Somme in advance, rejecting any other possibility and justifying his view with the fact that the enemy ... for supply reasons, the enemy would have to choose the shortest distance from its ports of entry to the landing site ...

In all these questions, Rommel's views coincided with Hitler's, albeit for different reasons. Hitler had remained the Marine of the trench warfare of 1914-18 and had never understood mobile warfare. Rommel considered it no longer applicable because of the enemy's air superiority. It was therefore no wonder that both the Commander-in-Chief West and Hitler rejected our defensive suggestions for the organization of the motorized units, referring to Rommel's previous front experience.

On 6. 6. 1944, the day of the invasion, there were in France

48 infantry divisions, 38 of which were in the front line; 5 of these were between the Sd elde and the Somme, 2 between the Somme and the Seine and 3 in Brittany.

l0 Panzer and Panzergrenadier divisionsi of these were located

1. SS-Panzer-Division 'L.A.H.' in Beverloo (Belgium),

2. Panzer Division in the Amiens-Abbéville area,

1 t6. Panzer Division east of Rouen (north of the Seine),

12th SS Panzer Division 'H.J.' near Lisieux (south of the Seine),

21st Panzer Division near Caen,

Panzer-Lehr-Division in the Le Maus-Orleans-Chatres area,

t 7th SS-Panzer-Grenadier-Division around Saumur-Niort-Poitien, lI. Panzer Division around Bordeaux,

2nd SS Panzer Division 'Reidi' around Montauban-Toulouse,

9th Panzer Division around Avignon-Names-Arles.

The entire hope for a defensive success was based on these last 10 Panzer and Panzer-Grenadier divisions. With difficulty, it was possible to keep these divisions reasonably fresh and trained.

Four of these divisions were under Rommel's command - the 2nd, 1 t6, 21. and the 12. SS-Panzer-Division. The 1st SS, Panzer Lehr and t7. SS-Panzer-Greria- dier-Division. The 9th, 1st and 2nd SS Panzer Divisions were deployed in southern France against an expected landing on the Mediterranean coast.

This fragmentation made a major defensive success possible from the outset. Apart from this, however, the course of events was as unpleasant as could be imagined. First of all, Ronunel was on his way to a meeting with Hitler on the day of the invasion of Germany. Hitler had gone to bed late, as was his custom, and was not to be disturbed on June 6 when the first reports came in. Jod1, who was in charge of the operations in his place, could not decide to call up the OKW reserves.

three armored divisions - immediately because he did not feel sure whether the Normandy landings were already the main operation or whether they were just an exercise. Because the OKW was not clear about the question of the landing in the Mediterranean, the armored divisions from southern France were not immediately brought in.

The 21st Panzer Division, which was on the invasion front, was - contrary to the training orders of General Frhr. v. Geyr
- Rommel's authorization to begin their counterattack and thus missed the most suitable time to attack the British airborne troops. Rommel did indeed bring the 116th Panzer Division no closer to the coast at Dieppe than it had been and held it there until mid-July. The ignorance of the higher leaders in the use of the tanks, the ordered attacks during the day under the influence of the enemy air force - especially in the case of the Panzer-Lehr-Division - and the use of frontal counterattacks in the area of the superior enemy artillery, prematurely destroyed the only combat-capable weapon that the German army was able to oppose the invasion. The armored troops suffered tremendous losses ...

However, with clear command and control, more could have been achieved from the formation that had been ordered. On June 16, two weeks after the start of the invasion, the 116th Panzer Division was deployed between Abbéville and Dieppe on the coast, the J. Panzer Division near Bordeaux, the 9th Panzer Division near Avignon, the SS Panzer Division, the SS Panzer Division and the SS Panzer Division. Panzer-Division near Avignon, the SS-Panzer-Division ‚Reid in the band fight in southern France, while the remaining SS-Panzer-Divisions, augmented by the (9th and 10th) SS-Panzer-Divisions transported from the east in the meantime, increased their forces in a frontal engagement with the SS artillery. Apart from the armored divisions, however, there were only 7 infantry divisions north of the Seine that day, standing idle near the coast, awaiting a landing that never came ...

After a delay of many days, the SS Leibstan- darte 'A.H.' [from Beverloo Belgium] and the 2nd Panzer Division [from the Amiens-Abbéville area] came into fragmented action. On

On June 28, the reconstituted Panzer Group West again took command of the I. and II. SS Panzer Corps, the LXXXVI and XXIXVII Panzer Corps. General Frhr v. Geyr's proposals for an attack with combined forces were rejected by Rommel, who had lost faith in the success of the attack. It remains to be [seen] whether audi nodi other political reasons played a part in the delayed and fragmented deployment of the reserves.

With this revealing question, Guderian refers to Speidel in the footnote on page 302 of his memoirs, in which he notes: 'For political reasons, it was advisable for the field marshal to have reliable armored units available for possible future events.

Cf. also frfir. e. *je yr,* 'Invasion without Laurel' in No. t, J950, of the Irisdien Zeitsdirilt 'An Cosantoir': The 2nd Panzer-Divi- sion (an Army, not an SS-unit) was held ba'k by Rommel for some time, because in expectation of the '20th July Plot to assassinate Hitler, he wished to have a 'reliable' Army division available for any emergency. Although the situation at the front obliged him to com- mit the 2rid Panzers ori the western sector of the battle6eld, where it opposed the Ist U.S.-Division, Rommel did manage to keep the ll6th Division in reserve until the middle of July." And later:

"His refusal (Rommel's) may have had a political reason."

To deuts&: Frhr. von Geyr [then commander of the Panzer Group under Rommel), "Invasion without laurels" in No. 1, 1950, of the Irisdien magazine "pAn Gosantoir": pThe 2nd Panzer Division (an army, not an SS unit) was held back for a certain time by Rommel because he was awaiting the 'Vers&wörung des 20.

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107 Heinz Guderian, 'Erinnerungen eines Soldaten', page 299 ff.

108 Hans Speidel, 'Invasion 1944', page Zt.

The 'July 20' campaign, which aimed to assassinate Hitler, wanted to have a 'reliable' army division that would be available for any emergency. Although the situation on the front forced him to deploy the 2nd Panzer Division on the western section of the Sdiladitfeld, where the
1. US Division, Rommel had to keep the 116th Paozer Division [an army division that lay ***east of*** Rouen north of the Seine] in reserve until mid-July.' And later: 'His (Rommel's) refusal may have had a political reason.

Rommel's refusal' refers to another paragraph of the same article by Freiherr von Geyr, which states:

"The arrival of a number of infantry divisions presented us with an opportunity to withdraw **three** panzer divisions from the line and assemble them under the command of I SS Corps as mobile rmerves. This was suggested to Rommel. Although his Chief of Staff concurred with the proposal, Rommd himself firtrily dulled it.
'The infantry *is* not able to tindertake the task and will not inder- take it', was his reply.

His refusal may have had a politieal reason. lt could not be expec- ted that shortly befor the 20th (J-) y, on whi':h day Hitler was to bc eliminated, Rommel (who was a party to the plot) would have been
eager to place three divisions under the command of I SS Corps, whidi was likely to remain loyal to Hitler and might accordingly be a direct threat to himself."

To deutsdi: The intervention of a number of infantry divisions was indicated to us with the instruction to pull three armored divisions out of the main battle line and place them together under the command of the I SS Panzer Corps as a mobile reserve. This was a suggestion to Rommel. Although his chief of staff agreed with the proposal, Rommel himself firmly rejected it. 'The infantry is not capable of taking on the task and will not take it on', was his reply.

There may have been a political reason for his refusal. It could not have been expected that shortly before July 20, the day Hitler was to be eliminated, Rommel (who had participated in the

Rommel (who was part of the conspiracy) would have been prepared to subordinate three divisions to the I SS Corps, because it was loyal to Hitler and would have posed a direct danger to him.

Baron von Geyr must have known this as the commander of the Panzer Group under Rommel at the time, as he had a positive attitude towards Rommel's convictions and political intentions.

If Rommel had thrown the 2nd and 116th Army Panzer Divisions, which were held in reserve and were both in the immediate vicinity of the invasion area, into the defensive battle on the second day of the invasion at the latest, i.e. at the enemy's moment of defeat, instead of waiting for the 1st SS Panzer Division lying in Belgium, this action could have made a decisive contribution to preventing the formation of an Allied beachhead.

It is clear from this that the Allied forces were not free from taking into account their own plans for the surrounding area in their operational decisions to repel the enemy, however much they may have been anxious to maintain a firm front against the western Allies as a precondition for possible armistice negotiations.

Holding back armored divisions for the purposes of the conspiracy was a betrayal of the fighting force, which was worn down in fragmented operations on the invasion front. It was the worst kind of sabotage against the German command!

The extent to which the units deployed on the invasion front saw themselves betrayed is described by *Lothar van Greelen*, who himself went through the hell of the defensive battlefield as a small unit commander, in his harrowing war biography pVerkauA und verraten'. qAmong the men of the Panzer Corps that deployed for the attack on the Orne, there is no one who knows that everything was lost before they were thrown onto this front. They could not know, because not even the divisional commanders and commanding generals in Normandy had any idea of this, namely that the Commander-in-Chief West had been in possession of the operational plan of the US VII Corps since June 8 and thus knew all the details of the American attack.

details of the American offensive in its implementation.
knew.

The Russian lieutenant Koranin and his Volga Tatars from Eastern Battalion 439 broke up an American landing craft between Gefiosses and Fontenay and recovered three dead US naval officers. By chance, the officers responsible for the landing from the Allied invasion headquarters, including plans and maps, had come to him.

General Eri& Mariks, the commanding general in the Normandy, acted immediately. But that was not enough. He was alone with his sdiwadten forces and had nothing to expect from the Commander-in-Chief West.

Although the Commander-in-Chief West had been receiving ongoing reports from the Paris Defense Control Center since May 1944 about Allied preparations for the imminent invasion, no military action was taken. And when the think& counter-intelligence reported precise information about the time and point of the planned Allied landing, the Commander-in-Chief West dismissed the possibility as nonsense.

The troop leaders on the invasion front had their hands tied. They had to watch as, on June 4, a total of 124 aircraft were withdrawn to Metz from the 160 aircraft of the fighter squadron 26 available for deployment on the Channel coast and operational army units, including a battle-hardened infantry division, were deployed to the east.

Lothar van Greelen further reports that during the decisive night of June 5-6, 1944, the Chief of Staff of Army Group Rommel [the insurer Speidel] organized a literary evening at which Ernst Jünger, who was present, was to present a plan to eliminate Hitler. In the same hours, the staff of the LXXXIV Army Corps in St. Lß celebrated the birthday of the Commanding General, higher commanders in Normandy and group leaders of the 7th Army began their journey to a large-scale planning meeting scheduled for June 6.

exercise to Rennes [Brittany], the naval commander West rad Bordeaux and the t. The general staff officer of a division deployed for coastal defense was even on a hunting expedition far from his staff quarters.

Already in the late afternoon of that fateful day, the nad ridite men of the German radio surveillance had noticed a lively traffic between British stations and the bases of French resistance groups. The transmissions of various radio sprays increased in frequency until finally, at midnight, British stations called on the French resistance in plain language to stop their collection points, to take partial action and to await the Allied landing ...

While all this was happening and most of the troop leaders
of the weak defense forces in Normandy left their command posts, 5,000 landing craft and 702 Allied warships approached the Channel coast between St. More Eglise and the Orne estuary, the 82nd and 101st US Airborne Divisions *took off* from their bases in southern England with
13,000 men and the entire British 6th Luf(lande-Division in several waves.
waves to jump behind the German coastal defenses. The largest landing operation
in the history of the war had begun.
initiated. The Allied operation 'Overlord' was underway ... t8,000 men fell from the sky. The first bombing tents drummed the German soldiers of the inadequate defense out of the sdilaf. Unexpectedly and without prior warning, they were confronted by suddenly appearing enemy paratroopers over long distances. Without waiting for orders, the German soldiers fought alone in the darkness of a confusing night at the Orne-BrüAen, in the area of Carentan and south and west of Merderet'^.'

At the Commander-in-Chief West, where the alarming reports were overflowing, the airborne landings were dismissed as a deceptive maneuver.

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109 Lothar van Greelen, "Verkaufi und verraten", Munich 1963, page 25 ff.

were dismissed. The Commander-in-Chief West, Feldmars&all von Rundstedt, always refrained from putting the 7th Army lying on the coast and the LXXXIV Army Corps, which was holding the coastal section between Caen and the west coast of the Cotentin peninsula, on alert, and Rommel had been at his family home in Herr)ingen on his way to the Führer's headquarters since the morning of June 4.

This meant that the German leadership failed to take any decisive action.

The enemy acted according to his operational plan, as if he knew very well that the top German leadership in France would not allow him to be stopped if he knew his intentions. For the head of Allied field reconnaissance was already well aware within twenty-four hours that the Allied operational plan had fallen into the hands of the Germans.

had fallen into the hands of the Germans.

The German reaction failed to materialize, and the sacrifice of the German

sd'en units can.

After fierce battles with heavy losses, the elite regiments of the 2nd Brigade Army were able to establish themselves on the heights east of the Orne and form up their tanks for the offensive, in order to establish a link between the remnants of the 2nd SS Panzer Division and the German troops past Caen, which was heroically defended by the 12th SS Panzer Division. SS-Panzer Division and the 2nd SS-Panzer Division, which was bleeding to death in the counterattack and defense.

2nd SS Panzer Division Das Rei&'.

And it was into this hell that the II SS Panzer Army Corps with its two divisions, the SS Panzer Division pHohenstaufen' and the 10th SS Panzer Division pFrundsberg' under the command of Ober- Gruppenführer Paul Hausser were thrown that day after a day-long march overland with no losses.

10. SS-Panzerdivision pFrundsberg' under the command of Ober- gruppenführer Paul Hausser. However, because the 7th Army did not allow time for the deployment of all its parts and reconnaissance of the attack area, the corps had to attack under the most unfavorable circumstances, one of the many orders given since the first landing day of the Allied forces on June 6, 1944 by a tinents';h1osseneri and the seriousness of the situation negating leadership.

the seriousness of the situation. As a result, the few forces available were not deployed in a meaningful way, neither in time nor with a concentrated force, and the best divisions were constantly being frittered away.

Only when the mass of enemy airborne troops had gathered and formed up in the Orne and Merderet valleys did the orders go out. But it was too late to intercept the Allied airborne assault in a direct and devastating attack. The disaster took its course.

Two thousand one hundred four-engine and six hundred two-engine bombers attacked the German positions and supply zones on a seventy-kilometer-wide coastal strip in preparation for the invasion. In just a few days, the Allies had landed five to ten divisions with a total of 326,000 marines and 140,000 tons of war materiel, while only the 709th, 353rd and 7t6th Infantry Divisions were initially deployed to defend the attacked coastal strip. Infantry Division with the 21st Armored Division in reserve. The immediate deployment of the 21st Armored Division could have dispatched the imminent disaster. But despite the orders of the Commanding General of the 84th Army Corps, Eridi Mar':ks, the Commander-in-Chief West did not immediately release this division.

When the release finally took place in the early afternoon hours, the opportunity was gone. The death march of this division could no longer force a decisive success.

The two elite units deployed near Paris, the Army's Panzer-Ohrdivision and the 12th SS-Panzerdivision, w o u l d also have been in a position to destroy the first Allied bridgeheads in the attack and force General Eisenhower to abandon the invasion if they had been deployed immediately. Similarly, the immediate deployment of the 2nd and 116th Army Armored Divisions, which had been held back for "political considerations", could have saved the situation at the enemy's moment of defeat on the first day of the invasion.

Walter Bargatzle y, co-insurer in the staff of General von Stülpnagel, provides clarification in the publication July 20, 1944 ,

what they had to deal with in Paris during these hours of war.

qWhile Hinter's blood-curdling voice rang out over all the radio stations, promising the bikes forditerlid, the Paris prisons closed behind hundreds of SD men. Stülpnagel, two hours away by car, wrestled with Kluge over the execution. Teudiert implored Lin- stow [Stülpnagel's chief of staff, Colonel von) to delay the arrest until Stülpnage1 returned.

Only the three of us agreed after a brief consultation: Paris must take over Berlin's legacy. From the west, where the uprising had proceeded like clockwork, the Browns in the Reich had to receive the final fatal blow. Stülpnagel would have to give the order to shoot the four SD colonels, if necessary without trial, and open the floodgates to Eisenhower's and Montgomery's invasion troops so that they could stream to the Rhine together with the German units. Earlier, when we wanted to despair because the attack never came to fruition, we had talked about it. General Speidel had won. He had unobtrusively deployed the SS divisions [Waflen-SS) on the most distant wing of the invasion front"°.

The true intentions of the Chief of Staff of the Army Group on the invasion front, Speidel, and those of his friends, cannot be clearly revealed.

Fsd on before', it says in the publication qDer 20. Juli"'*, when Feldmarsd'all von Rundstedt nodi led the OberbefeM in the West, Tres&ow went so far as to suggest to Stauffenberg that Speidel's tactical measures were intended to enable the Allies to break through the German lines.'

According to a report by Wilhelm von Sdiramm in his book 'Der 20. Juli in Paris', the Paris resistance group under General von Stülpnagel intended to use the English

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t10 Walter Bargatzky in p20. July 1944' by Zimmermann and Jacobien, Bonn 1925, 5th edition, page 317 t.

111 Henri& Fraenkel and Roger Manuell, 'Der 20. Juli', Berlin t964, page 8t.

and Americans should not be resisted at all when they landed, but the gate to Reidi and the way to Berlin should be opened to them"°'.

It is not hard to guess that the battle-hardened elite units of the Waflen-SS must have been a thorn in the side of the invaders, because they could only be a hindrance to their plans for overthrow. Thus the Tresdtows and Sdilabrendorffs in the staffs on the invasion front, who longed for the German military defeat in order to be able to overcome Hitler's rule, must h a v e had hardly any inhibitions about exposing the Waffen SS divisions to destruction in the fragmented deployment on the invasion front and paving the way to Berlin for the Western Allies once the invasion had succeeded.

According to a further report by Wilhelm von Sdiramm, everything could not have been in order on the staff of Commander-in-Chief von Rundstedt. Von Sdiramm reports that Rommel and Stülpnagel spoke openly with Rundstedt and the members of his staff, in particular with the Chief of Staff, General of the Infantry Blumentritt, and the 1st General Staff Officer, Colonel i. G. Bodo Zimmermann. Bodo Zimmermann, were quite open about the fact that the staff of the Commander-in-Chief West did not assess the situation any differently than the conspiratorial circles, with the only difference being that Field Marshal von Rundstedt would not have drawn any conclusions from this.

Field Marshal von Kluge, on whom the influence of Tres&ow from the middle section of the eastern front must have had a lasting effect, was different, otherwise he would not have sent Lieutenant Colonel Caesar von Hofacker, Stauffenberg's cousin, to Berlin as Commander-in-Chief West, to report that he, Kluge, would support the state campaign with all the forces under his command as soon as Hitler was dead. But like Rommel, he wanted no part in the attempt on the Führer[1^].

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112 Ritter Wilhelm von Sdiramrn, "July 20 in Paris", page 23 f. Hi Henrich Fraenkcl and Roger Manuell, Der 20. Juli', page 81 f.

According to Beridit von Speidel, Rommel's relationship with Rundstedt was trusting. He [Rundstedt] well understood Hitler, whom he only called the 'Bohemian corporal' in all confidential discussions, following the example of Hindenburg, but whom he regarded as the 'last word in wisdom'. He left the tone to others. During a discussion on the formulation of joint demands to Hitler, he said to Rommel: 'You are young, the people know and love you, you must make them mad!

It is clear from these reports that the Hödist military leadership (Rommd, Stülpnagel, Rundstedt and, after his replacement, Kltige) and their staffs were torn to shreds by the conspiracy.

While the defensive dilatht raged on the invasion front and the decision was on the side of the masses, the conspirators in the military leadership continued to be preoccupied with their manifold preparations for the overthrow instead of fulfilling their duty.

The defensive measures taken by Army Group ß in the three days following Rommel's €iberzeugung, which were decisive for the success or failure of the defense against the invasion, show that the operational approach was not unaffected by the decision of the invaders to overthrow. This becomes clear beyond the critical assessment of Colonel General Guderian in the course of the defensive battles of the first days of the invasion, about which Rommel's chief of staff, General Speidel, reports"':

"The Army Group had ordered a precautionary alert for its entire front from the first days of June, because Commander-in-Chief West had issued agent reports that the invasion could begin between June 6 and 5. June was possible ...

On June 5, 10 p.m., the l5. Army again intercepted a cue that indicated the start of the invasion.

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t t4 Hans Sptidel, **"Slnvasion 1944",** page 98 If.

The 15th Army had, of course, immediately alerted its troops and audi the Nadibarn armies. The Western Command, to whom the message was transmitted by telephone, refrained from alerting the entire front ...

In the early hours of June 6, the Chief of the General Staff of Hecresgruppe B [Speidel] received reports of airdrops in the Caen area and in the south-eastern part of the Cotentin peninsula. At first i t was not clear whether these were airdrops by larger units or whether they were stronger liaison troops being dropped to support the resistance movement in France. Especially in the area between the Seine and Omc, the airdrops were widely scattered. Nevertheless, orders were given by telephone everywhere to be ready for action. Between three and four o'clock in the morning, the reports of parachute drops became more frequent. Bombs were also dropped on coastal fortifications, and strong enemy air forces were reported in the approach. The armored divisions standing in reserve were made ready for Mars. The ni&t subordinate General Command of the I SS Panzer Corps immediately received instructions to contact the corps of General of Anillerie Eri& Marcus commanding on the coasts of the Calvados and on the Gotentin and the deployed divisions. The 21st Armored Division received the order to move into its reconnoitered deployment areas south of Caen. The high command of the Wehrmadit and the OberbefeMs- haber West were subriditet.

At 5.30 a.m., the occupation of the Ca1rad'nkücte by hundreds of riflemen began immediately. The long-planned automatic defensive measures began. The orders prepared for the case of 'Normandy' were issued.

The Chief of the General Staff of Army Group B reported the situation and initial measures to his commander-in-chief between 6 and 6.30 a.m. on 6 J--' -wis':h, which Field Marsd'all

Rommel approved He immediately ordered the onward journey to Berditesgaden (where he wanted to present Hitler with his military and political situation

and arrived at his command post in La Rodie Guyon between 4 and 5 p.m. on June 6.

Issuing operational directives was out of the question in the early days as long as reports and the reconnaissance units sent everywhere had not clarified the situation. One had to have the nerve to wait. Constant calls from the OKW and the O.B. West gave evidence of the nervousness in the hiidist places ...

From 6 o'clock onwards, the reports of the deployment of troops intensified ... On the 6th in the afternoon, the scene of a major landing between Orne and Vire became apparent¡ The situation between the Seine and Orne and in the south-east corner of the Gôten- tin, where Allied airborne units of unknown strength had jumped off, remained unclear.

Anticipating that every hour would count in an enemy landing in order to destroy the forces that landed first and prevent the enemy from reinforcing and gaining space, Rommel had already given the 21st Panzer Division in the area south of Caen the combat order in May to use the enemy's moment of weakness on landing for an 'automatic counterattack'. All possibilities were prepared according to the terrain and forces of the war. The 21st Panzer Division had been placed in this crucial position by Rommel, but he was denied further armored forces ...

After Hitler, despite repeated requests, did not release any further reserves, the 21st Panzer Division launched a counterattack on both sides of the Orne at 10 a.m. on June 6 on the orders of the commanding general of the LXXXIV Army Corps, General of Artillery Mar&s. The advance of the armored forces led to the coast and established contact with the parts of the 716th Division that were still in their bases there. When the opponent deployed new landing troops into the attacking armored units and into the area east of Caen, the decision was made locally to call off the attack and to fight the rearward parts free.

In this way a favorable service was rendered to the enemy and the initial success was not exploited"

Who, we must ask General Speidel, gave the following order to abort the successful attack? General Speidel should have been able to determine this and certainly did so in view of the serious consequences of the abort order. Why does he withhold the name of the local commander?

Speidel continues: qIn May, Field Marshal Rommel had repeatedly demanded the deployment of the I. SS Panzer Corps SS Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler with the t2. SS-Panzerdivision 'Hitler- jugend' and the Panzer-Lehr-Division in the area between Caen and Falaise, he wanted to make the demand again to Hitler on June 6. The immediate deployment of this armored corps in the area of the enemy landing could have had some local success ...

On the evening of June 6, the enemy had formed a bridgehead 2S km wide and up to t0 km deep between Orne and the area north of Ryes, and a second one 15 km wide and 4 km deep in the southeast of Gotentin, with undisturbed sea and air superiority ...

The attack by the I SS Panzer Corps was launched on June 9, after the enemy's moment of invasion had passed on the third day of the invasion. So much for Speidel's report.

Here the crucial question arises as to why Speidd does not mention the 2nd Army Armored Division and the 116th Army Armored Division, which, according to Guderian Rommel's critical presentation above, were resurrected just like the
21st Army Panzer Division and which also did not belong to the OKW reserve. According to Guderian, the 2nd Army Panzer Division was in the Amiens-Abbéville area on June 6 and the 116th Army Panzer Division was east of Rouen north of the Seine, while the
J. SS-Panzerdivision qLeibstandarte Adolf Hitler" (LAH) was in Beverloo (Belgium) at the same time and had an almost twice as large

The German army had the same distance to the invasion front as the army armored divisions held back by Rommel. So why did they always insist on the immediate deployment of the OKW reserve under his command, which in the case of the 1st SS Panzer Division had to overcome an almost twice as long approach route from Belgium through the heaviest enemy air attacks, instead of making an effort to bring in the Army Panzer Divisions under his command and throwing them into battle to support the 21st Army Panzer Division on the second day of the invasion at the latest? The 2nd and 116th Army Armoured Divisions could have been ready for the attack on the second day of the invasion by the evening of June 6.

The retention of the two army armored divisions was openly political, that is, determined by the intention to have reliable armored divisions of the army available for the overthrow, as Baron von Geyr, then commander of the armored group on the invasion front, clearly expressed in his article in the irii':hen newspaper Ari Cosantoir'. Speidel confirms that the conspiracy could rely on the two army armored divisions mentioned, or more precisely, on their commanders, when he writes: 'Voices were raised in the troops. The commander of the 16th Panzer Division, Lieutenant General Graf Schwerin, submitted a memorandum on the military situation and demanded an end to the war and a change in the National Socialist regime on behalf of the troops. His reliable Panzer Division was also in his hands for use against internal enemies. The same applied to the 2nd Panzer Division under Lieutenant General Freiherr von Lüttwitz to"°."

It was therefore no coincidence that Rommel kept these two divisions in s&onal reserve in order to have them available for political considerations. It is therefore further understandable that the 2nd Armored Division, according to Speidel's report, was not deployed until 13 J i << -

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t t5 House 5peidd, "Invasion 1944", Srice 126.

and the 116th Army Armored Division was not deployed to the front until the end of July.

July for the first time on the front line.

On the other hand, the VersAwörer in the military leadership of the invasion front could only be very interested in wearing out the strong Waffen SS units in the defensive battle of the invasion front, as they would certainly have become very dangerous to the Umstüizler after a successful assassination attempt on Hitler; because they would never have been considered for the purposes of conspiracy if the Waflen SS leaders of the invasion front had expressed their momentary anger and displeasure at the Wehrmacht High Command to Commander-in-Chief Rommel. They had no idea of the treacherous activities of the resistance clique in the invasion area and in Paris.

A few days after the meeting between Field Marshals von Rundstedt and Rommel and Hitler on June 17 in Margival, Rommel and his chief of staff Speidel informed the commanders-in-chief, commanding generals, division commanders and chiefs of the general staff about the completely negative outcome of the Führer's meeting and the consequences resulting from it. Field Marshal Rommel made it more or less clear to the individual leaders, depending on their political views, that independent action by the Wehrmacht in the West might prove necessary in the course of the military events. Colonel General von Salmuth (l5. A r m y], Colonel General Dollmann [7th Army] and General of the Panzer Troops Freiherr von Geyr [Panzer Group West] agreed with the Field Marshal's assessment of the situation and expressed their confidence in the commander-in-chief of the army group. They were prepared to follow the orders of the field marshal, even if they might contradict the orders of the Führer"® ."

At the same time, the new quartermaster in the west, Colonel i. G. Finckh, reported to the command post of Army Group Rommel on behalf of General Quartermaster Wagner in order to

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116 Hans Speidel, "Invaiion 1944", page t25.

Rommel was to report to him on the preparations for the elimination of Hitler and the planned coup and on a new attack that was to be carried out in Ber&tesgaden.

Rommel, who continued to insist on Hitler's condemnation rather than his assassination, instructed Colonel Fin':kh to '*discuss* with the Quartermaster General the urgent need to organize all measures at headquarters and at home and to report back to him as soon as possible'.

When the commander-in-chief of the 7th Army, Colonel-General Dollmann, died of a heart attack on June 29, SS-Obergruppenführer Hausser, who had been a member of Ludendorff's staff during the First World War, was a p p o i n t e d as his successor. The fact that he was accepted into the higher military leadership on the invasion front with mixed feelings, as Speidel believes, cannot be attributed to him. because he did not fit into the circle of insurgents. It would have been much better to have seen Rommel's artillery g e n e r a l Erich Mardts i n Hausser's place, but he was rejected by Hitler for political reasons because he deeply mistrusted Marcks, the former ministerial director in General Sdileidier's cabinet. Around the same time, Feldman "iiall von Rundstedt was replaced by Feld- marsdiall von Kluge as O.B. West and on July 5th the O.B. of Panzer Group West, General Freiherr von Geyr, was relieved of his post and replaced by General der Panzertruppe Eberbach. Von Geyr was blamed by Hitler for the failure of the counterattack of the II SS corps was blamed and accused of defeatism.

accused of defeatism.

On July 9, 1944, Lieutenant Colonel d. Res. Dr. von Hofa'ker (cousin of Count Claus von Stauffenberg) arrived at Rommel's staff quarters on behalf of the military commander of Frankreidi, General von Stülpnagel, to obtain a conclusive assessment of the situation on the invasion front for Be& and Stauffenberg. On the basis of a memorandum, he presented his and the military commander's thoughts on the need for swift and decisive action as a result of the overall political and military situation and concluded

with the urgent appeal of all resistance forces to the field marsdiall to end the war in the West as sdually as possible on their own. It was an appeal for insurrection, which adopted the view of the Berlin resistance forces that the Allies would never negotiate with Hitler or one of his 'paladins' - Göring, Himmler or Ribbentrop - and that therefore these leaders had to be eliminated at the same time as the system …"

In response to Hofadters' clear question as to how long the invasion front could still hold, because the Berlin decisions would be influenced by it to a certain extent, Rommel gave the equally clear answer: 'A maximum of four days to three weeks, then we can talk to the Durdibrudi. We have nothing more to oppose him.

Nad lecture at the O.B. West was to inform Colonel General Bek and the other leaders of the resistance in Berlin and prepare the timely organization of all measures of the coup. Nad' your July 15, he was to lecture Rommel again.

The possibility of the froniiibertritu of authorized representatives to negotiate a ceasefire - according to Speidel page t34 - had already b e e n tested with the 2nd Army Panzer Division by the above-mentioned Lieutenant General Freiherm von Lüttwitz. The Allied leadership had offered to exchange the female nursing staff and soldiers who had fallen into their hands during the capture of Cherbourg for seriously wounded soldiers at a place designated by them, where the exchange took place during a two-hour truce.

This event confirms that the organizers could rely on Baron von Lüttwitz. But whether his lower officer ranks, non-commissioned officers and men of the 2nd Army Armored Division would have actually followed the Yersdiwörung in the event of a successful assassination attempt on Hitler on July 20 is another question. At best, the mass of officers, non-commissioned officers and men would have been allowed to lie.

orders for a short time, as happened in Berlin and Paris on July 20, 1944

On July 12, another discussion took place between Rommel and von Kluge, which resulted in a final and complete agreement in the assessment of the military and political situation, whereupon Rommel instructed his chief of staff, Speidel, to inform his co-insurer, General von Stülpnagel, about the situation, his absidites and the discussions with von Kluge. It was to be expressed under all circumstances that Rommel was prepared to act, even if von Kluge could not decide to cooperate. The orientation took place late in the evening of t3. July in Paris"°.'

On July 15, Rommel sent an ultimate memorandum to Hitler with the following words: 'The troops are fighting heroically everywhere, but the unhappy battle is drawing to a close. And he added with his own hand: 'Ida must ask you to draw the conclusions from this situation. I feel it is my duty as commander-in-chief of the army group to make this clear.

After sending off his thoughts, Rommel said: 'I have now given him the last chance. If he does not draw any conclusions, we will act"^.'

On July 17, Rommel was so severely wounded at the front by an enemy air attack that he was no longer able to continue his command of his army group. Field Marshal von Kluge took over the command of Army Group B as Supreme Command West.

Three days later, on July 20, Count Stautfenberg's assassination attempt on Hitler took place at the Führer's headquarters and the coup d'état was carried out in Berlin.

In Paris, on the other hand, General von Stiilpnagel was known to have succeeded on the afternoon of July 20 in forcing twelve hundred SS men to

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117 Haas Speidel, "Inruioii **t944", page 135.**
t **l8 Haut Speidel, Inraiion 19s', page t39.**

SD and the Gestapo, who in their stupefaction surrendered without resistance, were imprisoned.

Some SS officers who managed to escape from the detention center alerted the commander of the Waffen-SS division 'Hitler Youth', who in turn informed the commander of the Leibstanddarte gAdolf Hitler, Sepp Dietridi. The July 20 attack in Paris was thus a failure, because the guard regiment, which in its mass anyway had no idea what it was b e i n g used for, would never have
the battle-hardened armored divisions of the Waffen SS.

On July 20, 1944, the resistance practically came to an end. Those who were not appeased by Colonel General Fromm's oath of allegiance and imprisonment for sentencing by the People's Court could only be interested in saving their heads through emphatically loyal behavior.

This probably applied above all to Feldmarsdlall ron Kluge, whose complicity in the conspiracy was already known to Hitler. It can therefore be assumed that after the failure of the assassination attempt and the attempted coup in Berlin, von Kluge was willing to fight the further defensive battles on the invasion front successfully, although hopes for this could only be very low due to the daily increasing superiority of the enemy.

Whether Feldmarsdiall von Kluge will be bought a S&uld for the Dur'hbrudi at Avrandies at the end of July is very questionable. According to Spei- del's report, an independent decision was taken by the 7th Army to unite its forces of the west wing, which had been cut off as a result of the Durthbrudi of St. Lo, with the forces of the XXIXVII Armored Corps (consisting of the 2nd and 116th Army Armored Divisions), which were gathering for the counterattack to the southeast. The army order was immediately countermanded by Field Marshal Kluge on July 29, because he had released the Avraridtes key pocket without a fight. However, the counter-order came too late in the face of the raging storm of enemy armored units and airborne forces.

From July 30 to 3t. July 1944, Army tank forces took possession of Patton Avrandies. The enemy's operational breakthrough was imminent and the crisis had reached its climax. Between the St. L8 area and the bay of St. Malo, the front line had been torn apart. Battle groups under good leaders held nodi as wave breeds, whose overwhelming was only nodi a matter of days or even hours. Counterattacks to advance as far as Avrandies and restore the torn battle line continued. The enemy had succeeded in breaking through at Avrandies.

In his letter of 18 August 1944 to Hitler, in which he summarized the reasons for the collapse of the invasion front, von Kluge said that, given the superiority of the enemy forces, it would have been impossible to prevent the breakthrough at Avrandies after the promised aid had never arrived and his operational proposals had been rejected.

It is not possible to analyze how things really went at Avranches, as Speidel only deals with the operations there in broad strokes, apart from the fact that he was one of the main players in the conspiracy and therefore his reporting on various phases of the invasion battle cannot claim to be reliable.

Whether the commanders Count Sd werin and Baron von Lüttwitz, who were deployed with their army armored divisions, the 2nd and 1 t6th, in the Sdiladit near Avrandtes, p l a y e d an impeccable role after the conspiracy had been carried out, is a question that cannot be answered despite their positive attitude towards the coup plans and their corresponding declarations.

On August 6, Hitler ordered a counterattack from Mortaine with all available armored forces, with the aim of regaining contact with the coast and, at the same time, to cut off the American divisions that had passed through from their nadi thrust, but this attack led by Kluge failed. Hitler reacted to the failure of this counterattack with even more mistrust of the Commander-in-Chief West, whom he

knew that he was privy to the plans of the insurrection.

Colonel General *Heinz Guderian* writes about this: 'Hitler was quite distraught at the news that Field Marshal von Kluge h a d not returned from a trip to the front. He suspected that the field marshal had made contact with the enemy [on the basis of enemy nadiridites, where a German general tried to make contact with the Western Allies]. He therefore ordered him to the Führer's headquarters for reporting. Feld- man "fiall vOn Kluge, however, madite on the way his life durchdi Gifi an end"[1]°.

The main culprit for the shrill formation of the Anglo-American brooding heads was undoubtedly Speidel, because his comradely omissions in the nad t to - June gave the enemy

t h e opportunity to use the German defenses and side forces in the coastal forces in the coastal area of Normandy by its airborne troops in completely surprising sneak attacks and hand-to-hand strikes.

We learn how this came about from *Paul* Cnrelf, who gives a detailed and authentic account of the invasion in his book 'Äste kommen'.

Carell explains that the German command had learned of the imminence of the invasion to the day from the Allied radio, but that the commanders-in-chief and their staffs responsible on the invasion front dismissed those Allied radio reports as nonsense.

The Allied High Command had set up the above-mentioned secret organization (SOE) for nadir intelligence and sabotage in France, which was spread throughout the occupied territory. Nadi reports were transmitted by radio or by carrier pigeon. The Allied staff in London had prepared the "Plan qGreen" for Day X, with the aim of being ready hours before the

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t 19 Heinz Guderian, "Erinnerungen eines Soldaten", page 335.

invasion to destroy over 500 French railroad stations and pastures and make 50 main lines impassable. In addition, there was the "gsdiildkröte" plan, which was aimed at disrupting long-distance lines and blowing up crossroads, bridges and viaducts.

The main problem, the transmission of the operation order to the many section leaders in the various French operations, was solved by means of an ingenious method via radio. The heads of the sabotage organization were instructed to listen carefully to the BBC's French broadcasts on the 1st, 2nd, 15th and 16th of each month and to listen for a code word, namely the first line of Paul Verlaine's poem about autumn. If it came between the other messages, it meant that the invasion was imminent. From then on, the radio broadcasts had to be listened to constantly to wait for the second half of the verse, the so-called B-BotséhaR. If it also came, it meant that the invasion would come within the next 48 hours.

Although the whole thing was well thought out and carefully prepared, one of the many confidants was in the German service and revealed the verse of the French Gedidites to our Nadiridite service with the following wording:

qLes sanglots longs des violons de l'aotomne blessent
mon coeur d'une langueur monotone."

So it was that not only the rayon chiefs and the active saboteurs of the SOE carefully listened to the BBC broadcasts according to the verse of the Verlaine poem, but also the specialists of the nadiriÖite office of Colonel General Salmuth's 15th Army in the Tourcoing headquarters were waiting for the slogan. They were not fooled by the countless camouflage messages and waited, and their waiting was rewarded

"The war diary of the 15th Army," Carell continued, "which stood between the Seine and Meuse, contains five entries on June 5. The first one says that the night's post contains the first part of Verlaine's line 'Les sanglots longs des violons de l'automne' on J., 2.

and June 3. The second entry reports under the time 21.15: "Listened to the second half of the song 'Blessent mon coeur d'une langueur monotone'.

The third, fourth and fifth entries at 9.30 p.m., 10 p.m. and 10.00 p.m. show the dramatic excitement of the Sd'reber. They state that the sensational Nadiri'ht, the big secret, was passed on to the Chief of the 15th Army, the Commander-in-Chief West, the General Commandos, the 16th Flak Division, the military commanders in Belgium and France as well as Army Group B and the OKW in Rastenburg. By 10:15 p.m. on June 5 at the latest, the OKW, Field Marshal von Rundstedt, the Naval Group Staff in Paris and Army Group Rommel knew that the invasion w a s imminent.

No shot had been fired. The bombers were just taking off from the British flight plans. And the transports with the airborne troops were taxiing to the runways. The pilots and paratroopers all believed in their secret. Dodi their secret was sdionally revealed.

But don't worry - it sd adete nidits. A great effort had been wasted, the first victory had been lost by the detached high command. Colonel General von Salmuth did indeed deploy his l5. General von Salmuth immediately put his 5th Army, which was not in a state of readiness for the coming events, on high alert. But nothing else happened. Nothing at all: Army Group B [Speidel] did not alert its 7th Army and, hours later, let it become the unsuspecting victim of the most powerful attack in the history of war. The 84th Corps, against whose coastal divisions the first air and sea landings were directed, was taken by surprise. Neither the naval commander Normaridie, Admiral Henneéke, and his most important naval coastal batteries, nor the radar stations were alerted. Rommel was not immediately recalled from Herrlingen. His army group remained without its head for fourteen crucial hours, without the driving, all-dominant force. The Chief of Staff, General Speidel, was left to his own devices.

General Jodl at the Führer's headquarters can be conceded that he was of the opinion that Field Marshal von Rundstedt would sound the alarm. But he didn't because he didn't b e l i e v e in the invasion. The standard American work on the history of the invasion quotes a word from his staff: 'General Eisenhower announced the invasion ni&t over the BBC broadcasts.'

The information was simply not believed. A line of poetry by Vedaine - ladihah!

It remains unclear, however, why the General Staff of Army Group B (Speidel] allowed itself to be guided by this sovereign psy':hologic warfare and did not alert its corps and divisions from sid.

Thus the victory of the German defense remained without frudit. The nadit from S. to 6 June passed in routine work, carelessness and nt&t rarely in cozy cheerfulness'°°."

For us today, with the knowledge of the workings of the conspiracy, it is no longer so unclear why the active conspirator Speidel, Chief of the General Staff of Army Group B, refrained from immediately alerting his corps and divisions4 and did not immediately inform his commander-in-chief Rommel, who was on his way to his wife's birthday in Herrlingen, Württemberg, on June 5. On June 5, he w a s on his way to the Führer's headquarters for his wife's birthday in Herrlingen, a town in Württemberg, but he did not immediately telephone and return the call. "You had to have nerves of *steel*," said S p e i d e l in his report, an attitude that must be understandable when you t h i n k of the ideas of certain insurers. Then it was audi riditig to give Rommel the understandable short rest at home and to report the start of the invasion to him only in the early hours of the morning.

Is it not reasonable to assume that Speidel was referring to the message to Rommel with his friends, who spent the evening of June 8 at his house on the occasion of a "literary evening" with the writer Ernst Jünger? -

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120 Pent Carell, øsie komme-', Oldenburg 1960, Seier 17 &.

Erich *Kern* writes about the events on June 6 in his work "pAdolf Hitler and the War":

pThe Chief of the Wehrmad'tführpngsstab, General Jodl, received the first nadirid'ten from the Commander-in-Chief West, Fe1dmarsd'all von Rundstedt, of the Allied undertakings g--Jodlaber did not believe in an invasion.

When the Chief of Staff at Feldmandiall von Rundstedt, Major General Günther Blumentritt, asked for the tank reserve to be released, Jodl refused. He explained to his deputy, General Warli- mont: 'According to the reports I have received, it could be a diversionary attack - part of a deceptive maneuver. OB-West currently has sufficient reserves. OB-West should try to clear the attack with the forces at its disposal. I do not think the time has come to release the OKW reserves. We must wait for further clarification.

At Rundstedt State they were spradtios about this refusal. They were finally convinced that the invasion had begun. Despite Jodl's refusal, the two armored divisions were put on alert. Now only two men could have stabilized the situation: Field Marshal von Rundstedt or Field Marshal Rommel. Given the consequences to be feared of any delay beyond Jod1, they could have woken Hitler directly and asked him to make the decision. However, the exhausted soldier von Rundstedt could not bring himself to ask Hitler for anything and let things take their course; Rommel could not do anything, he was completely unaware of what was going on with his family. But the officers find men of the two elite divisions sat and waited. Hour after hour passed. More and more Americans and the British went ashore.

At 10.15 a.m. Speidel called Rommel in Herrlingen and told the field commander what had happened. Rommel listened, stunned. He replied tonelessly: 'How stupid of me!

How stupid of me!"* He immediately sped off in his car to his headquarters in La Rod e Guyon'°[1]."

Speidel's statement that he had reported the situation and initial measures to Rommel by telephone between 6 and 6.30 in the morning'^ does not apply to the above. Speidel was obviously not precise about the time of Rommek's return to his headquarters.

taken. While according to his statement Rommel ga J- -- arrived at his command post in La Rodie Guyon between 6 and 5 p.m., according to Admiral Friedridi Ruge™'s report, he only arrived in La Rodie Guyon in the evening. arrived in La Rod e Guyon in the evening. Admiral Ruge was the naval liaison officer for Army Group B and, as we w i l l see below, was very familiar with Romiisel.

By 10.t5 p.m. of S- J--i at the latest, Speidel had informed Nadu i&t of the start of the invasion.

the start of the invasion, but the Commanding General Mar&s of the decisive 84th Corps, against which the enemy's final attacks were being waged, did not know. Ned' nad Mitternadit Maixks was therefore tasked with preparing for the war game, for which he had been ordered to Rennes in Brittany by the commander of the 7th Army, Colonel General Dollmann. Dollmann himself, however, was unable to cancel the war game in Rennes, for which the widest commanders were already on their way, in good time, because the good nerves of the dispatcher Speidel prevented him from informing him sufficiently.

In order to get to the war game in time, Major General Falley and his Ib had set off from the 91st Airborne Division's command post near Picauville on June 6. When, at dawn, the enemy's raids against the hinterland roared over him, Falley, as a seasoned front-line officer, did not suspect anything good and ordered his driver to turn around and return to the command post.

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t21 Eridi Kern, "Adolf Hitler und der Krieg", Preußi d' Oldendorf, page 389 f.
122 Hnns Speidel, "Invasion 1944", page 98 ff.
12S Friedri& Rugg, pRommel and the Invasion', page 167.

The car turns off the main road directly into enemy MPi fire. General Falley jumps out of the car and fires two shots from his Walter pistol. Then Falley and his Ib Bartuzat fall in the enemy MPi fire.

The commander of the 9t. Airborne Division is dead before *a single* single order can be given'°*.

When the battle groups of the 91st Russian Division and the 709th Division were deployed late and without artillery escort, without tank destroyers and without anti-aircraft support for the unsuccessful attack against the American FallSdlirmjäger to capture and save the W5 base, it became apparent that the two German divisions were without a leader at the decisive hour. Falley had fallen on the way to Rennes and Lieutenant General von Schlieben had only returned from Rennes, where the battle was to take place, around noon on - J--i. returned."^

The regimental staffs of the 2t. Panzerdivision, whose detachments and companies were widely dispersed from each other and were in charge of their small units, were completely unaware of what was going on. At 10.30 p.m· the radio master made his last patrol at the regimental radio communications center and received the answer from the carefree front to his usual question "What's going on?": 'Nothing special, Herr Funkwad tmeister, only bomber attacks on the coast have been reported!

It was forty minutes after midnight when the commander of the III Battalion of the 919th Grenadier Regiment looked a t his watch. For an hour, the constant hum of airplanes had been heard over his position east of Montebourg. The commander stepped in front of the bunker and suddenly saw giant birds landing on his firing position. Seeing men jumping off, he thought at first that a turbine was faulty, until he realized that it was an enemy parachute.

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124 Paul Carc11, "They are coming", page 51 f.

125 Paul Cerell, "They are coming", page 64 f.

fighter mission. He had barely alerted his squadrons, which were bearing down on the enemy behind him, when the first burst of fire from an American MPi flashed out of the darkness. The surprise of the enemy was complete.

The German sentry on the east side of the bridge over the Caen Canal near Bénouville collapsed when, not far from where he was standing, an airplane suddenly flew towards the ground without the sound of an engine, causing it to crash and splinter. The guard snatched the carbine from the shoulder stock and loaded it. pA crashed bomber', he said, holding his breath. Then a hand grenade cradled him and knocked him down. The comrades in the sub-group scrambled, jumped to the machine gun and chased a Gart'e out. But the three platoons of the 6th British Airborne Division were stronger than the Brüékenwadie, and the c r o s s i n g over the Caen Canal at Bénouville fell into British hands in a surprising attack.

The Wad e on the Dives-Brü&e, which runs over the Stra& Vara- vill Grangues, was overwhelmed in a surprise attack and the bridge was blown up by the British.

The Dives bridge near Robehomme is similar. And the bridge at Troarn, which is in the way of traffic and over which the main road from Caen to Rouen and Le Havre crosses the river, was blown up by British sappers.

pWhen the first planes took off from England on D-day for the bombing raids against the Normandy coast, the German High Command in France knew that the invasion had begun. It had the proof in the literal sense on the table. Only - it did not use it.

This is not a legend or a movie story. The report of this sensation is in the official American war memoirs about the invasion; the proof can be found in the war diary of the German I S. Army. Intelligence and counterintelligence had uncovered the great secret, had penetrated its finely spun web. No German staff officer, no base commander

dant and no Landser should have been surprised by the invasion on June 6'^.°

The fact that the enemy was able to conquer

The fact that the enemy was able to conquer or b l o w up breakthroughs, occupy road junctions and take tactical positions throughout the front area was possible in the 3'xt, as shown in the examples above, because General Hans Speidel had alerted the units of his Army Group B in good time.

But this was sabotage on the invasion front.

Rommel's clear tactical principle was that the invasion would take place on the beach, and in the first 24 hours. pDon't let it come ashore' was Rommel's thesis, pLet it come' was that of Field Marshal von Rundstedt, who, like the leader of the armored group, General Freiherr Geyr von Sdlweppenburg, wanted to lead the deployment di1ad't far behind the coast. Hitler had made a decision in this dispute, which rejected Geyr's plan but did not completely reject Rommel's demand.

The course of the invasion strategy with the unintended

air superiority of the enemy confirmed the validity of Rommel's view. By the time the German armored divisions finally came into action, they were half destroyed by the enemy air force. On the other hand, Rommel was firmly mistaken in his assumption that the Allies would land at the Pas de Calais and at high tide.

The insurer Speidel was aware of his superior commander's opinion.

Rommel was certainly well aware of this, but he did not act danadi. He did not immediately alert the defensive forces of the army group in order to offer the enemy all the tactical advantages of his surprise attacks, he did not inform Rommel of the start of the invasion before 11 p.m. on June 5, and he also did not ensure that at least the 21st Panzer Corps would be able to take over.

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126 Pour Carell, "They are coming", page 17 If.

Division was deployed in the early morning of the first day of the invasion.

According to Paul Carell'°"s report, the commander of the 716th Infantry Division, General Ri'::hter, gave the commander of the 21st Armored Division, General Feuchtinger, who was under his command, the order by telephone at 1:20 a.m. on June 6 to attack and destroy the enemy forces that had landed with the closest parts of the armored division. At 2 o'clock, Riditer supplemented his order to Feuditinger to attack the airborne enemy east of the Orne with the entire armored division and to fight to clear the area. The 21st Armored Division was subordinated to the 716th Infantry Division, on whose shoulders the coastal defense in the British land division lay. But Feuditinger felt bound by the OKW's orders and waited in vain for authorization to deploy, which he did not even have to wait for, because his division was in the combat zone, which was subject to the military law that the enemy entering the combat zone must be attacked. It was only at around 6.30 a.m., after constant urging by Corps General Mar'ks and General Ridtter and after an excited debate, that General Feuditinger decided to intervene with his armored division on his own responsibility. But hours passed before the widely dispersed companies had their marching orders.

It had become the afternoon of the 6th when the first tank counterattack finally rolled onto the British beachhead. A few hours after the landing, at least six hours too late. If Rom-
mel had been at the front in the early hours of 6 J i, his presence and authority would have been enough to dispel the concerns of Panzer General Feuthtinger and clear the way for the immediate redirection of the 21st Parizerdivision.

12s Piu1 Carell, 'They are coming', p. 98 f.

Vor den Augen der deutschen Landser flog diese wichtige griechische Nachschubbrücke in die Luft.

Am hellichten Tag sprengten dänische Saboteure mitten in Kopenhagen diese Radiofabrik, die für die deutsche Wehrmacht arbeitete.

Viel gefährlicher als die ganze alliierte Sabotage war die Sabotage, die in hohen und höchsten deutschen Führungsstellen verübt wurde. Ein klassisches Beispiel dafür lieferte Generalmajor Hans Oster, Leiter der Abteilung Z in der Deutschen Abwehr. Er sabotierte alle deutschen militärischen Kriegsmaßnahmen vom ersten Augenblick an und verriet überdies den westlichen Alliierten alle deutschen Angriffstermine im Westen.

Audi, the 12th SS Panzer Division and the Panzer Lehrdivision could have started the attack on the morning of June 6 at 10 a.m. at the latest according to the long-prepared deployment plans. The commander of the Panzer Lehrdivision, Lieutenant General Bayerlein, had been alerted by General Warlimont from the Führer's headquarters at 2.30 am. The Jabo danger from the enemy air force would not have made this mission impossible, as the morning of June 6 was hazy and rainy and would have allowed a fairly undisturbed march to the front.

On June 6 in the morning, General Pickert had no news of the landings. General Pitkert and his **III** Flak Corps had been instructed to go into the beachhead immediately with his flak forces in the event of a landing on the Normandy coast. The battalions of the corps stood on the Somme. Three regiments, about sedis divisions were available, a strong firepower and a rudder for attack and defense. It was not until noon, when Pi&ert returned from an inspection tour, that he found the first reports, with the proviso that it was "not clear whether it was the big invasion".

These events clearly show that in the first few hours of June 6, the all-important head of the commander-in-chief was missing, who could have mastered the situation and prevented the formation of enemy brethren's heads. Rommel, who was not informed of the start of the invasion by his chief of staff, Speidel, by telephone until 10.30 a.m., did not return to his command post in La Rodie Guyon until the evening, at an hour *when* he could no longer succeed in initiating successful counter-operations in good time.

But it was only the sensational report from the 15th **Army**'s nadiridite team under Colonel General Salmuth that should have alerted all the forces on the Normandy front, but also that of a Na& ridite company lying on the Channel Island of Guernsey. About this

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t28 Paul Carell, "They are coming", page 116 f.

Colonel (retd.) *Hand* Oefze, the commander of the siding regiment, which was also located on this Channel Island, reported the following:

pOn the evening of June 5, a Lultnadirid ten company, equipped with the best Freya and Würzburg locators available at the time, was lying on the Channel Island of Guernsey, which had been conquered by the German Wehrrnadit.

At around 10.40 p.m., four-engined, heavy Lancaster bombers appeared on their screens in regular formation and at equal intervals; behind each aircraft, at equal intervals, another missile could be observed, which could soon be identified as a cargo glider.

A total of 180 of these 'teams' are located by this one air nadirid company ...

The company commander wants - responsibly - to be completely sure of his position before he sounds the alarm. That's why he asks the commander of a named army service regiment into his observation room, who confirms that it's not just a figment of over-excited nerves.

The colonel's decision was quick and he skipped all the relevant offices in his long official channels and immediately contacted the superior general command of his corps in St. L8 (Normandy coast). He demands the Chief of Staff. The latter is unrepentant. He now wants to speak to his First General Staff Officer (Ia). Absent Plagued by distress, the colonel now demands to see the commanding general personally ...

Then he bursts his collar: one of the gentlemen is in Paris for a meeting with the army group, the other is at a birthday party and one is on vacation, the officer on duty, an orderly officer, tells him.

The colonel orders him, or even commands him, to sound an airborne alert immediately because, according to his impression, a major landing operation will take place on your mainland in the next few minutes. The officer on duty promises to do his best to ...

About 20 minutes later, the general command reports back. The gentlemen of the staff wished the comrade on the island a good night and advised him not to see any ghosts and not to let the horses run wild ...

Another 20 minutes later, the la of the general's command, all excited, now on the line himself: 'You were right. Big airborne troops behind the whole front. Alert!'

This delayed the defense against the Anglo-American invasion in the center of the front by at least thirty minutes. The Lancasters were able to send off their paratroopers without resistance to cover the landing sites and the cargo gliders were able to land completely undisturbed behind the front line ...'

The event was witnessed, recorded and transmitted by Colonel (ret.) Hans Oelze, the commander of the aforementioned security regiment on the British Channel Island of Guernsey in that critical period from June 6, 1944, when the war finally turned"°.

Questions upon questions arise here: For what reason must the report of the commander of the Sidiening Regiment have been questioned by the staff of the General Command of the Z. Army under the command of Colonel General Dollmann? Army under the commander Colonel General Dollmann) Why did the latter cancel the war game in Rennes ordered for June 6 not even before midnight on June 5, when one finally had to believe in the enemy's final landings)

In view of that event, is it not reasonable to assume that the staff of Commander Dollmann was also displaced by the conspiracy like the other high staffs on the invasion front? The suspicion is very obvious, since Colonel General Dollmann declared to Rome that he was prepared to minimize the independent action of the Wehrmacht in the West at a crucial hour.

The more that is read into the events on the invasion front, the more one must come to the conclusion that no

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t29 Devudie Wodienzeitiing front January 11, 1974.

The fact is that it was not only negligence and irresponsibility, but also indifference, and not least sabotage, that was involved.

In addition to the serious obstruction caused by the enemy's naval and air power, the catastrophic proximity of the crossing and the confused command relationships, there was also the presence of the Anglo-American ghost army in the British ports and in the county of Kent, which was expected by the OKW and OB West Keith at another point on the Channel coast, in the Pas de Calais, which is why the intervention reserves for the Norman front were not released in time.released in good time. The enemy already provided enough information on the evening of June 6.

Carell reports: qWhen the 84th Corps received the evening report for the 6. June was discussed, Major Hayn explained: 'Three airborne divisions are perfectly there. That is three quarters of all the airborne units found in England. In addition, there are the US elite formations of the 4th and T divisions. It is out of the question that the British should sacrifice their best attack troops for the sake of a mere maneuver. And here', he said to Lieutenant Kretsébmer, the 03, 'Read Major Wiegmann's report from the Caen area. The 5th British Division and the 3rd Canadian Division had already been established around noon, and now we know that the 50th London Division and the 7th Armored Division are there. The SI. Highlanders and the 1st Armored Division, then we have Montgomery's entire 8th Army from North Africa on the neck If this is not the invasion, what is it supposed to come with?' The question made sense and convinced the staff officers. The ic of the Z. Army, Lieutenant Colonel Vorwerk, agreed. 'I completely agree with you,' even the Ic at the OB West von Rundstedt, Lieutenant Colonel Meyer-Detring, concurred. But that was the end of it. Rundstedt himself, especially the OKW and Hitler remained skeptical.

How the German High Command came to disbelieve the existence of this Allied ghost army is explained in detail.

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130 Paul Carell, psie kommen', page 96 f.

Carell gives a conclusive explanation, in which he states:

'Chester Wilmot, the allied war adviser who outdid all other allied war advisers, s':drives: ' At the fall of Cherbourg there were 25 British and American divisions in the beachhead. In the United Kingdom, 5 divisions were waiting to be deployed to Normandy and 6 were being trained as reinforcement depots for the British army on all fronts: 'The enemy has deployed 27-31 divisions and a large number of army troops of all kinds in the beachhead. In England there are no;;h 67 large units ready, of which at least 57 can be deployed in a major operation.'

The 42 non-existent divisions, which the German secret service placed in Eisenhower's reserves, were the result of British cunning and German incompetence. It was easy for the Allies to sell the German agents a deployment force that was exaggerated to the point of ridiculousness, as they found willing customers in the OKH's intelligence department. These foisted divisions clouded the judgment of the German High Command and helped to distort its strategy.

Cherbourg was the first frudite of this 'distorted' German strategy.

tegy. It was not to remain the only one'°(1) ."

In the Nadtridttenabteilung of the OKH sat the willing recipients of the tale of the Allies' ghost army, but also in all other departments of the OKH, the OKW and in the staffs of the commanders, because everywhere there were conspirators at work following Canaris' method of misleading the Wehrmacht leadership through false reporting and distorting their strategy. There was no need for British cunning to deceive and mislead the German military leadership. The conspiracy did this from the beginning to the end of the war.

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131 Paul Carell, "They are coming", page 205 f.

audi without **the help** of enemy agents. The German high command had to believe in another invasion elsewhere so that it w o u l d not think of throwing all the armored and infantry divisions in France onto the Normandy front and destroying the invasion. Keeping this belief alive could only serve the conspiracy.

If at least the 12th SS Panzer Division, the 2nd and 116th Hee- res Panzer Divisions with the 2nd Army Panzer Division, which Guderian stated were all under the command of Rome, had been deployed on the second day of the invasion. Army Panzer Division, which Guderian stated were all under Rommd's command, had been deployed on the second day of the invasion, the enemy forces that had landed could perhaps have been destroyed. The forces held back by Rommel
2nd Army Armored Division, held by Rommel, made its first appearance on t3. J-ni'°', i.e. on the 8th day of the invasion, when it was deployed to reinforce the Panzer Lehrdivision in the area between the British and American sectors of the invasion front.
was called in. With the help of its advance party, the village of Villers-Bocage was r e t a k e n , while the entire armored division was not deployed.

On July 25, i.e. after the failure of the assassination attempt on Hitler and the plot to overthrow him, the 2nd Army Panzer Division under General Lüttwitz returned to action at St. L8, while the 16th Army Panzer Division, also held in reserve by Rommel, was withdrawn. Hee- res-Panzerdivision under General Graf S':hwerin, also held in reserve by Rommel, was only thrown into **battle** for the first time on August 6. The 2nd and t16. Army Armored Division were combined with other armored divisions on this day in order to launch a massed panic attack from Mortaine against the Lodi of Avrandies and to cut off the American General Patton's army from its current connections. Although they did not succeed in routing the Avrandies army, the 2nd and ll6th Army Armored Divisions did not succeed in taking over the fortress. Army Armored Division, like the other divisions, fought bravely and proved to be strong fighting units. Nevertheless, if Rommel had

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132 Paul Carell, 'They **are coming',** page **t60.**

he would not have been able to overthrow Hitler and arrest him, as was his intention, with just a few army armored divisions due to his serious injury on t Z July.

On the question of whether the defense against the invasion was possible at all given the enemy's air and naval supremacy, former Grand Admiral *Karl Dönitz* came to the conclusion that the invasion would not necessarily have succeeded despite the enemy's air superiority,

> if Rommel's and the navy's view that the enemy would be defeated on the coast as soon as they landed had been pushed through as a unified view and the expansion of the defenses, deployment of the army units and plan for the course of operations after the landing had been prepared accordingly,
>
> if the army had not committed itself to the assumption that the enemy would land in the Somme area,
>
> if the Luftwaffe and Navy had done more f o r reconnaissance on the day before the invasion and on the night of its beginning, since an enemy landing could be expected with increased probability during these days due to the tides, and finally
>
> if both the Western High Command and Hitler had confirmed the
>
> Hitler would have immediately regarded the subsequent landing in Seine Bay as the main invasion'°°'.

And to these conditions would have to be added the very essential one: if there had been no conspiracy audi in the upper echelons on the invasion front, which from many weeks before the start of the invasion until July 20, 1944 was almost nodi riiier than in the central section of the eastern front.

According to strategic considerations, the army was, from the standpoint of

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133 Karl Dönitz, p10 Years and 20 Days", Bonn 1958, page 344 ff.

of the enemy that an invasion was most likely to take place in the Somme area, because from here the Anglo-Americans would be able to disable the *V-weapon* at the Pas de Calais, which posed a danger to London, most quickly, because from here they could quickly push through to Paris as part of the overall defense of western France, in order to then the entire rest of the coast west of the Seine, including the submarine harbors, because the approach route to the sea from the narrow coast was shorter here and from here the Allied air force could penetrate deeper into the hinterland of the invasion area and because a landing east of Le Havre would eliminate the only major natural obstacle, the Seine.

For the navy, on the other hand, the landing in the Somme area was not very likely for naval reasons, despite the considerations made by the army and despite all the modern means of landing. The coastline in this area, which was also exposed to westerly winds, must have made landing on this route very difficult. Nor did the navy believe that the enemy would land on the rocky coast of Brittany, which was unfavorable due to its sea and weather conditions.

On the other hand, it pointed to the Seine-Butht as a very advantageous landing site for the enemy because it had a wide sandy beach protected from westerly winds. Since the invader needed an efficient harbor soon after the start of the invasion, despite all modern aids and despite the construction of artificial harbor facilities on open coasts, the navy's argument in favor of the Seine-Butht as a presumably enemy landing site was the proximity of Le Havre.

Although the navy's argumentation, as presented by Dönin at a Führer briefing, was very convincing, the OKW and Rommel stuck to their almost certain assumption that the invasion would have to take place in the Somme area.

Thus, the German leadership was in complete uncertainty about the Allied landing site and whether the first invasion would be followed by others.

would be followed by others. Before the Allied invasion, Admiral Canaris' defenses again had nothing reliable to rely on.

The fact that not even the commanders-in-chief, Rundstedt and Rommel, shared the same views on the question of where the main battle line should be drawn up had a devastating effect. While Rommel always demanded and maintained that the **forces** should be drawn as close as possible to the coast in order to fight the landing enemy immediately, von Rundstedt was of the opinion that the enemy should be allowed to come ashore and then be destroyed with mobile forces.

This divergence in strategic and tactical planning was bound to have inevitable consequences in the defense against the invasion, because Rundstedt hesitated to release the urgently needed armored divisions for the main battle line in time and Rommel **resisted** withdrawing armored troops from the front in exchange for infantry divisions of two different combat units.

The opinions of the army and navy differed on the deployment of the coastal batteries. During a discussion of the situation at the Führer's headquarters, Dönitz put forward the Navy's approach of positioning the coastal batteries in such a way that they could fire directly and deliberately, because direct fire was less damaging and therefore more successful than indirect barrage fire. According to Hider, the guns near the beach were hardly more endangered by air attacks than those in the hinterland. However, Hider maintained the view of the OKW generals during almost one hour of tough discussion.

According to Döriitz'^ nodi's report, there were no coastal mines in the Seine-Bud't because the coast east of Le Havre was to be protected first, against the wishes of the Western Naval Group, on the express orders of the Commander-in-Chief West and the Führer's headquarters. When the Allies landed in the Seine-Bn&t on June 5-6, they did not encounter any effective mine barrages, and there were no Yorpost boats at sea.

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134 Karl Dónitz, "10 Years And 20 Days", page 394.

Naval Commander West was of the opinion that this landing was the actual major landing and nt&t a landing intended to divert attention from the main invasion. For this reason, he issued nod' in the nad't to all the naval services under his command the stidi word laid down for this case. The available naval forces were all dispatched to the invasion area.

On June 6, between 5:00 and 6:00 in the morning, the naval representative in the Führer's headquarters, Admiral Voss, called his commander-in-chief, Dönitz, to inform him that the military command staff was hesitating to throw all available divisions into the invasion area immediately. Dönitz got in touch with General Jodl and told him that he thought the landing in the Seine-Budit was the major landing, whereupon Jodl told him that the Commander-in-Chief West, Rurtdstedt, had doubts as to whether it was the major landing.

In his memoirs qRommel und die Invasion', Admiral Friedridi Ruge, who was commanded as a naval advisor to the staff of Army Group B (Field Marshal Rommel) from November 1943 to August 1944, conveys the extent to which Rommel was internally burdened by his ties to the Versdiwörung.

Admiral *Friedrich Ruge* based his remarks on daily diary records and wrote on June 9, 1944: "At this time it was clear to the staff that the invasion had succeeded, that there was no chance of pushing in and eliminating the large bridgehead and that, on the contrary, the enemy was constantly reinforcing itself ...

The Feldmarsdiall also felt the need to talk about the situation and their problems. He liked to do this on short walks in the Sdiloßpark or in the surrounding area with Speidel and me, or with me alone. He carried a particularly heavy emotional burden during this time, because he felt responsible not only for the military situation in Normandy, but also for the plight of the entire nation. He had predicted that a successful invasion would mean the war would be lost for good. Now he sudite sidi to be clear about the ways and means,

that there might be to end the war, which had become pointless. He played a difficult dual role, that of the soldier who tried with all the means at his command to delay the calamity of the enemy as far as possible, and that of a man who felt responsible for the whole and waited for the time to act politically. For this second part of his task, he sought to organize his thoughts and views in discussions in the smallest circle. This mostly took place in theoretical discussions. Speidel did not go into detail about his contacts with the groups preparing for July 20, no doubt convinced that it was right to have as few confidants as possible. Speidel had given me a few hints, but without giving me a complete picture of what was planned.' ...

It should be noted that the diary entries could not be exhaustive and for understandable reasons had to be cautious on some points. Nevertheless, they give a good picture of Rommel's thoughts at this most difficult time of his life.

Admiral Ruge wrote on June 11:

In the afternoon, the field marshal took me into the garden, which turned into a two-hour conversation in which we climbed up and down the hill behind the Sthloll, then walked up and down the garden, stopping at times. Rommel answered almost all the questions that arose from the situation, including many things that I had repeatedly thought about myself. In his opinion, the best solution in the obvious situation was to end the war while we still h a d something to negotiate with. The strength of our position at the moment lies nod in the opposition between the Americans and the Russians. The Americans were so strong that the Russians had no prospect of prevailing against them. Hitler, however, did not want to negotiate - that would not work with him either - he wanted to fight to the last house ... Rommel said that it was the nation that mattered, not

atif the individual. Eloquence is the basis of the state ... We ourselves are not sure of our lives ... He, Rommel, had always consciously led the battle cleanly ... During reconstruction, the cities would have to be rebuilt, all the old officers would have to be deployed. The SS would have to be completely abolished, instead of the HJ something like the Wandervogel would have to come back

I& told Rommel that he would have to play a leading role in the reconstruction and that, in my opinion, he was the only man from the Hödist military leadership capable of doing so.

The OKW made a lengthy, strict request because the British had reported that they had surprised individual German soldiers in their underpants.

This inquiry came about because our soldiers were completely surprised by the enemy on the first day of the invasion due to Speidel's criminal failure to raise the alarm in good time. (The author.)

qThe OB [Rommel] was with the 116th Pz. Div. which stood on both sides of the Somme. Beridit Ruges under the t4. 6: After dinner, Speidd and idt played tennis as a **cover** for a conversation about the situation. We were in complete agreement on our views. Afterwards, Rommel went for an hour's walk with me in the garden, accompanied by the dogs, who occasionally raised him. He talked about everything again, the good attitude of the troops, the lack of material and especially the lack of flying ...

Admiral Kran'ke arrived around noon. He was alone for three-quarters of an hour with the chief officer, who gave him a clean bill of health, which Rundstedt had not done the day before.'

Berid t Ruges under the 24. 6.:

gIn the evening I was at Speidel's with Ernst Jünger, Speidel's sd wagerer and a high lawyer, a kind of refined Falstaff. Very stimulating and entertaining. After dinner we walked up to the Donjon, with a wonderful view of the mother-of-pearl-colored waters of the Seine.

the pearl-colored waters of the Seine. It was strange to have such a beautiful evening on the brink of destruction. We were all fooling ourselves and knew exactly how things stood.

Ruge's report on June 25th:

After supper, the Feldmarsdiall took me for a walk. He noticed that the view had been cleared and sat on the bench for a while, from where you now had a particularly beautiful B1i& iris Seinetal.

He s p o k e in great detail. He was upset that he had been ordered to launch counterattacks to relieve Cherbourg, while he was happy that he had managed to put together some kind of defensive front. Then we discussed the question of whether he should be shot if he was completely defeated. We both rejected it as too negative a course. Idi was of the opinion that we had to come to peace, and since the opponents would never conclude it with Hitler, he would have to clear the way for it by dying voluntarily if he loved his people as he had always claimed. Rommel said: 'You are a rough warrior', to which idi replied: 'You have to look at things soberly and sadly; that's what's been lacking up there for years. He agreed and responded very strongly.

Report from Ruge on July 4:

The field marshal talked to me the whole time, discussing the situation and the essential events of the last few weeks.

We then spoke of the mistakes of the past, of the future and the tasks of the future, of the misuse of spiritual guidance, of the incitement of the youth against the teachers, of similar attempts against the officers, of the division o f power, of the personal enrichment of many, of the excessive ambition and the boundless goals. 'If you say that openly, you'll be put up against the wall. 'That' s why I'm only saying this to you, Mr. Field Marshal. They obviously failed to dismiss him. 'They've been playing tricks with my name …'

Again, we discussed whether the officer should surrender. It was mentioned from above But we agreed that it would be wrong, because it would be like admitting a sditild, and besides, the people concerned would not be brewed later. He spoke out against the clique e c o n o m y ; that would be better in the navy ...

He was in a very serious mood, because the enemy was no longer able to stop him. We discussed the possible attitude of the British and Americans; in doing so, as he had done on other occasions, he asked many individual questions about them. He said that the soldiers' efforts h a d been in vain. He reflected and said t h a t in 1918 the overall situation had been hopeless for us audi and that it was precisely the aditung to the German soldiers that had enabled us to rebuild. Aditung was present this time, especially in front of him.

Berid't von Ruge under the t t. 7.:

. Then I learned that Speidel wanted to go to Le Havre and I stopped there. In Rouen we first went to Admiral Rieve, who above all asked for concrete s o that he could set up more guns. He was aware of how serious the situation was and was of t h e opinion that it c o u l d only be solved politically. He got on well with Speidel. A particular difficulty for him was that he had no one with whom he could really talk ...

The next stop was the staff of the 8t. AK. General Kuntzen was not there himself. As we drove on, we talked about the fact that you c a n 't speak as openly with everyone as you can with Rieve...'

Report from Ruge on July 12:

'At breakfast we talked about the situation. The question was asked: 'What is the world of thought of the people who see it so completely differently)' Rommel said: 'One must not act according to dreams, but soberly according to reality. Another question:

'Do we actually have a constitution' Speidel: 'No, the old one has been

The old one has been abolished, the new one does not exist: 'Sau&el gave me his book on the use of labor. Very interesting. Next to him and above him again Göring. It's like that everywhere, there's only one man sitting next to the old authorities. District administrator - district leader, etc.*

Then we talked about the power of the many inferiors. Rommel: 'The high leaders of the HJ kept themselves clear to fill these new positions. They did not go to the front and made enormous demands.

Beridit von Ruge under the 13. 7:

pRommel would have liked to know how the Ob.d.M. [Commander-in-Chief of the Navy) dad'te about the situation; but I was ni&t aware of it ...

Rommel again described himself only as an administrator. He was now always asking whether the OKW could not pass on responsibility t o him, as was repeatedly attempted. 'It is crucial that in this situation the OKW is fixed on its responsibility. Very cold people at the top. He went on to say: 'The difficulty of the situation lies in the fact that one must resist to the last, but on the other hand is convinced that it is more difficult to prevent the Russians from invading than the Anglo-Americans...'

The field marshal suffered greatly from the pressure o n everyone. He asked repeatedly: 'What will it look like in four weeks? Will we be past the worst by then?' He was convinced that the front could not hold much longer and that the political decision had to come. He wanted to report this to the top on July 14.

Ith said that after Scapa Flow audi nid t in 1918, people believed that *things* could get *better again*. We agreed that you could be satisfied with very little if you were only with your family. He said that the first tasks were to provide food for everyone and to build homes. We had to continue to implement the measures for the workers despite all the poverty. Doctor Ley was of course a god for the workers. But good factory managers would have to do it themselves.

It would be a great deed if Hitler did what was appropriate to the situation on his own initiative. Nadi all his declarations this was untrue. But what would come after the battle for the last house? There would be great difficulties with the SD, the SS and the party functionaries. Care must be taken ... The young SS men would have to be transferred to other units as soon as possible

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Rommel was curious to see what would be done in response to his letter. He said he didn't care whether they put him out or killed him. Then he said that they wouldn't do that. The military leaders in responsible positions had to speak their minds openly. Unfortunately, those around Hitler had not done so.

Bert&t von Ruge under t5. 7:

q . . Rommel spoke again of the workers and farmers, whose fiefdoms should not be allowed to deteriorate. He then said that it was better to continue to live as a western dominion than t o leave the homeland behind. He then spoke of the nodi existing strength of the political position between the opponents. He always asked the question: 'When will a resolution come?

Beridit von Ruge under 20. 7:

qRommel had discussed many things with me theoretically, but his concrete plans, but only briefly hinted at them ...

In my opinion, Rommel was the only man in Germany who was strong enough to turn the situation around, even after it had become clear that Hitler was alive. Rommel alone possessed the name, the deed and the political feeling that together were necessary to prevail against the demon Hitler. I& believe that he would have mastered the situation in the West and probably also in Germany if he had been able to act as commander-in-chief of Army Group B on July 20, 1944. I& believe it is possible that the ceasefire offer he made to the Allies would have been successful, despite Roosevelt's demand for unconditional surrender in 1943. The timing was favorable after the sdiwe-

the British losses at Caen, where the failed breakthrough had cost them as much blood as they had spent on the road to Berlin'°^."

The criticism of the internal conditions in Germany at the time, as expressed in Admiral Ruge's diary entries above, may have been more or less fabricated, but in the days of the invasion battle it was an expression of *deep* resignation and an inner conflict that robbed Rommel of his drive to act and his belief in success. His language was the language of many Versdiwörer, with whom he shared the total error of judgment of the Western Allies in relation to Stalin. The dispute between them only began when Germany was defeated and they could n o t agree on the distribution of the spoils.

The German generals, whether resisting or not, could not expect the slightest concession in their planned ceasefire offer, because they were no less wanted by the enemy than Hitler and the entire German people.

Without a commitment to the conspiracy, without a conflict of souls, Rommel would have acted differently in the first days of the defense and in the following weeks. There were many burning and

There were difficult frontal situations from June 6 to July 20, in which the 2nd and 116th Army Tank Divisions, which were completely sdioned for the purpose of the overthrow and which were in the vicinity of the front and continuously under Rommel's command, should have been deployed to reinforce the defense or support counterattacks. And there were extremely difficult situations on the front in which a mentally unburdened Rommel would have disregarded orders from the OKW and OB West without recourse to his person in order to be relieved of his responsibility as Supreme Commander. Other commanders have

- on all fronts - before and after the Führer's orders - when sudden situations forced them to do so.

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135 Friedridi Ruge, "Rommel and the Invasion", Stuttgart 1959.

However, he often deliberately held back in order to provoke his sudden dismissal as commander-in-chief of Army Group B because he needed to have reliable troops available for the overthrow.

Incidentally, the enemy also had its crisis during the invasion diladit when the British advanced at Caen on July 7 and the Americans at Sr. Li nt&t on July 9.

Paul Carell writes about this:

pEven Eisenhower was dominated by worry: If the Germans bring their infantry from southern France for reinforcements - and they now had time to do so - then there is no telling what will happen. Then the Allies might be pinned down in their beachheads at the beginning of winter, without the possibility of large-scale operational movements. Then the weather becomes sdiledit and disables the bombers, especially the Jabos. But this would take the decisive weapon on the Allied side out of the game. Outmaneuvered by General Wetter!

These were the gloomy thoughts of the Allied staffs. The %se word about the 'paralysis of the front' was circulating among them. Articles appeared in the American press whose impatience and resentment could not be ignored.

The German soldiers had no idea of any of this - which is not surprising. But the German high command had no idea - which is even more astonishing. This once again shows the failure of the German nad- nd service.

It is hard to believe, but the German high command, all the way down to the Chief of Staff West, did not always believe in a second invasion at the Pas de Calais. And they did not always leave powerful divisions there, instead of leading them to the fighting front - as Eisenhower anxiously advocated. Grotesque l

The Allied High Command could not imagine this behavior and continued to be moved by the great concern that powerful German armored divisions would not be able to reach the American front.

front. This countermove would have jeopardized the Allied general staff plan, which envisaged a breakout on the red wing. America's Guderian, General George S. Patton, had already been prepared for this hour with the newly brought in **3rd U5 Army**

The German high command and the Führer's headquarters were sorry for him: the fact that the victory was nevertheless achieved was due to the sacrifices of the fighting front troops'°°."

Well, the a)liated high command could sith mainly on the the treachery and sabotage of the wörer, who sat in droves sited in droves in the German high command staffs and instilled in the high command the poison of deliberate deception that a second invasion was still to be expected. Up until this crisis, Rommel had always kept the 2nd and 116th Army Armored Divisions on the Allied side in reserve, apart from the deployment of the 2nd Paozer Division's advance party on June 13 at Villers-Bocage. The fact that they were not deployed was sabotage on the invasion front. For the sake of the whole truth, this must be spelled out on the basis of the unequivocal statement by General Speidel, Rommel's chief of staff: qAudi for political considerations, it would have been advisable for the Fddmarsdiall to have reliable armored units at hand for any corrupting events'°'."

However, Feldmars&all Rommel would certainly have been unavailable to the insurrection if he had only suspected the reprehensible treasonous acts of the insurrectionists, which were only revealed after July 20, 1944 and after the war.

If Grand Admiral %nitz spoke of the fact that more should have been done for reconnaissance on the day before the invasion and at the time of its beginning, as there was a higher probability of an enemy landing during these days due to the times.

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136 Paul Carell, "They are coming", page 223 f.
t3Z Hans **Speidei,**p Invasion **1944",** page 71.

This is an apt indication for the assessment of the activities of the vendi- cants in those Souths. On June 5, the start of the invasion was considered impossible because of the sdiledite betting, while the enemy's meteorologists, thanks to their large-scale weather observation over the Atlantic, recognized that there was a small interlude between the lows coming from the west, which should bring an improvement in the weather for June 5 and 6. Eisenhower took advantage of this improvement in the weather and thus had another surprise effect on his side.

The German troop commanders and staffs in Normandy were deceived by the weather, while the Kriegsmarine alone was making a thorough assessment of almost all issues. When the 15th Army's nad ridit office sent word of the start of the invasion to Speidel at 10 p.m. on June 5, he was so preoccupied with Ernst Jünger's presentation of the plan to eliminate Hitler that he forgot to immediately alert all units of Army Group Rommel and notify his commander-in-chief without delay.

If the entire operational tactical planning for the defense against the invasion in sidi was muddled and disjointed, i.e. not from a single source, then there was a lack of unwavering determination on the invasion front among Hödist military leaders and staffs to repel the invasion under the most adverse conditions.

the most adverse conditions. But this determination had to be lacking because, in all their strategic and tactical considerations and decisions, they were not free from the commitments they had made with each other in pursuit of the jointly agreed overthrow. In addition to these main causes of defeat on the invasion front, there were no fewer cases of sabotage, which had already been systematically condemned by the allied sabotage cen- trals intended for France. Partly in German uniforms, confusion was caused, transports were diverted, bridges and railroads were blown up and the Allied army was attacked from the hinterland.

mec leadership is systematically subordinated to German opera0ons.

lin comparison with what had been and was happening in the upper echelons was and was seen, these were only pinpricks.

On October 14, 1944, Field Marshal Rommel was picked up in his home town of Herrlingen near Ulm by Generals Burgdorf and Meisel, who had been commissioned by Hitler, and given the choice of answering to the Volksgeri'lttshof or taking the poison offered to him. Rommel opted for death by poison. He had been informed by the generals that he had been accused by arrested and interrogated conspirators of having belonged to the resistance.

On the night of July 20-21, the Commander-in-Chief West received a telegram from the OKW informing him that General von Stülpnagel was to be sent to Berlin for military service. He left Paris for Berlin on the same day, but stopped the car near Verdun to c o m m i t suicide. There he h a d climbed into a canal and shot at sit in order to drown them if the attempt was unsuccessful. The men accompanying him pulled him out of the canal and took him to a military hospital. Stiilp- nagel had shot out one eye and injured the other so severely that he lost it during the operation. After a hospital stay of about fourteen days, he was transferred to Berlin, where he was later sentenced to death and executed by the court of justice.

But the Allied invasion had succeeded. The deliberate sabotage and the negligent German mistakes had cleared the way for the Anglo-Americans to reach the Rhine. Just as a part of the conspiracy had intended from the beginning.

Sabotage against the Luftwaffe

On 17 June t944, a briefing on the invasion front took place with Hitler in Margival, ad t kilometers north of Soissons, to which the field marshals Rundstedt and Rommel had urged him. At this meeting, when the field marshals pointed out that their own air force had made mistakes, Hitler replied that he had been deceived by the Luftwaffe leadership and technicians. The most diverse types had been developed side by side without coming to a practical result.

Today we know that we must not only speak of such deception on the part of the Luftwaffe, but also of sabotage of the Luftwaffe.

In response to the Field Marshals' proposal to use the V-weapon on the beachheads of the invasion front, Hitler summoned the General in Command of the V-weapon, General of Artillery Heine- mann, to report on its possible use. The general p o i n t e d out that the V-weapon had an unpredictable spread of fifteen weapons at the current stage of development.

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138 Hans Speidel, plnvaxion 1944', page 11 F.

up to aditzehn kilometers tind therefore because of danger to the troops could not be used in the invasion area.

As with other types of weapons, the development of the V-weapon, for the most diverse reasons of a technical and personnel nature, was subject to repeated setbacks and obstacles from the very beginning, which then, however, due to treachery and sabotage, assumed such proportions that its timely and effective use at the front was no longer possible. As mentioned above, our traitors informed the enemy about the production of our new wafers with details of the production sites in such an informal manner that it was easy for them to disrupt our production with targeted bombing attacks on the most sensitive parts.

In this respect, the author Dr. Otto John was particularly responsible for betraying the Peenemünde production and supply facility of our weapon to the British.

How much this betrayal of the British was appreciated by them can be seen from the &ridit which the British colonel D "t'1rf *Shapiro* M. C. handed over to Ostern' for publication on August 8, 1954, shortly after Dr. Ot John had left East Berlin. The British colonel was Otto John's advisor in London during the war, alongside Schon Delmer, who was known to have directed the subversion propaganda against Germany with the help of around 300 German traitors (mainly emigrants).

He writes: "He was introduced to me as Oskar Jürgens. I couldn't imagine what that meant ... It was only when this Mr. Oskar Jürgens came to talk about Peenemünde without any context that I pricked up my ears ... But I always understood nothing.

I was simply not prepared to suddenly find myself face to face with the man who had lent us Peenemünde and its mysterious facility for miracle weapons. That was always a great sad e, at least until then the greatest success of our Nadi- rid'tendienst. I'Ii remember it very clearly: the message came from Berlin, from well-informed air weapons circles. It had come to us via Spain, whereupon RAF initially deployed reconnaissance aircraft of the type

'Moskito' reconnaissance aircraft to Peeriemünde and soon afterwards 600 bombers. And the Marine, who we had to thank for all this, was now sitting in my office with badly dyed hair ... That was the beginning of my acquaintance with Dr. Otto John, who went by the nickname
'Oskar Jürgens' had received. He remained in my care for most of the voyages. I a c c o m m o d a t e d him in Knightsbridge in one of our so-called permanent houses. That was a precautionary measure, and no exception could be made for Otto John, despite all recognition of his merits. Ida hope everyone felt at home with us. The villa was comfortable and did not differ in appearance from the staid, bourgeois villas of the Nadi- barsdialt. The staff were dressed in civilian clothes and did their work inconspicuously and unobtrusively. There were certainly not many houses in the whole of London back then that were better looked after than here. And if we had kept a guest book, Otto John could have been listed under a prominent name."

Erich Kern reports in his documentary 'So wtirde Deutet-
betrayed' about Dr. Otto John:

pToday, Dr. John knows nothing about his wartime betrayal of the Peenemünde missile testing facility. In his doctored memoirs 'Zweimal kam i& heim* (Düsseldorf 1969), John makes no mention of Peenemünde at all.

On the other hand, *Hans Frederile* deals with this problem in great detail in his book 'The End of a Legend' and writes, among other things:

On December 12, 1944, Otto John was brought to London on a special RAF plane accompanied by Harold Middle-Waerd, the British Air Force Commander in Lisbon. Taken over by members of the military counterintelligence service, he was subjected to a check-up there. This was merely a routine matter to which all foreigners who arrived in London under similar circumstances had to submit during the war.

Dodi this routine vetting was completed very rae;cally in the case of Otto J hn, as key personalities such as Winston Chur-

diill, Lord Vansittart, Sir Ivone Kirkpatri'k, the Bis':court of Chidiester were waiting for his reports.

In the London of the war years to which Otto John was flown, there was a huge number of German political émigrés w i t h the same motto as Otto John: 'Against Hitler - for Germany'. However, they were worse off. They were either interned or degraded to political passivity. Only a very small circle managed to break out of this wall of 'enemy evaluation'. Political cooperation was only available to those Germans who were willing to propagate the Allied doctrines of unconditional subjugation, collective tolerance and the division of Germany. Otto John was one of these chosen few.

Early in the morning of the next day, Otto John was taken by a military patrol to the It was ... the counterpart to the 'German Defense Force' ... There Otto John had to undergo detailed questioning by various special officers. The interrogation complex by no means covered the events of the failed July 20, because Otto John's special reports, which were received from Madrid and Lisbon in London, already covered a considerable amount of nadiridi- tendienstlidien content.

These interrogation results, supplemented by reports written by Otto John once again in London, were interesting enough for the Prime Minister Winston Churdiill to l i s t e n attentively for a few hours to one of Otto John's reports. . .'

Frederik also carefully records what John revealed and how he was recommended by Prince Louis Ferdinand:

'When the game began for Otto John in Madrid in March 1942, it was the recommendations of Prince Louis Ferdinand that enabled him to gain access to the British and American agents in Madrid via Juan Terrazza. When he was recommended to the American secretary Yillard Beatilaque and subsequently also to the British

was able to p a y a corresponding visit, he did so on behalf of the 'Abwehr'. His targeted information, which he had received directly from Be&, Hammerstein and Oster for this purpose, had no effect ...

In November 1943, he appeared again in Madrid. Colonel Hohenthal, the military officer at the American embassy there, received him for confidential talks. Hohenthal had previously worked as a military attaché at the American botsdiaJt in Berlin and was therefore no stranger to John. At that time, the contact had been established by the American journalist Louis Lu&ner.

The trip took place on t6. December- - John made a detailed report for Colonel Hansen and Colonel von Stauffenberg about his discussions with Beaulaqite and Colonel Hohentltal. His new interlocutor was struck by Otto John's outstanding knowledge o f military science. He was very well informed about the status of developments in nuclear research and nuclear weapons in Germany. He obtained his information from the first circles. Above all, facts from the so-called Uranium Association were of importance - this group of about a dozen scientists under the chairmanship of Nobel Prize winner Heisenberg was working on the planning of an atomic bomb. In the fall of 1943, Otto John was able to report in Madrid that although the production of an atomic bomb was ready on paper, it was not possible to manufacture it for technical reasons. In this context, it was also possible to report on the progress of the V-t and Y-2 weapon project in Peeneriiünde ...

On March 10, 1944, Otto Jobn returned to Berlin.

In the capital of the German Empire, things had become so turbulent that the political situation on April 10, 1944 forced him to make another trip to Madrid. For Otto John, commuting back and forth between Berlin and Madrid had already become routine ...

Otto John's efforts were aimed at obtaining real information from the contact people about the Allies' attitude in the

question of unconditional surrender. His confidants from London as well as from Washington gave him the following idea: The Allies are not l i k e l y to agree to an unconditional surrender. The Russians are expected to invade Germany soon, and the British and Americans will not m a k e any special efforts to get to Berlin before the Russians. It is felt that Germany deserves to be punished, and the Western Allies prefer to leave that to the Russians'^."

Mr. *C'rerhard Frame, a* graduate engineer from Kierling/Osterrei&, who as commander of a v-1 launching ramp was responsible for the flawless launching preparation of the wing bombs, tells us how the development and use of the V-weapon was continuously sabotaged by Dr. *Otto* John's father.

Like his comrades in action, he often had to experience that, among other things, ingenious sabotage had been carried out on parts of the automatic course control system. pThe thin pneumatic diläudie for the compass and rudder adjustment' - he reports verbatim - qwere damaged in places that were difficult to access. This led to early crashes of our projectiles, often into our own lines, to circling or even returning fighters, which sometimes caused heavy losses in our own area. Losses not only in our own ranks, but also among the civilian population of the occupied territories. In such cases, the blame was naturally placed on the German soldiers, thus poisoning the atmosphere. I experienced a specific case of this myself when a soldier was sent to a small Dutch town.

As far as we knew at the time, V-1 shells were mostly assembled by concentration camp prisoners. There is no question that there was ample opportunity for sabotage. However, the acceptance inspections at the production sites were undoubtedly carried out by our own officials. To what extent acceptance

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t39 Hans Frederik, sDns Rnde einer Legende', Miin':Im 1971, page 53 $.

The extent to which the inspections were carried out in bad faith or the sabotage was even carried out by political opponents among the inspectors can hardly be answered today. Unfortunately, given the catastrophic extent of betrayal and sabotage in the last war, the last possibility suggested cannot be dismissed out of hand.

J. F. Taylor reports in his SÖirifl; pDer 20. Juli° that the V-rockets could have been mass-produced since 1941 and that the improvements made in the meantime were not significant, but that the authorities in the ReidisluRfahrtministerium had repeatedly thwarted their entry into service. Ted nis the mistakes would have been corrected within a short period of time when the advice of Professor Messersdimitt was taken, against whose participation in the preparations for V 1 and V 2 the departments of the RLM concerned with this had desperately resisted"[0].

The Englishman *David* Zeit g writes on the sabotage of the V Wafé:e:

gsince 1939, Hitler had promoted the new strategy of war through long-range weapons and had a center of German long-range weapons built in Peenemünde, which was under the leadership of the best German technicians and scientists such as Walter Dorn- berger and Wernher von Braun. This development received a devastating interruption because Otto John, a member of the German resistance, had provided the Allies with detailed information about the work of atomic research and the Peenemünde research center.

600 British bombers destroyed the center of German long-range weapons on August 17, 1943. The research and development facilities, which had cost nearly half a billion Reidismarks, were in flames. More than 700 engineers, technicians, scientists and workers were killed. The start of the German V-weapons offensive was therefore delayed for a long time.

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140 **J. F. Taylor,** "Der 20. Juli **1944", Bremen t968, page 14** f.

delayed long enough that *it* could no longer prevent the Allied invasion of Normandy, which began ten months later."

General Eisenhower explained: "If the Germans had succeeded in

If the Germans had succeeded in completing and deploying these new weapons six months earlier, the invasion of the European continent would have been extremely difficult and perhaps impossible".

The fact that the planning and development work for the Luftwaffe was constantly exposed to sabotage from within the ranks of the RLM is explained by the fact that the "Red Orchestra", the largest pro-communist agent organization within the Reich, had its center in the RLM. Although most of those involved were arrested and sentenced by the Reidis War Court, many were not caught because the investigations were mainly carried out by the Foreign Defense Office, i.e. Canaris.

Feldmarsdiall *Milch* confirms this in a discussion with his

Amtschefs on 21. 10. 1942, in which he r e v e a l e d that he did not trust the defense of Admiral Canaris:

'The interdiction only serves a purpose if it is carried out by the Gestapo. It is pointless if it is done by the Abwehr. I would like to bring this to your attention. And he added: "I forbid any kind of screening by the Abwehr; any screening must be done by the Gestapo, because otherwise we have no guarantee that it will be a successful screening." When he saw the curious faces around the table, he continued: "I can't tell you why. I have certain reasons and evidence for this ..."

In this conference, Mildi also told his colleagues about the "Red Orchestra": "There is a circle of people involved in this sadie, that is, in absolutely proven treason, which is five times as big as what is sitting around the Tisdi. Not a single worker is involved. B u t instead, gentlemen, the Hod is noble

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141 David J. Irving, "The Secret Weapons of the Third Reich", page 8 If.

and relatives are represented to the half, people who could be trusted to be fiercely reactionary and loyal to the Kaiser, who would never be trusted to collaborate with the Communists, to betray their own fatherland to the Communists'--."

Although Mildi had rejected the appointment of Schulze-Boysen, the head of the Red Orchestra in Germany, to the Reich Aviation Ministry at the suggestion of the head of the personnel office because of his communist leanings, he was appointed after all on the orders of the credulous Göring. Thus the Sdtulze-Boysen affair further damaged Göring's prestige, which had already been in decline due to the escape of the British army from Dunkirk and the loss of the air battle over England in the summer of 1940, to such an extent that he abdicated audi where he should not have done so under any circumstances. For example, he did nothing to prevent the repeated withdrawal of fighters from the aviation industry, resulting in a weakening of the Luftwaffe, which also led to the retreat from Stalingrad because the 6th Army could not be supplied.

The Führer says with reddit: 'Ida wants to have 5oldaten', Milo explained, then the people around him cringe and say, 'yes, that's going to happen', and simply grab new people from the factories." Before Milch could protest, workers in the aviation industry were transferred to army armaments to fill the gaps there.

One sector of armaments that had a decisive influence on the course of the war was the radar system, the furik measurement technology. This applied to the air force as well as to naval warfare, as we shall see.

The extent to which the Luftwaffe was inadequate in this area, despite the outstanding basic research of our scientists,

142 David Irving, pDie Tragödie der Deutsdien Luftwaffe', page 246.

sdlildert the then General of the Kampfßieger Werner *Baumbach* in his war book "Too late?

pNot much different from the rockets were the new developments in radar technology. The importance of radio frequency for modern defensive and offensive weapons was only increasingly recognized by the German leadership from 1943 onwards. The first years of the war had shown how much influence radio communications technology could have on the course of military operations. The 'ScJsla'iit around England' had failed due to the close and well-organized radar detection of the British. The submarine war had been paralyzed as a result of the installation of radar equipment on the Allied ships and with the help of their radar patrol aircraft ...

An umbrella organization should have been established in good time for military applications in order to coordinate research, development, research and procurement. This did not happen, at least on paper, until January 1, 1944, when a Reidis- forsdiungsratcs was founded. Until then, each part of the Wehrmacht had worked for itself without having to share its experiences ...

When Göring asked on May 2, 943, who was actually responsible for the radio measuring industry, Mildi and Martini both answered in the negative. Göring decided that MilÖt was now the person responsible. Martini [General, head of the 'Foreign Air Forces' group in the Luftwaffe High Command], however, remained in charge.

In addition, research within the air force had been concentrated on a special plenipotentiary, State Councillor Plendl, who listened little to other researchers. As a result, Plendl's assessment of British procedures was inadequate. He did not realize that the Western powers were now using new methods that were extraordinarily resistant to interference. It turned out that the German scientists had almost always been active in the field in question earlier than the Western opponents. However, those responsible in industry and the military had rarely pursued their own procedures in a timely manner and had often rejected promising research developments.

which the opponent then appeared. Fundamental and groundbreaking findings, which only nod' did not offer an optimal solution, were discarded as 'tedlnisdi xtnreif'.

On March 18, 1943, Göring complained about the state of German radio measurement technology with the following words: 'By far the worst is in the field of radio measurement. Here it is desperate! It must be clearly admitted that the British and Americans are far, far above us. I have said so from the outset, and it has always been clear to me. But frankly, I didn't expect them to be so far ahead of us. I at least hoped that, if we were at the back, we would at least be able to keep up to some extent"°.

The people initially responsible for the nadiridite system and the development of the nadiridite resources were Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, head of the Foreign Affairs/Defense Office in the OKW, Lieutenant General F-ritz Thiele, head of the Wehrmaditnadiriéhtenwesen, and General of the Nachrid truppen Eri& Fellgiebel, all of whom had been accused of conspiring against the
July 20 and were executed. *It* would have been their duty to coordinate the qualified forces of research, industry and all parts of the armed forces at the latest at the start of the war and to drive forward the development of radio measurement technology instead of dealing with plans for subversion and thus sabotaging the war effort.

In late 1942, Mildi learned that the British Natht bombers were emitting clouds of the finest aluminum dust to interfere with the on-board radar qLiditenstein° of the German nadit fighters. His experts told him that the enemy could wipe out the entire German air defense if he developed the jamming method against the Luftwaffe's forc-measuring systems. They showed Mildi: "If he (the Englishman) lets such clouds, which stay in the air for about 20 to 30 minutes, trickle down over a large city

143 Werner Baumbadi, "Zu spüt?", Hürer-Verlag, Buenps Aires 1946, Seire 262 f.

area, then the Würzburgmesserei [the German radar early warning and defense system] is not very effective ...

When Mildt demanded an extensive jamming of the British radar in January 1943, he was told that General Martini, who was responsible for these matters, was against any jamming and demanded that all attempts of this kind to interfere with the enemy's radio measuring operation be refrained from under all circumstances for the time being, because there is a simple means of interfering with the entire radio measuring process in our country and that we have no antidote.

In the following six months, he did not undertake any research into the development of an antidote. When the British used their 'Window' method [jamming method using tin foil strips] for the first time - during the mass attacks on Hamburg in July - the German radar system was exposed, as had been predicted. Only now did Martini begin to devise countermeasures'^.' In the middle of July 25, 1943, seven hundred Swedish bombers attacked the port and city of Hamburg and were the first to drop cascades of tin foil strips 25 centimetres long into the sky.

mel to interfere with our anti-aircraft and Jagdleit radio measuring devices. While the searchlights flickered aimlessly over Hamburg's sky and the blinded fighters cruised around in the dark, the bombers **killed J500 people** and devastated a large part of the city.

the bombers killed J500 men and devastated a large part of the **city.** Only twelve bombers were shot down. No measures had ever been developed to combat the fighter metal strips. The next morning, 100 American bombers attacked to disrupt the firefighting, and in the evening the British bombed Essen with 600 planes ...

On the evening of July 22, Hamburg suffered another massive strike. As if wrapped in tinfoil, the bombers dropped 2300 tons of high-explosive and incendiary bombs over the city.

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t44 David J. Irving, "The Tragtidie der Drutsdien Luftwaffe", page 284.

Huge wildfires broke out. The main water pipes had been destroyed in the previous raids, and soon the fires swept over the city with horrifying speed; tens of thousands of inhabitants were drawn into the inferno by the artificial hurricane created by the fires, which raged through the streets as a 'firestorm', burned to death in the huge concrete shelters or were poisoned by carbon monoxide. 50,000 people died'*°."

Three months after the catastrophe in Hamburg, the problem of overcoming the tinfoil strip disruption had still not been solved, although dozens of scientists were working on it. In the second half of October 1943, 1700 tons of bombs were dropped on Hanover and 1100 tons on Leipzig.

In a conference on October 8, 1945, Göring rancorously admitted his admiration for the British electronic devices: 'He must be a world genius in the field of radio measurement. He has geniuses and we have doofuses ... The British would never have built the chaff [cover name for tin foil strips] here if they had not been one hundred percent successful in their interference suppression.

Audi w a s astounded by the performance of the British target-sounding devices: "There may or may not be fog here: the Englishman finds the smallest dredi mill here. He flies above the clouds and drops points at the station in Stuttgart ... Yesterday he flew as far as Munich without any ground visibility! He turned to General Martini and said: "Maybe you forgot to jam it?" "He probably has a new frequency," stammered Martini, a man who blushes very easily, "A frequency that can't be jammed at the moment." qMar- tini!" sdirie Göring, you're very lucky that you don't have to lecture the Führer, only me. The Führer would probably not listen for so long."

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145 David Irving, 'The Tragedy of the German Air Force', page 298.

Goering always enjoyed great popularity among the population. In the last week of October, he visited the fighter units in the West, and wherever his Mercedes stopped in the cities on the Rhine and Ruhr, the crowds surrounded him and cheered him on. It was a mystery to the generals who accompanied him"°.

Today, thirty years after Germany's cities died under the hail of bombs from Allied terror attacks, "Bild am Sonntag" reports in a series of articles from April 21 to May 2, 1974 about a momentous sabotage. In a series of articles from April 21 to May 2, 1974, "Bild am Sonntag" reported on a momentous act of sabotage by hijacking a German nadi fighter of the type)u 88 with the most modern radar device "qLid'- tenstein", which the German air force possessed in 1943, to the British.

The leader of the (J-) 8, Lieutenant Heinrich Sdimitt, supplied the enemy with the on-board radar device "Licfitenstein" at the stage of the air war when the German Luftwaffe had weapons in this on-board device of the night fighters.

fighters and in the Flak qWürzburg' defensive equipment, with which it could detect the enemy's bombing raids. The British bomber commander, Sir Arthur Harris, who will go down in history as the destroyer of German cities, had to realize from the daily casualty lists of his nad bomber squadrons that the German cities had become veritable fortresses. From one attack on Pilsen alone on April 17, 1943, 36 of 307 bombers deployed did not return. 5Z gWellingtons', 'Lancasters' and "Sirlings" had crash-landed or had been grounded on emergency landing sites by comrades.

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So it was understandable that the British did everything they could to disable the German air defense weapons or at least disrupt them significantly. During the night o f February 27-28, 1942, he dropped a Fallsdiirin commando at Saint Brunewal in northern France, which overran the German Luftwaffe's air traffic reporting station there.

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146 David Irving, "The Tragedy of the German Air Force", page 32t f.

and escaped with the radio measuring device pWürzburg".
could.

The British radar expert Dr. R. v. Jones, who had known the wavelength for a long time, made the decisive discovery that the wavelength of 53 centimetres could not be changed. This meant that the øWürzburg' device could not be switched to a different frequency when it was disturbed.

The deserted saboteur Lieutenant Heinridi Sdimitt proved to the British that the on-board radar of the German nadit fighters could be switched to other frequencies by delivering his Ju 88 with the "Li&tenstein" device.

The under- standing of the pLi&tenstein' and øWürzbørg' devices enabled the enemy to disrupt our entire air defense system by means of electronic jamming and by dropping strips of tin foil (with the name pDüppel'), the length of which was precisely matched to the wavelength of the radio measuring device.

The first attack of the British bomber command, the incineration of Hamburg in July t943, and the destruction of other cities met a defenseless German air defense.

'The captured German Naditjagd-Ju 88' - according to the literal report *by Cr'unther St'dler* in 'Bild am Sonntag' - was tested by the British in entire air combat series against a 'Halifax' night bomber. On the basis of these tests, the 'corkscrew' was developed, a spiral-shaped evasive flight maneuver in which the Ju 88 in particular could hardly follow the British bombers, let alone hit the target. This 'corkscrew' was to save the lives of hundreds of British four-engine crews.

In addition, however, the British quickly developed a satellite radar (de&name: 'Serrate'), which the rays of the German bomber.
Liditøistein' was located. Equipped with this device, the British
Beaufighter' fighters of the t4l. Group had already shot down 23 German nad fighter planes in June and July t943. On board the super

sÖinell 'Mosquitos' of the RAF, 'Serrate' later became the henchman of German night fighters ... They [the German nadit fighters] climbed up and unsuspectingly betrayed themselves to the enemy long-range fighters by the beams of their 'Liditenstein' device, which had been betrayed to the British by their fighters.°

Oberleutnant Schmitt's crew included the on-board radio operator Oberfeldwebel Paul Rosenberger and the on-board medic Oberfeldwebel Eridi Kantwill, who both volunteered to take part in the betrayal. Their flight followed a course that began in southern Norway and ended near Aberdeen in Scotland. At 5.40 a.m. on May 9, the ship's radio operator issued the false radio message pSOS ... SOS ... Engine on fire ... seek emergency rescue" into the Morse key.

A German radio station responded immediately and requested the position of the allegedly burning aircraft. But the Ju 88 with the code numbers SDS - EV' did not respond. The point of no return had been flown over. A few hours later, a cross was marked on the German situation maps in grid square 88/41 next to the note: 16:06 - whereabouts unknown.

For the comrades of the deserters, the secret of the lost Ju 88 was revealed six weeks later when Sdimitt and Rosenberger appeared on British radio and called on the German night fighters to "run away" at . However, they could not have known that the desertion of First Lieutenant Schmitt had been prepared before the outbreak of war, that the father of the night fighter officer Sdimitt was in constant contact with London f r o m "Fortress Germany" and that there were agents of the enemy in German frontline squadrons.

One such agent was this Luffwaffenoffizier Sd mitt,
who had landed briefly in a Dornier Do 217 in England not far from the English city of Lincoln on May 20-21, 1941, to hand over a sealed package to a Royal Air Force officer.

I flew to England in May 1941 **on the basis of** a secret order from the very top," said expilot Schmitt to the reporter from "Bild am Sonntag", who recently found him after a long search.
"somewhere in Europe'. qHave you heard of the so-called 'gray war'?" Sdunitt continued. pAt that time, other German pilots landed in England - nad' registration! They brought secret mail and certain people over. Conversely, English aircraft landed at night in occupied France and were received by German officials ..."

When asked how a German fighter pilot could become an enemy agent, Schmitt replied: qI got the decisive impetus from my father. He had been secretary to Gustav Stresemann, the Weimar Republic's long-serving minister of state. And as an ardent enemy of National Socialism, before and during the war he maintained close contacts with Social Democrats who had emigrated to Prague, Paris and London, above all with the circle around Erich Ollenhauer (note: during the war, he was a member of the board of the Social Democratic Party).: during the war, board member of the Social Democratic Party of Germany, based in London; chairman of the SPD from l9S2 to 1963) and Fritz Heine (note: after the war, head of Sozial- demokratisdien Konzentration GmbH. in Bad Godesberg, SPD spokesman and editor-in-chief of 'Vorwärts')."

From 1940 onwards, Sdimitt began to regularly pass military information to England. The secret mail went through his father, who lived in Thuringia and was undoubtedly the central figure in this game, and the "relay stations" in Switzerland and Lisbon. At some point, the British secret service w a s called in, whose orders Sdimitt still has to tell me about today: "Before I could meet with you," the almost sixty-year-old said to me, "I first had to talk to some people in London and Bonn with whom I was working at the time. I wasn't ordered to say a word. But you already know my story too well. Keeping quiet now would be useless and also wrong: I would like at least the motives for my activities to become known ..."

At the end of t940, first sergeant Heinridi Sdimitt, who was soon to be promoted to an officer's career because of his exceptional aeronautical achievements, had himself t r a n s f e r r e d from 'fighter aviation', the business of bombing, to the nad tjagd, no doubt on London's orders! At the time, the British w e r e preparing the devastating air offensive against Germany with the construction of a gigantic fleet of four-engine bombers, which - at least according to the British - would force the Third Reich to surrender in two years at the latest.

A secret agent in a German night fighter, a pilot no less, must have been of immense value to the British! And with Heinridi Sdimitt they had installed a kind of 'fifth column' in the German air defense system - an experienced pilot who not only provided military secrets and let every British bomber fly away unscathed, but was also after the heart of the German night fighter [7].

In May 1970, the magazine "pNation Europa", Coburg, published an article by Otto Gerber which reported the following:

Idi was appointed in J>re t934 to the staff of the deputy leader (later party chancellery) in Mündien in the Brown House,
He was appointed Head of the Head Office and entrusted with the processing of all kinds of Bcsd and lawsuits. In cooperation with the party offices, I was in charge of processing labor complaints, applications for the allocation of living space and applications for help in emergency situations through no fault of my own. I passed on the other applications to the relevant departments in my own office ...

Around the middle of 1944, an engineer was sent to me.

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147 This report by reporter Cluster Stiller of pBild arn Sonntag' comes from the files of the British Air Ministry, which, in contrast to its other documents on the Allied bombing raids in the years 1943 to 1945**, have** not been released for publication.

(name of the sdirift line known) reported for an interview. After dealing with a personal matter - finding a room for his wife, who had moved from Gdansk - Mr. K. moved his chair closer to my desk and said the following:

'I have been ordered here with several colleagues from the Ministry of Aviation. have been ordered here. We are working under the designation 'BAL 44', i.e. 'Construction supervision of the Lufiwaffe 1944'. Our task is to supervise the production of material and weapons for the Luftwaffe. The 'BAL' is deployed throughout Reidi because more and more faulty material and weapons are being delivered. We have strict orders not to talk about our task and our actions. I would also have to refuse to talk to you. But for reasons of conscience, I feel compelled to present the following to you with the request that the Party remedy the situation.

Then K. continued: 'This is about the construction of the R S58 radar device. Work has been going on for three weeks on the test piece (BMW company), and it's making no progress, the piece is simply not finished. We at 'BAL 44' have complained about this to the plant management and have therefore had difficulties with them. We were told by the management of the BMW plant: "The speed of production is none of your business!" In my opinion, only the Party can help. That's why I'm here.

I passed the complaint on to the Führer's headquarters as a 'Secret Reidisache'. From there it came back to the responsible Department II Ab of the Party Chancellery for further processing with the highest military service authorities. I became involved through communication and thus learned that a hearing had been scheduled (in Berlin) to which, in addition to the representatives of the military, SS Group Leader Kammler had been invited.

After some time, Engineer K. returned to my office to g e t information about the status of Sadie. When he heard from me that the case was being handled by the Speer Ministry, he declared indignantly: 'For God's sake, how can you give this matter to Speer! I came to you so that the end-

lix the party intervenes! You know, the radar device is the same one that Dr. Goebbels had already said in 1942 - this year he was literally shouting into the room: 'You hold your breath once you have experienced the effect of the device'.

As Mr. K. went on to say, this device had already been used in a night raid over Sdiweinfurt, during which 140 four-engine bombers were shot down. Mr. K. continued excitedly: 'In the meantime, one big city after another is being bombed to rubble and nothing happens! Us fadi people - we have a famous specialist for oscillations from the Ruhr area in our group - they don't want to take any action and don't want to hear it at all!'

I immediately passed this conversation on as a file note to the responsible Department II.

After some time, engineer K. came to see me again. Normally he had always tried to speak calmly and authoritatively, but now there were sparks of scorn in his eyes: 'Now we've been completely paralyzed. According to the latest company regulations, all our engineers have to wear uniforms. They are members of the air force and have the highest rank of Oberwachtmeister. This means that we technical specialists are subordinate in disciplinary terms to the young lieutenant in charge of the operation. That's the end of any freedom of action!

At the beginning of 1945, Mr. K., an engineer, came to see me and said the following: 'To round off this matter, I bring you the information that the perfectly tested and proven device for shooting down airplanes is now being converted on higher orders. - As he said, there should have been 2000 E 558 devices in Munich-Alladi (BMW). Some of them were camouflaged and stored in the woods near Mündien in spring 1945. But immediately after the relocation, in the following nad t, the individual sections of forest where the equipment was stored were bombed.

The following process, reported by *Rol f*

Hillebrand in the "Reichsruf", Hanover, of December 14, 1957. Hillebrand was production manager on the staff of Fernseh GmbH, which from 1939 united all branches of research in the field of television technology and which was relocated to the USSR in 1945 by Soviet Marshal Konjew. First Hillebrand writes: gIt was towards the end of the Korean War when the US army command announced that an American secret weapon had been used in an experimental way. It was said that it could be used to observe any target at a distance of many kilometers during firing and that the already released projectile could be deflected at will during flight in response to any target shift. The results were outstanding. This American invention, according to the announcement, was the most significant in recent years in the field of warfare.
and its effects cannot yet be overlooked.

When I read this announcement, which was shrouded in a veil of impenetrable secrecy by the press, I couldn't help but laugh quietly, albeit bitterly. The secret was not so impenetrable to me because this new weapon was not an American invention, but a German one, in the development and production of which I had been closely involved during the Second World War. And if the German treachery in the key positions had not been so widespread, this weapon, as well as a number of other secret weapons, would have been used by the Germans by 1944 at the latest. And not just in 1952 by the Americans!

This German secret weapon - we called it 'Tonne' - was probably one of the most groundbreaking German forestry achievements in the field. This, I believe, as well as the characteristic fate that befell it, prompts me to give a more detailed account of its history, development, testing and tragic end ...

In August 1943, the company Hentschel-Flugzeugwerke had developed a missile with short wing stubs, which could be equipped with explosives.

loaded with material was to be attached to the fuselage of a mother aircraft and released for the sinking of 5diiifen. These already existing cigar-shaped cells were to be equipped with television equipment and remote control - that was our task. That was the birth of the 'ton'.

The most difficult prerequisite for the solution was the broadly advanced basic research of our 'Fernseh-GmbH'

... Our often-derided 'basic research' ensured that individual development processes that had to be implemented could always fall back on the necessary foundations. This principle also proved to be particularly beneficial in our case.

The principle of operation of our 'ton' was to be as follows: The missile was a t t a c h e d to the fuselage of a carrier aircraft like a sd were bomb. In the head of the missile, not in front of the explosive charge, was a television recording device. This recorded the target and its surroundings during the approach and transmitted the images to a television screen mounted inside the aircraft. A second receiver was located in the airport and served as a control device and as a backup in c a s e the receiver in the aircraft failed. A remote control system was located under the television screen. Once the enemy target was s i g h t e d , the pilot released the 'barrel', which continued to fly with the help of its own engine, while the carrier aircraft turned towards its home port.

On the television screen, the onward flight of the 7onne' and its relationship to the target could be tracked.)every change of course - for example due to wind effects - of the wing bomb could be regulated by the remote control system, every deviation of the target from the target line was visible on the screen and could be compensated by renewed control of the 'ton'. In order to keep the image recording steady during the continued flight of the 'barrel', a new lens with a different focal length was automatically placed in front of the camera after a certain flight time.

focal length in front of the camera. This way the hit had to be infallible.

If the previous path of our research institutes had been hard and tedious, what happened now surpassed everything previously imaginable. The trials at the test sites in Karlshagm J= , Neu-Me&- lenburg, Rödilin and Mannzell were chased non-stop - the aim was to overcome the teething troubles.

the 'ton' w a s ready for use. This was a completely new principle, for which there was no evidence of use, and the war-induced shortage of supplies, the repeated loss of suppliers due to bombing and the need to constantly adapt to changing production conditions created new obstacles.

In order to make it possible to use the 'Tonne' audi in the event of nadi, fog or cloud formation, we developed the innovative infrared iconoscope, which allowed images to be taken audi without visibility; In order to prevent the lenses from clouding, which would blind the camera, we built a climatic chamber with automatic temperature and humidity control, which harmonized the indoor and outdoor temperatures; in addition, a de-icing system was installed for the camera's optics due to the high altitude. The optics were one of the most difficult problems; they had to be adjusted to many different angles and gradations as well as to the wind speed and had to be specially manufactured for these devices. The Sdineider company in Kreuz-na&i was responsible for the design.

Since March 1944 - we had been relocated to the Sudetenland in the meantime - we had been constantly trying to get a group of pilots assigned to the practical testing of the 'ton' in front-line operations. However, we came up against a bewildering wall of inaction. Finally, in June, a squadron was assigned to deploy the 'Tonne' to the Adriatic. We eagerly awaited what was to come. But we continued to wait in vain for a deployment order.

Incomprehensibly, the delivery of the special multi-plug, which provided the connection of the cables in the masts, was also delayed. Thousands of these multiple plugs were waiting in Berlin-Straußberg. When a number of 'tons' were suddenly requested for a deployment planned within a few days and the delivery was ordered directly to the port of deployment under the highest level of urgency, we chased special couriers directly from us to Berlin to procure the plugs; they returned empty-handed: the depot was under the control of a high-ranking military military officer who refused to hand them over. Telexes and phone calls chased us through the night to Berlin, we were desperate. Finally, in the morning, a concrete message arrived: the head of the Wehrmadit-Nadirichtendienst, General Fellgiebel, was on his way to us. We breathed a sigh of relief. Scientists and technicians, who had been working non-stop for weeks on the completion and testing and were only able to k e e p themselves on their toes with the help of these tonics, were filled with new hope: in the end, everything would work out!

The situation is explained to the general of the rear troops arriving for the factory inspection. We ask him to personally arrange for the release of the required soldiers due to the urgency, we only have three days until the final deployment! The general remains extremely obliging, but does not commit himself. When he wanted to leave the factory again after four hours of trivial discussions, I stood in his way and politely asked for the necessary assistance. 'I have more important things to do now' is his laconic reply. I refer to the 'Tonne's' consti- tutions, which inspire the greatest hope, I refer to the imminent deployment, which has been ordered by the Führer's headquarters with the utmost urgency and the code number for special deployment, I refer to the insignificance of the formality of a single signature ... As a matter of principle, I do not issue sub-directorships within my office. Come to my office in Berlin tomorrow in atht days. We will then see what we can do.

can be done. Besides: the war won't last long and you won't b e late!' Leaves me standing there and drives off in his car ...

Shortly afterwards, the equipment was transported away. Ni&t to the Adriatic - to a storage room in Klein-Mathnow. They were found there again in November 1945. The Russians had discovered them, mistaken them for radios, turned them - and when no music sounded, they simply doused them with gasoline and set them on fire. The general of the Nadiridite troops, Erid' Fell- giebel, however, was executed on September 4, t944 for his involvement in the July 20 assassination attempt.'

Nadi the Berid t Irving's air force audi was sabotaged by corruption. "A lot of evidence of the corruption that had oflenbar in the LuAwaife Ilorated came into his [Mildis) hands. He met [in prison] a Heinkel director who had himself issued a sdieck for 40,000 Reidismarks for a senior test pilot to get a favorable report on the sdiledtt-designed test models of the He 177.'

As early as the summer of t941, Mild' Göring gave the names of some of the men he had in mind to have the aviation industry hire them* .®

Nad' Italy's apostasy revealed the entire disloyalty and deceitfulness of this ally. Shortly after his return from Berlin, the Italian Atta'hé Major Gasperi was the guest of Allied Nadiridite service officers in an apartment in Naples and told them everything he knew about the new weapons of the German air force.

gWhile hundreds of thousands of escaped Italian soldiers went into captivity, the German troops took over their c h a r g e . The evidence of Italy's disloyalty was enough to make even Mildi's head spin. In mid-October [t943], Göring informed him that the Italians had hoarded enormous quantities of raw materials, while

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148 David Irving, pThe Tragedy of the Dfutsdien Luftwaffe', pages 275 and 195.

while they demanded ever more supplies from Germany: 'They have more copper than we have in stock,' said Göring, stunned. 'The greatest thing is the fuel oil. We found so much in two tunnels that it would have been enough to keep the entire (Italian) fleet at a high level for a year. The Sdiweine have understood barrel for barrel, and they have been with me: 'We'd like to fly, brand new but gasoline!' I gave them a thousand tons more, and now we have 65,000 tons stowed away."

Mr. *Heinrich Dritter* from Kiel-Kroog told the author the following about his wartime experiences in the Luftwaffe:

pAfter training, I took over the TO position at the C19 Ohlau airplane pilot school in the summer of 1942 ... On my first tour with the commander, I saw a large store of front-line equipment, bombsights, bomb-catching devices and so on.

We were given front-line aircraft (Ju 88) that had flown off for our school. We dismantled everything we no longer needed for training purposes. I told my colonel to make an immediate effort to put this expensive equipment back to use. So I wrote via the commander to Fliegerausbildungskommando 10 and Luftgau 8, both in Breslau, our post-delivery office. I phoned several times, but my call went unheard. My camp grew larger with every plane that arrived.

By the time I left school a year later, my warehouse had doubled in size. Things were stored here, they were urgently needed at the front.

In July 1943, I took over the TO position at the sea rescue squadron in Kalităa (Budit of Piraeus). We were equipped with the three-engine flying boats Do 24. In August 1943, idi sent a Masdiine to Bordenham for a partial airframe overhaul. As one engine (Bramo 323) would exceed the 300 hours of flight time specified for this overhaul, idi had it overhauled beforehand by my

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t49 David Irving, 'The Tragedy of the Deuudien Luftwaffe', page 309 f.

to disembark people. The pilot had the order to report si& from each intermediate landing site. The first place was Semlin/Belgrade. The pilot reported from there and said that the new engine had gone sour during take-off. I referred him to the shipyard there and asked the manager to fix the sdiaderis. The Do 24 continued to fly after the engine had been replaced. After several inquiries, he received no information about the engine fault. A few days later, a Do 24 flew to Crete with an engine that we had replaced. Half an hour after take-off, it returned with piston seizure in the atiswed engine. Together with my engine inspector, I then examined the new engines we had in stock (about 7/8 stii&).

We found that the cylinders and pistons of all the engines were totally oxidized. They had been treated with an acid or alkaline solution at the end and h a d been made unbreathable. What would have happened if I h a d allowed two engines to be wiped out. Probably a crash, because with one engine the machine is no longer airworthy.

Around September 1943 I came back from a Nothing. One of our planes landed in front of me. On the bridge, I casually asked my first sergeant about the mission of the aircraft. Answer: Sdiulllug. That's when I saw our tried and tested pilot Fw. Lange and others leaving the plane. Idi rani fuel, Cilverbrauth and flight order determine. Co 3000 liters of fuel and 80 liters of lubricating oil w e r e used to fetch 16 canisters, 20 liters of olive oil each, from Mytilene for some gentlemen in the RLM [ReidisluAfahrt Ministry]. tlber both operations were reported to the 10th Air Corps, our superior office. We were asked to take back the reports by the report commander, Lieutenant Colonel Sikurius. However, I refused. My initiated transfer to the reconnaissance squadron, which

1. F. 122, equipped with the Ju 88, followed immediately. After I soon realized that our engines (Jumo 211) had been tampered with. I sent a report via my squadron captain,

Captain Mufl, sent another report to the 10th Air Corps and the responsible air district command. In it, ith stated that ith had to have 26 of the new engines installed in our airplanes removed again within a month due to defects. The engine with the longest operating time had run for 36 hours instead of 150 (replacement time).

During our 8-hour reconnaissance flights over the sea, it became a risk to install a new engine. Therefore, I preferred to take the risk of letting one engine fly for more than 150 hours instead of r e p l a c i n g two overdue engines at the same time.

My aim now was to control the engine running in such a way that only one engine had 7 hours nadi when replacing the other (i.e. half the running time). A long-distance fighter can torture itself with an intact engine nodi nad home, an empty bomber audi.

When looking through the engine history files, I soon realized that the engines that were last overhauled in the home factories w e r e all in order. I therefore went to our local office, the Fliegergast, and checked out the engines for our squadron on the basis of the service life files. How did the units now take the other engines? What happened to the single-engine aircraft, e.g. the Ju 87, which was equipped with the same type of engine? It simply fell down when its engine failed. The engines had become the great primal safety for our crews!

As mentioned before, I wrote all this at the end of 1943 about my a squadron captain to the t0. Air Corps. Although idi immediately had a malfunction report written about every faulty engine in sevenfold production in accordance with orders, i.e. 26 pieces in one month, nothing happened at first. These reports went to the 10th Air Corps, the Luftgaukommando, Luftgauingenieur, Chef Sidier- heit-RLM, Ges4wader etc. But after receiving my report with the summary and the accusations at the IO. Fliegerkorps, all hell broke loose with General Holle. He himself went into the air every day

to escape the telephonic bombardment of the senior officers of the stage units who were disturbed in Sdilaf. My success was home leave with a subsequent transfer as TO to the Lult- naéhrichtertséhule Erfurt-Bindersleben.

After Italy was defeated in 1943, some of the Italians continued to serve under our command. A battery of flak was deployed on rafts in the Budit of Piraeus. One day, out of 'ignorance', this anti-aircraft gun started firing at our Ju 88 as it approached Kala-maki, our airfield south of Athens. This could not happen, but it could. It wasn't that nice. Our Masdiine came home with seven holes g1ü&lidi.

Now the curiosity! Although we were constantly advised to save fuel, a few days later the squadrons, at least of different types, flew for hours over Greece for the anti-aircraft reconnaissance service. The commander could hardly have come up with anything better. In any case, we were all very indignant about this waste of material.

At about the same time, I heard from my comrades after returning from a flight, an armored brigade was supposed to have rolled through Greece and Athens for propaganda purposes, although it was better trained at the front.

We learned what was going on in part of our upper command
yes then aude in the middle of 1944."

Sabotage of the naval warfare

The betrayal of Operation qWeserübung, which led to the occupation of Norway up to the far north, was the first act of sabotage to hit the Kriegsmarine hardest. The Supreme Allied War Council had already decided on February S. 1940 to land three to four divisions in Narvik and to occupy the sdiwedisd ore mines of Gällivare in order to from its anti-war ore supply.

To prevent this and to gain a better strategic position against England, Adolf Hitler ordered the operation. It was one of the boldest of recent gestures, because the entire German fleet had to take on the far superior British naval force. Hitler's directive of March t940 stated: 'Their numerical superiority must be compensated for by bold action and surprising leadership'.

If the bold action of the naval command and its forces was beyond all doubt, the surprise of the durdi leadership had to be denied them, because the whole enterprise was sabotaged by the treachery of the conspirator Oster.

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150 Cajus Bekker, qVerdammte See', Oldenburg 1971, page 92 t.

Lrich Kern describes the course of the betrayal in his work "Adolf Hitler and the War" as follows:

pThe Dutch military attaché in Berlin, Colonel Sas, sudite Colonel Oster in his apartment at 3. April 1940 at l7 o'clock Colonel Oster in his apartment, because the latter had asked him to sids Oster informed Sas dryly that the Wehrma&t was planning an action against Norway and Denmark: The company was called 'Weserübung' and would start on April 9th.

Sas left Oster's apartment in a state of great agitation and immediately reported the conversation to the Danish Naval Atta&é Kjolsen and the Counsellor of State Stang, who gave little credence to this nad'ridit. In any case, the Danish envoy in Berlin informed his government in Copenhagen, which in turn immediately informed the British government …'^"

This enabled the enemy to take countermeasures, so that our navy had to accept very considerable war losses and thousands of German soldiers were killed.

Caius Better reports on our losses of warships and their crews: "The self-sacrificing resistance of the Norwegian navy shatters the fiction of 'peaceful occupation'. The Norwegians defended themselves against the invasion - however hopeless this might seem. And they know how to defend themselves. At the same time as the events in Narvik - almost to the minute at 05:20 on April 9 - the drama in the Oslo Fjord unfolds more than a thousand kilometers to the south.

In the course of April 8, the convoy [the three cruisers 'Blücher', 'Lützow', 'Emden', the torpedo boats 'Albatros', 'Kondor', 'Möve', the 1st R. flotilla under Lieutenant-Captain Gustav Forstmann with the scavenger boats R 17 to R 24 and the two whaling boats Rau 7 and Rau 8 under Rear Admiral Kummetz] the Great Belt and the Kattegat. After several falsdien submarine alarms at t9.06 o'clock in the height of Skagen an edtte Torpedo-

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151 Eridi Kern, Adolf Hider and the War', Prussian Oldendod, page 74.

The torpedo runs in front of the bow of 'Lützow'. 'Albatros' turns into the bubble track and chases the attacker with depth charges.

It is the Trident under Lieutenant-Commander Scale. It is part of the didite swarm of British submarines lying in wait in the Skagerrak and Kattegat. If the Germans react to the British laying mines in Norwegian waters, they are supposed to run in front of the boats. And so they did.

At noon, Tfident has sunk the German 8000-ton tank#r
'Posidonia' at noon. Now Commander Scale launches ten torpedoes at the 'Lützow'. This time without success.

Admiral Kummetz is warned. A message comes over the radio that two German steamers have been sunk in the entrance to the Oslo Fjord. So that's where the British are too ...

Half an hour before midnight, the radio operators on 'Lützow' h e a r an order from the Norwegian authorities on Radio Oslo:

'Extinguish all fires immediately!

There is nothing more to be done with tricks.

The destroyer 'Thiele' transmits: 'A clear Norwegian defensive measure. A surprising incursion into the fjord therefore hardly seems possible any more' ...

00.25 hrs. The Rauöy and Bolärne islands flanking the entrance to the Oslofjord form a light barrier across the fairway. The German convoy passes through at 18 nautical miles,
Nevertheless, 'Blücher' is held by the naval gunners and bombarded with 15 cm shells from both sides. The German ships light up with their powerful searchlights - and the fire is intense.

At the same time, the torpedo boat 'Albatros' under Lieutenant Commander Siegfried Strelow is f i g h t i n g with the Norwegian guard Pol III, which has also illuminated the convoy with its searchlight. The Norwegian fires at the 'Albatros', demands that it surrender, and even starts a rendezvous. When Pol III audi nod radios and reports the Germans, Strelow has to shoot the furthless guard with artillery.

The four sailors are fished out of the water - the first prisoners in the Oslo Fjord. Now there can be no doubt that the Norwegians have been warned.

04.50 hrs. Two Norwegian guards again! They scan the ships with searchlights, then give the liditsignzle in Ridltung Dröbak ...

Admiral Kummetz sticks to his operational plan, which is characterized by the one word
characterized by one word: 'Durdihalten!

Then events come thick and fast.

OS.18 o'clock. It is slowly getting light. The ships are clearly visible, but details on land are not, because a light haze prevails.

05.20 hrs, 'Blücher' signals 'Halt Fahrt'. To starboard, just a few hundred meters away, lies the village of Döbrak. On the port side ahead is the fortress island of Kaholm. On both sides there is medium artillery, on Kaholm also heavy artillery: three older 28 cm guns. From Krupp Essen.

The ships have to pass through this bottleneck. There is no other
fairway.

05.20 hrs. Sdieinwerfer riditen sidi from land towards Blüdier. O n l y 600 meters away, the cruiser glides towards the narrows at half speed. Immediately afterwards, Kaholm fires the first 28-cm salvo.

'Blüdier' is completely hit. A shell orbits over the breasts and sdiräg nadi up against the foremar and mows down the anti-aircraft chief of operations. Kapitänleutnant Hans-Erik Podihammer and all the soldiers nearby are killed instantly. A second hit sets the aircraft hangar on fire with high flames. And from the starboard side, the 15-cm shells from Dröbak crash into the ship.

The surprise is complete, the effect tremendous. "Open fire!" orders the commander, Captain Heinridi Woldag. But no one recognizes where the Besdiufi is coming from. Leidite and heavy anti-aircraft guns fire at random. The artillery is silent, the fire control has no target. At Woldag's command, 'ftußerste

Power ahead!" the ship begins to turn almost immediately. The steering gear has failed and the rudder is not straight. The commander has to counter-steer with the screws to avoid running onto the rocks in the middle of the Dröbak Narrows.

OS.21 o'clock. Two muffled underwater detonations shake the heavy cruiser. Mines? The chief officer, frigate captain Eridi Heymann, thinks of the Feiiidnadiri'fitenblatt about Dröbak. It said something about mines in the fairway that could be detonated electrically from land.

In fact, however, there are two torpedo launchers. Shot from an underground battery on Kaholm ...

The torpedoes hit 'Blücher's' heart, the naval installation. The damage is devastating, water bridit into the rooms, the turbines stand still. The chief engineer, frigate captain (engineer) Karl Tfiannemann, immediately senses that nothing more can be saved here ...

BlüÖrer', the doomed cruiser, is alone, without any outside help. Because 'Lützow', 'Emden' and the torpedo boat
'Möwe' have been left behind beyond the Dröbak strait.

Right after the start of the cannonade, the 'Lützow' received three heavy hits from the Kruppsdien 28-cm guns on Karholrn: one on the middle tube of the forward 28-cm tri11ing turret, one in the hospital and one on the boat crane on board ...

Everyone on board [the 'Blücher'] had to wade into the ice-cold water and the 400 meters or so to shore. At around 07:00, at 45 degrees Sdilagseite, Woldag orders the ship to leave the Sdiiff. He sd- ber, the admiral, the leading ship's officers - all without lifejackets, all trying to get out of the suction of the sinking giant with powerful s_"; whimpers.

According to the first officer's report, the newest cruiser of the
German navy capsized around 07.32 on the morning of April 9, 1940 ...

At least five hours before the catastrophe it was clear that the Norwegians could neither be surprised in a hand-to-hand fight nor were they willing to accept a 'peaceful occupation' without resistance ...

On April 10 at around 12 noon, a day and a half later than planned, the Lützow Group arrives in Oslo. The capital was occupied mainly by airborne troops. After the 'victory' in the Oslo Fjord, which had been bought with heavy losses, the naval command wanted to retrieve 'Lützow' in particular without delay. In addition to the cracks in the engine foundation, the damage from the Dröbak strait must now be repaired before the cruiser can finally set sail for the Atlantic. Time is of the essence. The brighter the nights become, the lower the durdibruthsdiance.

In the nadit to J1. April . . . the 'Lützow' heads for Cape Skagen at 24 knots, her maximum speed. Thiele' wants to enter the Kattegat close to the Danish coast because enemy submarines are reported on the other side, off the Swedish archipelago.

Nevertheless, the "Lützow" is attacked by the British submarine Spearfish shortly before midnight. A torpedo hit damaged the entire ship. Screws and rudders were lost, so that the cruiser drifted across the sea towards Skagen. Despite this, 'Lützow' manages to stay afloat and is towed back to Kiel.

Ari Bergen', reports Cajus Bekker further, the cruiser Königsf'erg*, which had already been damaged by Norwegian coastal batteries, was attacked by British dive bombers and sank. On the south coast of Kristiansand, the 'Karlsruhe' runs into the British submarine Truant and is torpedoed. After an hour-long death struggle, this cruiser also sinks.

Hol in the north, in Narvik, in the early morning of April t0. April, the 2nd Destroyer Flotilla under Captain Warburton-Lee advances unnoticed against the Hafenbudit. The fire attack caught the Germans completely unprepared. The alarm is about to be sounded on the FdZ's lead boat, 'Wilhelm Heidkamp', when a torpedo hit tears away the entire aft section. Commodore Bonte is killed instantly, as are his 1st Asto, Corvette Captain Heyke, the unit engineer, Frigate Captain (Ing.) Maywald, and Lieutenant (V) Crudimann.

Immediately afterwards, 'Anton Sdimitt', commanded by corvette captain Fritz Böhme, sinks, broken by two torpedo hits. Roeder* and Lüdemartn (also destroyers) are damaged by British shells.

But not all German destroyers are in the harbor bay of Narvik. On the alert, frigate captain Erich Bey pushes out of the Hergangsfjord with Zenker', 'Koellner' and 'Giese' out of the Hergangsfjord, and frigate captain Fritz Berger, with 'Thiele' and 'Arnim', shifts the way out of the BallangenbuAt for the Englishmen already sailing west.

Thiele' and 'Arnim' combine their fire on the British leader's boat 'Hardy', which is destroyed by ten serial volleys and sits on the cliffs on the south side of the fjord. The British flotilla commander, Captain Warburton-Lee, was killed in the battle.

Hunter' sinks in the middle of the fjord, while Hotspur, Havo'k and Ho- stille manage to evade further pursuit with more or less damage in the storm - Hotspur with a torpedo launch from Thiele*.

The British attack succeeded because the FdZ felt safe thanks to the German submarines deployed in the outer fjord. Yat- sädilidi U 51 under Kapitänleutnant Knorr and U 25 under Korvettenkapitän Schütze attack the incoming and outgoing British - but their torpedoes fail!

Now the fate of *the* three Narvik destroyers is sealed. Most of them are out of action, their ammunition is almost exhausted and they are completely empty. The only tanker to make it to Narvik, the 'Jan Wellem', is far from being able to quench her thirst for fuel oil.

On April 13, Vice-Admiral W. J. Whitworth pushed forward against Narvik with the SdilaAtsdiiff 'Warspite' and nine other destroyers and chased the remaining German boats to the outermost fjords.

Sd'letlids only ned the lead boat of the 1st Z-flotilla, 'Georg Thiele', defending the Rombaksbott, has two torpedoes. The first was dozed off and hit the rocks. The last one is launched by the torpedo officer, Oberleutnant zur See Sommer, himself. And Sommer hits it: the British destroyer 'Eskimo' has its stem torn off.

Then atidi 'Thiele' has to abandon the ill-fated vessel. To save the crew, the commander, corvette captain Max-E&ardt Wollt, chases his boat onto the Ufedelsen with extreme force.

In Narvik, the detits&e navy has only ten destroyers, ten of the 22 with which it went to war. Audi the merchant ships used for the 'Weser Exercise', the tankers and transporters suffered further losses The occupation of Norway, projected as a 'peaceful occupation', brought the first significant loss of this war for the German navy. This is all the more evident because the vein of the British fleet, which had been awarded at the same time, failed to materialize.

No fewer than 42 submarines are lying in wait. Thousands of torpedoes were fired, but none hit. The openly reported torpedo failures turned out to be one of the most serious failures in the history of the German navy'°°.'

Cajus Bekker's report clearly shows that both the Norwegian and British armed forces were warned in good time by the treachery of the conspirator Oster and put on high alert before the operation began. The saboteurs snatched the factory surprise from the hands of the German naval command, causing enormous losses of soldiers and sailors.

The losses caused by the initial failure of the torpedo factory were, as we shall see, also due to sabotage, which was to be found in the sabotage circles of the navy itself.

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t52 Cajus Bekkcr, pVerdamnite See', Oldmburg t97l, page 98 II.

Where and how the catastrophic failure of the submarine weapon in the Norway operation occurred is also reported by Cajus Bekker in his war diary of the German navy 'pVerdammte See':

"The Yestfjord - the approach to Narvik, which was approached early on the 9th by Commodore Bonte's ten destroyers and occupied by General Dietl's mountain hunters - was sighted by four submarines at this time: U 25, U 46, U St and U 64.

But they see nothing. First the stormy voyage north, and now calm seas here in the fjord, but a dense swirl of activity. Early on April 10th. The fjord water around U 25 is as smooth as a duck's egg. Masked lookouts on the submarine tower. Like the snowmen. You can't even see your own bow. Suddenly waves approach. The boat rocks and starts to sdiling. In a few sentences, the commander, Corvette Captain Victor Sd ü t z e , is on top.

'Someone must have just passed,' reports the wadi officer. Unsecretly. They have seen no enemy. Even the other submarines don't notice anything. But the British 2nd Destroyer Flotilla is through - and is able to overwhelm the Germans in Narvik with a fire attack.

In the evening of the t0th, with better visibility, U 25 and U 51 fire on departing British destroyers: without success. Their torpedoes detonate too early. One of them immediately after the end of the safety period. Another '100 meters in front of a large destroyer', as Captain Lieutenant Dietrich Knorr of U 51 reported.

That's just the beginning.

t1. April. The German radio patrol recognizes strong British fleet movements in Rid'tung northern Norway. Apparently a planned counter-landing in the Narvik area. Dönitz [then commander of the U-boat force] directs another four boats with experienced commanders into the threatened area: U 38, U 47, U 48 and U 49. On this *day,* Captain Lieutenant Herbert Sdiultze has two big chances. Twice, his U 48 - the most noble submarine of the Second World War - runs into a Swedish cruiser.

sdiussgeredit in front of the pipes. Sdiultze shoots a three-footer twice. The first time at 12:30: torpedo failure. Early detonator.

The second time at 9.15 p.m.: Again all three torpedoes fly into the air too early. The damn magneto ignition!

The BdU [Dönitz) radios complicated instructions from Germany on how to set the torpedoes: In most cases, the MZ [magneto ignition] should be switched off and fired with atifsdilag- ignition.

13 A pz'1 This time, ten British destroyers are advancing towards NarviJi. And behind them a Sdila&tsd iff: the 'Warspite'. Victor Sdiützes U 25 is pushed under water by the formation, does not come to a shot, is simply overrun. The British destroy the last of the destroyers in Narvik and the neighboring fjords.

On April 14 - the 'Warspite' leaves the Vestfjord again - U 46 and U 48 come to the Sdiladits';hiff for launch: torpedo failure!

April 15. A heavily secured British transport convoy enters the Vaagsfjord near Harstad. There, not far from Narvik, the unloading of the troops begins, which are to recapture Dietl's position on the Sd Weden nad Narvik ore route. But Günther Prien's U 47 is on the spot. Prien, whom they call the 'Bull of Scapa Flow'. Prien will be mad about it. He found the transporters at around 10 pm in the evening. They are anchored in Bygdenfjord. Three huge pots, guarded by cruisers and destroyers.

Prien: 'A wall of ships!

22.42 hrs. Four torpedoes leave the tubes of U 47, only 750 meters from the target. No risk: all torpedoes are set to detonate, depth 4-S meters. The transports have much more draft. So the torpedoes have to rip a loi;ii into the ship's side.

Prien's chief helmsman, Wilhelm Spalir, watches the stopwatch. The seconds scatter, then the minutes ... The reduced

of the torpedoes is long over - and nothing is seen. No hit. No detonation. As if the torpedoes had sunk into the depths of the fjord.

Painstakingly in control, Prien has the tubes reloaded. He himself and his wadi officer check every move, every setting on the torpedoes.

Shortly after midnight on April 16, U 4Z approaches for the second time. This time, despite the danger from the nearby destroyers, over water. Prien wants to be on the safe side. He suddenly has the feeling that it is in his hands alone to save the mountain fighters in Narvik.

Then the four eels run. And it's just like the first time ... No: finally one detonates! But far away, on the rocks of the fjord. The ships are not even scratched on the ship's side. Their ordeal continues quietly.

Prien's mistake proves that not only the magnetic but also the normal detonation of the torpedoes is completely unsuccessful.

Dönitz learns of this that very night. He calls Berlin and demands that Raeder remedy the situation. The next morning, the Torpedo inspector, Rear Admiral Oskar Kummetz, appears before the agitated submarine commander. Kummetz had just returned from the Oslo Fjord, where he was supposed to occupy the Norwegian capital at the head of warship group s. But his lead ship, the heavy cruiser 'Blüdier', was first shot up by the Norwegians and then sunk: with two torpedoes! ...

But Kummetz does not immediately know what is going on with the German torpedoes ... The torpedoes with which the boats outside had their bad experiences had not even been fired before. The most recent attempts to beridize weifi Kummetz have shown that the torpedoes steer up to 2.70 meters deeper than they are set.

So it is not only the firing guns that fail. The 'call apparatus is also unreliable. That's why Prien couldn't even hit the brute an-

his torpedoes, which were set to detonate on the sdilag, ran under the sddffen ...

Prien is already on his way back when he receives the t9. April the Warspite' gets in his way. He risks two more torpedoes - this time with MZ [magneto ignition] again, because he is out of the confines of the fjords and magneto ignition is supposed to work in the open sea. He would have been better off leaving it alone:

Both torpedoes fail, and the 6ritisdien destroyers chase U 47 for hours with whole series of depth charges.

Dönitz then calls off the submarine operation. He recalls all the boats. You can't fight with blunt weapons.

Unbeknownst to them, the British had won a resounding victory and the Germans had suffered a devastating defeat. The result: 31 submarine attacks from a favorable position - four on the Sd laditsdiiff 'Wanpite', twelve against various cruisers, ten on destroyers and five on troop transports - and not a single success ...

The commander of the submarines: 'There is nothing wrong with our torpedoes. I don't believe that ever in the history of war soldiers have had to be sent against the enemy with such an unuseable weapon.

The naval command in Berlin spoke of 'complete failure' and of an 'operational failure of war-deciding proportions*.

The returning submariners do *not* speak out *until they* return home. Depression turns into anger.

Prien: 'Nobody can expect us to continue fighting with a wooden gun!

As early as April 20, Raeder has to appoint a special committee to investigate the causes of the failures. When the final investigations were completed in mid-May, Dönitz called the behavior of the torpedo captains 'criminal'.

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153 Cajus Bekker, pVerdammte See', page 124 if.

Der Oster gab es leider allzu viele. Da war der deutsche Abwehrchef, Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, der vom ersten Tag an die deutschen Kriegsanstrengungen sabotierte.

Da war Carl Goerdeler, der geistige Führer des deutschen Widerstandes, der vor Landesverrat und Sabotage der deutschen Kriegsanstrengungen nicht zurückschreckte. Und da waren leider auch noch andere, für die es wichtiger war, das politische System des Nationalsozialismus zu sabotieren, als für Deutschland zu kämpfen.

Er verriet nichts, er sabotierte nichts, er stand, kämpfte und fiel, getreu seines Soldateneides, im Glauben an das ewige Deutschland.

Zehntausende, ja vielleicht Hunderttausende deutsche Soldaten mußten sterben, weil die alliierte, zentral gesteuerte Sabotage schon in der Rüstungsindustrie dafür sorgte, daß oftmals unverwendbare Munition und Waffen geliefert wurden. Schwerer noch wog, daß sich hohe und höchste Offiziere fanden, die, während ihre Standeskameraden genauso wie die Landser kämpften und fielen, die deutschen Kriegsanstrengungen und damit das deutsche Millionenheer sabotierten.

The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Grand Admiral Raeder, announced the following about the results of the special committee's investigations:

1. after the experiences with the torpedoes G 7a and G 7e during the Norway operation, I ordered an investigation into the causes of the defects that occurred and the extent to which there was culpable failure.

2. The investigations have established that the main reasons for this were the torpedo damage and preparation deficiencies prior to the launch:

a) Neither the G 7a nor the G 7e met the requirements for a front-firing weapon.

b) The M.Z. section [magneto ignition section] of the pistol was technically not fully usable. The A.Z. part [superimposed ignition part] did not fulfill the demands placed on it.

e) At the torpedo department of the Kriegsmarinewerft Kiel and in the launching operation of the TVA [Torpedo-Versii&sanstalt der Kriegs- Marine], deficiencies were found with regard to the preparation of the torpedoes for launching. This point will be pursued in particular.

On the basis of these findings, the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy ordered an investigation, which led to the court-martial conviction of the responsible members of the Torpedo Research Institute.

Admiral Oskar Wehr, the head of the TVA, and two of his senior officers were found guilty and sentenced.

The officers and officials of the TVA in Eckernförde had known since June 1937 at the latest that the German torpedoes G 7a and G 7e had steered deeper than had been set. The error was believed to have been remedied by installing a new depth spring, with which satisfactory results were achieved during the first tests. Nevertheless, Mohr, the naval chief engineer in charge of the test casting, did not consider the

the results were not sufficient to make a final judgment. On July 16, 1937, the head of the TVA, Wehr, at that time not a captain at sea, applied to the superior torpedo inspectorate for the general installation of the new spring, because it "guaranteed a tolerance for the depth run o f nt&t more than 0.5 meters in the entire setting range from 4 to 12 meters depth".

The retraction and installation of the spring was described as "very urgent", but the urgency note was allegedly forgotten on the TVA's torpedo modification cards. Instead, it was noted there that the new springs were to be installed 'occasionally'. A shortage of materials and supply bottlenecks in the industry are said to have added to this, so that the first new torpedoes could not be delivered until January 1939.

In the meantime, the civil war was taking place in Spain, giving the navy the opportunity to test ships and weapons under frontline conditions: The German torpedoes were no good! They had masdiine faults, they didn't run straight, their depth run was wobbly, and towards the end of the run they sailed off.

Cajtis Bekker continues: "The naval command in Berlin was shocked. It ordered the Torpedo Harboring Command (TEK), newly founded in 1937, to carry out a trial shoot 'under the worst possible conditions'. In August 1938, the torpedo boat 'Albatros' carried out this test shooting for two weeks. Result: severe deficiencies in the mast and depth control!

TVA manager Sehr mocked these results: he was
'only unfounded criticism'. And above all, the criticism came from the competition, which was considered superfluous. Before the TEK came on the scene, the TVA had been sacrosanct. I t developed, tested and manufactured its torpedoes itself, tested them and declared them suitable. Rrgerlidi that the TEK was now functioning in between.

Wehr, meanwhile promoted to rear admiral, declared the 'Albatros' shooting on March 20, 1939 as an 'attempt with unsuitable means on an unsuitable object'. For filmmakers, the

proof is not required that a torpedo can be made to fail by appropriate means'.

Wehr: qThe front's confidence in the weapon handed over to it is unquestioned ...' The torpedo was to be fully 'front-line weapon' ...

The tests, reports and concerns piled up. But TVA did not let any of this get out, it reported the shortcomings to the top ...

The war was only there, and it needed the 'inexplicable' failure of the submarine torpedoes. Now Dönitz didn't let it go. He drilled oa'h the Ursadien.

On Sunday, October 8, the torpedo inspector, Vice Admiral Friedridi Götting, scheduled a special briefing at TVA's northern base. The result: Götting had to close the magnetic jetty. The submarines were only allowed to sail with the ignition on. This made the depth run crucial. If the torpedo steered too low, it could not hit the ship at all. But neither Rear Admiral Wehr nor any other participant in the discussion mentioned the known errors of the depth run.

Corvette Captain Karl Kattentidt, one of the younger TVA officers who had given several warnings beforehand, recalled: 'I myself and probably someone else didn't feel very well.

On the way to the car, Götting's chief of staff, Captain Rudolf Junker, asked Admiral Wehr whether the depth maintenance was all right.

Wehr: 'What is supposed to be wrong with it?

Kanentidt then got the ball rolling. He bypassed his direct superiors and informed the commander of the TEK, Captain Albert Sdied, of his concerns. That was on October 20, 1939.

Nodi the same day, Admiral Götting ordered Sdierf alar- ozie **to** sidt the sddeßstandcs **of the TVA**. **Within an** hour and with all the documents. Nod' on the same day %nitz received a long-distance letter from Götting: 'According to the latest findings

the torpedoes had to be lowered. The *torpedoes* were to be set two meters shallower than the draft of the target. This meant that destroyers could no longer be attacked with torpedoes at all. Because if the eels were placed at such a shallow depth, they would break through the surface of the water and become worthless ...

When the ObdM, Grand Admiral Raeder, found out about the dubious events he relieved the responsible admirals of the torpedo ship. But it took the total destruction of the submarine torpedoes off Norway in April 1940 for the matter to be brought to the attention of a court of inquiry and, on July 23, 1940, to the Supreme War Tribunal ...

The TVA alone was the scapegoat ...

The court did not stop at the responsibility of higher authorities, which was also recognized."")

Cajus Bekker's question is all too eloquent. The higher command of the navy had been warned often enough and had the self-evident duty to equip the front-line soldiers entrusted to them with weapons on which they could rely in their ever more dangerous missions.

It was only six months before the Norway operation that torpedo venagers were deployed in loss-making missions. The submarine commanders naturally reported the failures and just as naturally expected that everything would be done immediately to eliminate the causes. But none of the mistakes were made. Even Prien's reports about his torpedo failures in the missions at the time did not seem to have particularly impressed the admirals responsible, otherwise they would have immediately d o n e everything in their power to get to the bottom of things, as Grand Admiral Raeder and Dönitz did as commanders of the submarine force after the disaster in the Norway operation.

About the submarine missions with torpedo failures before the occupation

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154 Cajus Bekker, „Verdammte See", Seite 129 ff.

Cajus Bekker reports: "One of the most spectacular events of the war at sea was the dispatch of the British submarine 'Royal Oak' by a German submarine under the command of Lieutenant Captain Günther Prien. Spectacular because Prien entered the lion's den with U 47 on October 14, 1939: near Scapo Flow, the main base of the British fleet. There, in deceptive secrecy, the old 'Royal Oak' lay at anchor. Until she was hit by two torpedoes at 0.22 a.m. and blew up ...

Hitler was the first naval officer to award Prien the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross, and Dönitz, who had devised the operational plan, was promoted to Rear Admiral by Raeder on the sdunal de& of U 47.

Despite all the loud rejoicing, one fact was kept secret: Prien had fired a total of seven torpedoes before two finally h i t the Royal Oak! And that was against a target lying quietly at anchor ...

There was the first attempt at 5.58 am. The submarine thawed out, in the middle of the Budit of Scapa Flow ... Wa&officer Engelbert Endraß takes careful aim. The sd atten of the English sdiladitsdiiff is clearly in front of his eyes, and behind it, half covered, nodi a second sdliff.

'Pipe one to four ready', commands Endraß, '-los!

A torpedo gets stuck in the pipe. Well, that can happen. But three torpedoes are on their way, three deadly eels. Then a sdiwathe detonation over there - next to the 'Royal Oak'. The colossus doesn't move, its slats lie there so black and faint

The torpedo grazed the anchor chain, as is now known from English sources. Nothing else. The British are not even thinking of an attack from outside. They have it checked whether anything has exploded in the sdiifi forward.

Prien, pale with disappointment, turns U 47 180 degrees and fires the only the only hettorpedo behind it. Everyone waits for the hit.

But nothing happens. The Aal disappears without a trace, just like its two predecessors. A past eel? Then the torpedoes must have detonated somewhere on the shore. No, there is no other explanation: of the five torpedoes launched so far, four have failed, three of them inexplicably.

U 4Z is in the middle of Scapa, without success and with empty tubes. In this situation, the commander has the forehead and the nerve to give the order to nade-load the tubes with reserve torpedoes ... And something could happen outside at any moment. Because the boat is curving around in the Bud t. Fully defrosted. You can see it from afar. After a quarter of an hour, at least two torpedoes are loaded. Prien doesn't want to wait any longer. He runs up once and shoots: the two torpedoes that will destroy the ship - and kill 833 British sailors.

Prien's misses in Scapa Flow were not the German navy's first torpedo failures. And certainly not the last. As early as September 6, 1939, a few days after the outbreak of war, Dönitz had received a strange report from a submarine that a torpedo had detonated and exploded on its own during its run, far ahead of the target. and had exploded.

On September 14, a German submarine was navigated for the first time. And this is how it happened: Captain Gerhard Glattes is standing at the periscope of his boat U 39 and can hardly believe his eyes: the 'Ark Royal', the famous British aircraft carrier, is running right in front of his pipes. Glattes lets himself get between the carrier and its destroyer sidings. Into the best training position. The 'Ark Royal' is only 800 meters away when the German shoots a double thread: Two G 7a torpedoes. In a single s h o t . And with magneto ignition. This means that the torpedoes do not need to hit the ship's side. They pass under the target, and the Sd i8 itself triggers the detonation through the magnetic field reinforcement of its iron mass.

Nidit but here, on t4. September near the Orkneys. The German commander i'eobaditet how his two torpedoes explode about 80 meters

explode about 80 meters in front of the British ... without causing any damage. At least
at least not to the enemy.

Because now the devil is loose. The two muffled blows and the high columns of water alert the British defenses ... Three British destroyers turn into the bubble track. And are sdion over the German boat before it can dive deep enough. The captain of HMS Foxhound even sees the submarine underneath him in the water. His wabos [depth charges] are spot on.

G1ü'k for the men in the steel tube: U 39 does not sink immediately, but is pulled to the surface. Glattes orders them to get out immediately. The British send boats. The crew is rescued.

On October 51, Korvettenkapitän Victor Sdiütze angrily radios that he has fired four torpedoes at a stopped steamer northwest of Cape Finisterre with U 25 from a short distance - all four failures!

On November Z, U 46 returns from enemy action. The commander, Kapitänleutnant Herbert Sohler, and his men are deeply disappointed: four waves out, and only one tanker sunk! Sohler explodes at the report: "We were in convoy three times. Once I shot seven torpedoes at a wall of overlapping ships - and not a single trefler! And then a large cruiser was stopped in front of our bow, position 90. My two torpedoes went off as early detonators. The cruiser was warned and ran off ...'

The hopes that Lieutenant Captain Wilhelm Zahn places in the three torpedoes he has just fired are also deceptive. Zahn is the commander of U 56, one of the 'trees' of the submarine weapon. These are the small Type II boats, built only for the North and Baltic Seas, but too small and not durable enough for the great Atlantic ...

On October 30, at 10 o'clock in the morning, U 56 stands west of the Orkney Islands in the middle of the proud British Home Fleet! And its three torpedoes - the boat can't fire any more at once

at once because it only has three tubes - are heading straight for His Majesty's naval flagship 'Nelson' ...

Zahn: 'Three sd1la&tsdiifl were initially heading towards U 56 and would therefore have made an attack very difficult, if not impossible. Suddenly they turned 20 to 30 degrees and passed the boat in an ideal attack position! In the meantime, the 'Rodney' is running from the most favorable angle. But the second tooth is just coming back: the
'Nelson'.

The commander carefully checks the shot values: distance 800 meters, enemy position 80 degrees, enemy speed J2 nautical miles, depth setting 8 meters, ignition ... Tooth: 'Ideal values. The **fan** fell calmly, like in a practice shoot.

After the shot, the boat rears up, comes *out of* the water with the visual *cobx*, but then it goes into the cellar. Safety first. When 'Nelson' is hit, all hell breaks loose upstairs.

If 'Nelson' is hit, it will mean trouble for several illustrious guests who are attending a conference at the Fleet Flagship these days: The G-in-C Home Fleet, Admiral Sir Charles Forbes, has invited not only the First Sea Lord, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Oudley Pound, but also the First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churdiill, on board for a visit ...

Zahn doesn't have a sdiimmer of the high visit& on the 'Nelson' in his 'one tree' natiirlidi. But he knows one thing for sure: with its three individual, but di&t consecutive torpedoes, it is perfectly balanced on the bow, middle and stern of the sdiladitsdiiff ...

Suddenly, the commander and radio operator hear a metallic sound through the propeller noise. As if iron is bumping against iron ... But nothing else follows the impact. No bursting force, no detonation. Then a second, lei&- mad sdilag. And again nothing. The men in the boat look at each other, silent, desperate. Their eels have hit the 'Nelson' - but **oidit** detonated. Torpedo failure! ...

U 56 comes close to the Home Fleet nidit nodi once.

In the evening around 7 p.m. Admiral Dönitz holds a Fvtnksprudi from Zahn in his hand: '10 o'clock Rodney Nelson Hood ten destroyer square 3492, 240 degrees, three torpedoes fired, failure'.

Dönitz indulges in bitter reproaches. Nid't only that he had to wage war with far too few submarines; now

What are the boats supposed to do? Shoot them with the supposedly so versatile magneto ignition, there are early detonators. And immediately afterwards, the boats have the destroyers and the **Bewadier** on their necks. Dönitz suspects that most of the boats that have been destroyed so far have only betrayed the enemy through their torpedo failures. And if they are fired with a flare, then often nothing happens. Either the torpedoes steer too low and miss the target. Or they even hit the side of the ship, as on the Nelson, and still hit!'°"

Nadi the above report on the behavior of TVA leader Rear Admiral **Wehr** must seem very ambiguous, and the court martial certainly did not hit the nail on the head with its condemnation and punishment. General human failure, vanity, stubbornness, overestimation of one's own abilities and disputes over competence can often be the causes of mistakes. In the case of Wehr, however, one cannot help but feel that his sabotage of the torpedo weapon was deliberate.

It remains incomprehensible that the commander of the submarines did not intervene at that time to force the investigation of the defects and possibly their elimination, as he did after the catastrophe in the spring of 1940.

The war with several submarines could not be resumed in the Atlantic until the beginning of June 1940, when the use of magnetic detonation was completely discontinued. The Atlantic war began.

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t55 Cajus BeLker, "Damned Sec", page 113 If.

sdiladit, which was to be particularly successful in its first phase until, from 1942 onwards, the enemy succeeded in developing its air superiority over the Bay of Biscay to an ever greater degree of danger for the German submarine weapon. Even in moonlit nights, aircraft attacks now had to be expected, and the surprising attacks also became more frequent during the day. It was correctly assumed that the individual aircraft, which attacked from the clouds or from the sun during the day, had taken up their attack positions just outside the submarine's range, i.e. that the submarine's position had already been determined in advance.

This suspicion was confirmed when in< J-ni 1942, submarines in the Bay of Biscay were attacked by aircraft with bombs for the first time in the dark of night. At a distance of 1,000 to 2,000 meters, a searchlight flashed, which hit the submarine, and the bombs fell immediately afterwards. Three submarines were badly damaged in this way in June 1942 and had to return to the Bay of Biscay harbors.

return.

When the German offices of the High Command of the Navy were asked whether it was possible to locate the submarine from an airplane, they replied doubtfully and negatively. It was difficult to locate such a small object as a submarine against the surface of the water and, especially in rough seas, this could only be done at close range.

Dönitz explained this situation: "This view was undoubtedly in line with the experience the navy had gained with the other radars that worked with long waves. For the use of short waves, as it had been done without our knowledge in the English radar, we lacked the corresponding basic scientific research, so that we w e r e unaware of the possibility of much more far-reaching and more precise localization with short waves ... With the further development of the English aircraft detection device, the danger to submarines will become ever greater; damage on a large scale and total loss of boats will be the result ...

All these arrangements [regarding strong armoring to defend against enemy air attacks and equipping with radio equipment] were defensive measures. They could perhaps better protect the submarines from attacks based on detection, especially from the air, but they did not change the fact t h a t the British had succeeded in creating a long-range and accurate detection device. This meant that the airplane in particular had suddenly become a very dangerous opponent. If the two navies succeeded in permanently overcoming all areas, e.g. the entire Atlantic, with aircraft, the mobility of the U-Boom and their joint attacks over water had to come to a standstill.

come n'Q8g"

The security vessels of the Anglo-American convoys were increasingly equipped with the new short-wave device, the radar, which made it more and more difficult for the submarines to approach the convoy and push in to attack. There were an increasing number of cases in which submarines were attacked by surprise by destroyers and other weapons or shot at with artillery from close range, which was only possible by locating the submarines in advance.

In order to wage a successful submarine war, the commander of the submarines could not be guided solely by the reports of the observation service, which was increasingly able to intercept and decipher the English radio traffic of the convoys. In order to lead his wolves in a pack against the enemy convoy, he had to be in constant radio communication with them in order to learn their messages and get a picture of the situation in advance of his operational decisions. pWithout the extensive network of radio traffic," explains Cajus Bekker, "the submarines would not be able to fight as they did.

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156 Karl **D6nitz, "l0 Jsbre und 20 Tage",** page **230** If.

And this method of command and control had a decisive disadvantage: the part: the submarines miss each other when they are radioed.

The enemy cannot decipher what the wolves have to report to their admiral. But it is enough for him to pick up the lost signals from the boats in order to recognize their location ... I n the very moment when the submarine radio operator presses on the dead woman, his radio beam switches to your image screen of the new British-American satellite pilot 'Hufi-Dufi' - and indicates the route to the boat.

In most cases, the submarines are tracked by widely spaced landing stations and the results are sent to an evaluation center in London, from where they are forwarded to the convoy. This procedure is just too complicated. The destroyers and correctors, those sdunal, windy wadi dogs on the convoy, must themselves have soldie 'hufi duffs' to recognize the nearby submarines by their sparks if they have not yet entered the range of the radars.

It was again in the summer and fall of 1942 when the first 'Hufl-Duff'-sidipilers were first seen on board the escort vessels at sea. Now it suddenly became apparent that large, kilometer-long and wide convoys were blown away when the wolf packs tried to rush at them. Only well-prepared and equipped destroyers, corvettes and sub-hunting aircraft are nodi there and await their enemies ...

The ß.d.U. tcommander of the submarines) trembles betrayal Wodurdi would the enemy otherwise be able to recognize the formation and the approach of the U-boats so early, how would he otherwise be able to turn away with the convoy and drive around the waiting wolves?

Admirnl Dönitz was right with his verdad n It is really& Betrayal - betrayal by one's own spies ...

'Hufl-Duff' gives the English the forewarning for a long time to come - with the friendly help of the Germans. As soon as a submarine that is not too far away is located, the destroyer turns around.

his bow into the direction indicated by the direction finder. And then, when the wolf trembles at the danger, when it winds down into the sea, which alone affords it no protection, its ediocade soon ends on the radar screen ... RADAR measures the exact direction and distance to the target, it completes what began with
'Hufi-Duff' was started

In this way, the gray wolves of the seas are forced into a defensive position, the reins are taken out of their hands. The turning point of the Sdiladit tim the Atlantic is reached.

The hodi frequency war, which can only be waged with good weapons in order not to be hopelessly defeated, has been ignited at sea'°".

Despite the greatest success in the fight against the Anglo-American convoys, which was of crucial importance for the war, our submarine war came to a standstill in the spring of 1943. Grand Admiral Döoitz commented: qThe dominating superiority of the enemy's defenses was finally demonstrated by the next convoys, the SC 130 and the HX 239. The actual convoy armament worked together with the 'support groups' trained in anti-submarine warfare in an exemplary manner. In addition, there was the permanent air defense, which consisted of carrier aircraft and long-range land-based aircraft, and the general equipment with the new tracking device and new heavy depth charges as well as their improved throwing capabilities. All this made further combat on the convoys impossible. The losses we suffered on these two convoys as well as on the marches in all other sea areas, especially in the Bay of Biscay, the Iceland Passage and the atifmandi areas of the Nordztlandk in these crucial days of May 1943 for the submarine war, were only just beginning to be known. They had been sent up with a sdilage. By May 22, we had already lost 31 submarines, a first-rate number that hit us unexpectedly; for despite

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t57 Cajuy BCkker, eRzdxr, DgCIl im DcakJ-, Oldeabuzg t95s, p. 2tp f.

the sharp increase in enemy defenses in the 4th year of the war, an increase in submarine losses had not been apparent until then ... Ith drew the consequences and had the North Atlantic cleared. On May 24, i& ordered the submarines to sail southwest of the Azores using all precautionary measures"® .'

Nadi 4S months of an incessant sdila'f t, the wal- tige naval and air defense of the two largest naval cities, mainly due to the new Ortorigsmittel, had erdrüt'°°' the U-Bootkricg.

The loss of the submarines could not be compensated for by a more sophisticated new construction, nor was it possible to complete the Walter submarine with high underwater speed in time, which could have been the sole prerequisite for the continuation of mobile submarine operations against convoys. This boat, which had already been developed before the war by the ingenious engineer Walter, was allegedly repeatedly withdrawn due to a lack of funds and the need to use a s many known and proven submarine types as possible for warfare. However, this was only because the naval high command doubted the front-line usability of the Walter submarine.

What the submarine war meant for the enemy can be seen from Churdiill's book 'The Second World War'. In Volume IV, page 107, it says: pThe submarine war was our worst evil. It would have been wise of the Germans to put all their eggs in this basket.

In Volume V, page 6, Churdiill sdirieb:

'The Atlantic diladit was the dominant factor throughout the war. Never, not for a moment, could we forget that everything that happened elsewhere - on land, at sea or in the air - ultimately depended on its outcome.

158 Karl Döniti, "l0 years and 20 days", page 337 f.
159 Karl Dönim, "l0 Years and 20 Days", page 339.

and in the midst of all our other worries, we betrayed her changeable her changeable fortune day after day with hope or fear'.

Given the importance of submarine warfare within our navy, whether we are capable of winning it for ourselves is a question that we unfortunately have to doubt based on our current knowledge. If the failure of our torpedo weapon in the Norway operation was a catastrophe, it was repeated to a far worse extent in the Atlantic, because the navy was unable to r e n d e r the enemy's system of direction finding and radio measurement ineffective by jamming.

But that was not all. The fact that our submarine fleet was equipped with a radio device in the spring of 1943, which practically& almost led to its complete destruction, could indeed have l e d to this deadly handicap.

It was a blatant case of sabotage, which Corvette Captain *Ernst JäcLel,* from 1937 to 1944 advisor to the German naval command for radio reconnaissance, reported on in the journal Biologisdie Zukunft°:

It was in the spring of 1943. Our submarines, which Admiral Dönitz h a d sent out to the Atlantic Ocean in April 1943, were not returning ... Dönitz sends o u t more and considerably more submarines on enemy voyages. In May 1943, many more submarine crews never see home again ... He scrapes together all the U-boats at his disposal and sends them on enemy voyages. In June 1943, almost all the submarines had not returned from their mission. To be more precise: of 400 submarines deployed in the spring of 1943, 17 survived ...

At the time, the naval command naturally asked around what was going on. Everywhere, however, the reply was the same: 'Mensth, be quiet! The strictest silence was ordered. Every critic is labeled a defeatist, as the warfare is allowed to go on.

nagging Sdiwädiender betra':htet and standr "htlidi ersdiossen'°°." It is thought that the command to remain silent will have its purpose, Dönitz does not want the enemy to know the extent of our catastrophe.

Later, however, the author is taught better.

One fall day, you don't think you can trust your own eyes anymore. On the desk of a councilor lies the text of the funscription of his own submarine. And in this text is the word "pMetox". What does that have to do with a submarine of our own? "pMetox" is the name of the old booty of the French campaign, which was used for joint radio communication between England and France. It had a superhetsdialing, that is, it used a small transmitter whose independent design fundamental frequency was i d e n t i c a l to that of the respective radio reception, so that the reception of the difference between these two frequencies enabled excellent selectivity. This basic frequency of the small transmitter, common to the English and French, has also guaranteed the best possible communication between them.

In 1943, the year of the war, this captured device was on a German submarine. The radio text leaves no doubt about this. It is written there in black and white.

Restlessly, you ask around again. The result is horror. In the spring of 1943, the entire submarine weapon was equipped with this 'Metoz' receiver. Does this not force the realization t h a t the radiation properties of this receiver originally caused the enormous submarine losses? An explanation is possible here. It is a matter of facing a gruesome betrayal cold in the eye

EU S ßtlfifl.

A short message from the author puts this on paper. It describes the mere installation of the 'Metox° receiver on German submarines as an atrocious betrayal of all submarine comrades. The report is sent to all direct service personnel.

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160 Zeitsdirift "Biologisdir ZukunA", Hamburg, Fo!ge 4/1973.

superior onedilieẞlidi of Grand Admiral Dönitz. It is not possible to make a reply. But there will be no reply. What happens to your report is a matter for your superior! No more can be learned from further inquiries. The failure to process the report becomes the reason for a complaint. The court martial decides that there are no grounds for complaint as the complainant was not personally harmed. The author reaches Dönitz himself via Dönitz's son Heßler. Long reports on treason against the country in other areas supplement the report of treason in the submarine war. All documents are handed over to Dönitz. After the presentation, Dönitz says: 'Give me this in a short, brief form that I can use personally! A day later, Dönitz receives a criminal complaint against adit superiors in the admiral's rank who tolerated the betrayal, aided and abetted it or covered it up from Dönitz. At first we hear nothing from Dönitz, and nothing bad from behind the scenes ... And now Dönitz turns the tables and opens a case against the author.

Court martial proceedings for insulting superiors.

Thus the author is in the dock of the court martial. The main perpetrator of the charges was Kontemdmiral Stummel. Without the knowledge of other departments of the High Command of the Navy, he had the Metox receivers built in Paris and the submarines equipped with them. He now testifies as a witness.

He has to explain the Metox receiver to the court in detail. One of the court's observers, a front-line officer of the submarine weapon, then asks probing questions. 'So the small transmitter in this set was of its fixed frequency nad the gleidie like those in all British radios. Is there a non-radiating transmitter?

'No,' Stummel admits.

So was the transmitter necessarily switched on when the Metoz set was installed? necessarily included?'

-J-. of course," replied Stunsmel.

'So you expected the submarines to go to sea with such a transmitter. Isn't that what it was like for the submarines, as if they had gone to sea with searchlights shining on all sides?

Stummel is silent for a moment. "Mr. Admiral, I repeat: with their transmitter in the Metox device, the submarines transmitted unsuspectingly into the British radio reception. Mr. Witness, the Metox devices were transmitting into the British radios, i.e. into the radio receivers of British aircraft. Mr. Admiral, I ask you: Did you know that?"

qYes, we knew that.

Deathly silence follows in the courtroom. Not even a mensdilidies breathing can be heard. Horror has gripped all those present. The perpetrator Stummel has unmasked himself ... All the shrouds of human authority have fallen. All respect for superiors dissolves like a fog, ice-cold treason is written in flesh and blood. A representative of the home leadership has confessed to the mass murder of the front comrades entrusted to him, to the deliberate, sinister murder of comrades: 'Yes, we knew that!

The horrified silence all around him denounced the betrayal more sharply than any words could have done. Stummel looked around anxiously, as if seeking help, but only felt the eyes on him with contempt. Then he started to stutter: Yes, but I had issued a warning to the submarines that they should handle the Metox receiver with care. S o the submarine commanders didn't follow my instructions!

Now the submariner goes among the Riditers: "You're also insulting my fallen comrades, Mr. Admiral) Do you really think the murdered were to blame? Why should it be tricky here to handle the recipients carefully) Every one of the old ones brought death. So only the complete omission of the one-year-olds could be described as careful! Did you order that? Of course not. And if the recipients were

were not allowed to be dialed in, why did you put them on board?

on board? That is entirely your fault, Mr. Admiral!

Stummel was allowed to go as a pWitness'^'.

It will always remain incomprehensible why Rear Admiral Stummel, who was so heavily incriminated, was never tried for sabotage by the court martial.

If the betrayal of the Norway enterprise by Canaris and Oster and the equipping of the submarine with failing torpedoes was sabotage of the naval warfare with the heaviest losses and consequences, the use of the 'Metoa' device led to the destruction of almost the entire submarine fleet and thus to the war-destroying destruction of the entire German warfare.

161 Reported in .Bidogis&e Zukun1t-, Hamburg 19Z3, episode 4, page 2 ff.

Sabouge of the Austrian resistance movement

Although some of the Austrian politicians, in contrast to the leading members of the resistance circle in Berlin, strove for the restoration of Eastern Europe as an independent state, there was complete unanimity in the determination to defeat Hitler's rule at all costs.

According to the description in the book 'The Call of Conscience' by Otto *Blonden*, who, like his brother Fritz, belonged to the leadership of the Austrian resistance, the international differences between the various groups in CJsterreidi took a back seat to the common fight against the Nazi regime, more so than in the German resistance circle. The burdening of the resistance in Easterrei& by treason and sabotage, also on the part of the communist resistance groups, who saw their allies in the leading Red Army and whose fight they were willing to support without any inhibitions, is even greater. The bourgeois, clerical and military groups as well as the left-wing groups were equally involved in treason and sabotage of the German war effort.

Roman Karl Sdiolz, the leader of the bourgeois church-oriented "pÖsterrei&isdien Freiheitsbewegung", had already established links with some people in Downing Street before 1938.

ties with some people in Downing Street in case of an occupation of Austria.
occupation of Austria by Hitler.

Rüdiger Engert, a member of the Heintsche-Heinegg subgroup of the Dsterreidien Freiheitsbewegung, translated seven detailed mood reports with a list of public figures who had been arrested and, above all, with precise information about the increase in resistance among the Austrian population into English, as they were intended for England.

At the beginning of the war, the 400 or so members of this Viennese resistance group who were called up for military service were issued with tiny membership cards to legitimize their capture by Allied troops.

Arthur Preuss - son of the well-known Viennese Kammersänger - who had been sworn in by Heintsdiel-Heinegg at the beginning of October 1939 and was at that time completing an internship in his grandfather's timber processing factory in Ts&ec oslovakia, was commissioned by Sdiolz to establish contact with Czechoslovakian resistance circles. Preuss was soon able to establish a number of contacts via the plant's administrator, who was one of the Czechoslovakian liaison officers in Yugoslavia and London and had brought various leaders of the Putsdie across the border on the occasion of the Prague Hociisdiulput... When Preuss returned to Vienna on the occasion of a major discussion on the conduct of sabotage operations and the collection of weapons, it was decided that he should volunteer for the air force and then flee to England in a knife-edge machine gun, thus finally establishing final contact with the Allies.'"

Preuss actually enlisted in the Luftwaffe, but was arrested at the Klattau flying school in October 1940 shortly before being transferred to the fighter pilot school in Wiener-Neustadt, after he had passed all the necessary preliminary examinations. After several months

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162 Otto Mol den, Der Ruf der Geviss-ns", Vienna 1958, page 71 f.

After several months in prison, he managed to escape to his grandfather in the Chedlija, where he was kept in hiding in the surrounding woods. In the following period, he gathered a circle of escaped English, French and Dutch prisoners of war around him, with whom he joined the pl. Tsd echisd en partisan brigade "Jan Zizka" as an independent group, with which he took part in partisan battles against SS units.

Around the same time that Preuss established contact with the Tsdiecbo-Slovak partisans, the Hungarian Rudolf Strasser traveled to Budapest on behalf of Roman Scholz to establish contact with the Allies. After talking to the people in charge of the French envoys, he was informed that the Allies were interested in making contact and asked for a password. A little later, Strasser also managed to make contact with the Americans and Russians in Pre8burg. It was no longer possible to evaluate these various contacts with foreign countries, as between May and July 1940 most of the employees of the groups mentioned had already been arrested by the secret state police.

In the early summer of 1939, Dr. Thanner was informed by Otto von Habsburg, who was in Belgium at the time, that a group of former Aristlidi-socialist trade union officials had formed around a Mr. Hans Müller, who was said to have good connections abroad. Within the Müller-Thanner group, various members were entrusted with precisely defined tasks. Nikolaus Maasburg was given the task of keeping in constant contact with the Austrian associations abroad about Yugoslavia. He managed to become a member of Admiral Canaris' German Abwehr, which gave him freedom of movement and the opportunity to disguise meetings with Austrian resistance fighters and gain access to secret nadi-ridites from the German secret service, which were used in the interests of the West German movement.

Despite the possibility of this camouflage, Maasburg was arrested seven times by the Secret State Police during the war, but was freed time and again by his friends in the Abwehr'^°.

pDr. Zimmer-Lehmann, who was assigned to an interpreter company, got in touch with a confidant of the Haushofer family, who at that time was tasked with organizing powerful resistance groups in the individual replacement divisions of the German army. Constable Walter, who led a machine-gun platoon and was absolutely reliable as an Austrian, was commissioned by the OKH to take charge of the powder magazines and ammunition depots with his men in the event of an officer's revolt breaking out and to march against Dresden with the interpreter battalion, which was known to be anti-Nazi.

Dr. Zimmer-Lehmann was transferred from Meißen and Frnnkreidi in November 1941 as head of the Western Radio Monitoring Office. This office was regarded as the center of German opposition circles. There he was able to establish connections not only with the German military front, which was particularly active and strongly represented in Paris and was under the leadership of the German military commander in France, General von Stülpnagel, but also with French opposition circles.

After his acquittal in the trial against the "Meithner Group", government inspector Max Gererstorfer took over the leadership in place of Professor Meithner, who had been sentenced to many years in prison, and succeeded in establishing contact with resistance circles in Croatia, Carinthia and Belgium. He also established contact with a group that Major Alfons Stillfried had formed in the foreign letter verification office in Vienna.

One of Dr. Hofer's employees, who was responsible for setting up the countless radio interception and intelligence gathering points throughout Upper Austria, was

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163 Otto Molden, "The call of conscience", page 84 ff.

164 Otto Molden, "The Call **of Conscience",** page 90 ff.

In the spring of t944, he joined the Austrian resistance movement in the German army as an active member of his unit in Constanza on the Black Sea. A German sergeant, who identified himself as a former Austrian lieutenant, asked him to join the Austrian resistance movement and to report to a German Resistance registration office in Belgrade. When he arrived there, it was made very clear to him that there was no way back for partisans.

He writes about his further experiences: "A day later, I went to St. Lorenzen in the Ba&er Mountains with false papers. There I reported to the Dillinger inn, where, to my astonishment, I found Lieutenant F., whom I had assumed to be in Constanza, alongside 12 men. Lieutenant F. was now leading the sabotage groups in the Badier Mountains. We laid mines on the Klagenfurt-Marburg and Graz-Marburg railroad lines, working together with other partisan groups, some of them Yugoslavs. When, due to the lack of security on the railroads, we were forced to transport goods with columns of cars under the protection of tanks, we attacked them from the heights. But these actions were also very frustrating for tins. Within three weeks we lost 14 men of the 27-man group.

Soon afterwards we were informed that the secret field police were planning an action against us together with SS formations. So it happened. In a few days we were surrounded. We fought our way through one by one.

Ferdinand Roitinger, a convinced monarchist, organized a partisan group, which he led armed into the Kobemauserwald forest, where they destroyed telephone lines and overtook military cars.

In the period from 1942 to 1944, the 'Austrian Combat League' repeatedly carried out gluing operations in western Vienna and partially and temporarily paralyzed the traffic of the Viennese tramway through acts of sabotage in transformer stations.

and a major act of sabotage was carried out which caused various explosions in an ammunition factory in Trichter Strasse. The Kainpfbund also managed to gain a foothold in the Radetzky barracks and set up a weapons depot there, consisting of submachine guns, carbines and pistols.°

pThe groups 'Maier-Messner' and 'Caldonazzi' (so named after the chaplain Dr. Heinrich Maier, the general director Franz-Josef Messner and the forestry engineer Walter Caldonazzi) got in touch with the resistance circle in Germany - especially with Catholic trade union circles - through Dr. Heinrich Maier in May and June 1940. Some time later, he was visited in Vienna by Jakob Kaiser, with whom he remained in contact. In the summer of 1941 and October 1942, Dr. Maier held further talks in Berlin. Together with his circle, he came to the conclusion that any domestic policy of forming a force was impossible and that the fight against the Nazi system could therefore only be waged with the support of Allied troops. Therefore, strengthening the Allied forces by sabotaging armaments and nadiridite service.

From 1942 onwards, Dr. Franz-Josef Messner, the general director of the Semperit works in Vienna, established systematic contact with the American intelligence service via Ankara and international companies in Switzerland. The type, extent and location of the armaments industries and the status of development work (V-2 and tanks) were regularly communicated. Allied questions in this regard were answered ... This enabled the Allied bombing raids to be directed at the state armaments targets and the residential areas to be destroyed. Until the arrest of Dr. Maier and Dr. Messner, the destruction in the residential areas of Vienna was minimal. There was a connection with the men of July 20 in Berlin, and these groups received various basic support ...

In addition to the nadi service, military transfers could be carried out by means of injections administered by one of the group's members, the physician Dr. Josef Wyhnal.

Dr. Josef Wyhnal, and through relationships could be prevented ...

The fact that Dr. Maier was well acquainted with General Major Stümpfi, in whose house he constantly went in and out, made it possible for him to receive countless military and armaments information, which he passed on partly through the channels of General Director Messner, which had existed since 1942, and partly through the radio connection with London, which had existed since 1943 ...

The verdict of the Berlin People's Court, 5th Senate, based on the main hearing of October 27 and 28, 1944, states

T h e defendants prepared high treason in the Alpine and Danube floodplains, primarily in Vienna, as well as partly abroad, in the years 1942 to 1944 by participating in a separatist alliance and thereby favored the enemies of our Reich. Ritsd' and Pausinger also produced anti-state leaflets, while Maier and Messner made contact with the enemy abroad and drew their attention to German armaments factories for the purpose of aerial bombardment.

The defendant Wyhnal provided members of the WehrmaAt means
or applied to them in order to make them at least temporarily unfit for military service. Hofer had Wyhnal give him two injections for this purpose and, together with Caldonazzi, gave fever-inducing drugs to soldiers who were about to be examined by the military. Whynal, Kleppell, Hofer and Rits'h tried to help a French prisoner or a German soldier to escape abroad across the Reich border. L. assisted the accused Maier in his treasonous activities ...

The following are sentenced: the defendants Maier, Hofer, Caldonazzi, Wyhnal, Klepell, Ritsd , Messner and Pausinger to death and to
loss of honor for life. The defendant L. to ten years
imprisonment and loss of honor for the same period of time'°° ..."

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165 Ono Mol den, "The Call of Conscience", page lß0 $.

An intermediary of the Weihs-Tihany-Mainprugg group (student group), who was in direct contact with Resistance circles in France, was arrested in Budapest and sentenced to death in Berlin.

Gustav R. Weihs-Tihany-Mainprugg himself managed to obtain the secret files of the Wehrkreiskommandantur (military district commandant's office) in Vienna through his accomplices and, together with situation reports, passed them on to the English embassy in Bem.

Ar&ite ‗ Jörg Sa&enheim from the Würtlile' group had contact with the Luxembourg resistance movement with the help of falsd papers, as well as contact with some senior military officers in Miin-
chen. At the same time, the Würthle group had established contact with various armed resistance groups in the mountains around Innsbruck, which were recruited from prisoners or those who had deserted the army. The centers of these partisans were mainly located near Gnadenwald as well as in the Dtztal and near Schwaz. Various weapons and ammunition depots were set up by these groups and the first systematic contact with the Allied troops was established via the French officer Ferdinand Zöllner, who had been parachuted into Tyrol.

After they had succeeded in coordinating the groups in the Ötztal and uniting the partisans with them, Sauerwein and Pfaundler endeavoured to establish links with the rest of Austria and the Allies and thus integrate the Dntal resistance organization, which had developed into one of the most powerful large Austrian resistance groups, into the framework of the overall Austrian resistance struggle.

The "Astra" group, with a Catholic-junior conservative base, had extensive connections to the military and industry. On the one hand, they tried to carry out an extensive sabotage of armaments factories, and on the other, at the end of 1943, Dr. von Winkler established contact with Tito's headquarters and Dr. Veiter with American offices in Switzerland.

and at the end of 1944, Dr. von Winkler established contact with Tito's headquarters and Dr. Veiter with American offices in Switzerland.
fen Bernadotte was found.'

When, at the beginning of 1944, the various Widentand groups had come together to form the overall Austrian resistance organization q05', the more systematic and far more intensive expansion of gconnections to foreign countries and, above all, to the leaders of the Allied armies and Allied politics began.

gThrough Gero von S. Gaevernitz in Bern, a further adverse direct connection was established to the highest American political levels, namely to Allen W. Dulles, Roosevelt's American envoy and head of the US intelligence service (OSS) in neutral and German-occupied Europe, to whom Dr. Grimm had established similar contacts in Zurich.

Fritz Molden reports on his second perilous journey from Switzerland via Upper Italy and the Brenner Pass to Innsbruck and Vienna:

pFrom my second trip to Vienna from the end of October to November 13, I was able to deepen my contacts in Innsbruck. In Vienna, Frederiksen (Harald Frederiksen, an American student living in Vienna) had succeeded in expanding our nadir service during the intervening period; in particular, he **was able to** provide important information about the production of German secret weapons.

After Fritz Molden's return to Switzerland, contact was made with senior French officers and it was agreed that two French officers - including one of General de Gaulle's adjutants - would be brought to Austria by Molden to make contact with the resistance movement in Eastern Europe and with the French prisoners of war and foreign workers."

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166 Otto Molden, **sDcr** Ruf **des Grwisseni", page** ISO If.
167 Oito Molden, "The call of conscience", page 1r5.

On December 18, 1944, the qProvisoris&e Österrei&i sdie Naitonalkomitee' (POEN for short) was formed as the beginning of an underground government, which took over the spiritual political leadership of all resistance groups, including the communist ones, as well as the representation of the p05' abroad.

After the founding of the POEN at the end of 1944, Fritz Molden was invited by the adjutant General de Gzulles, Captain de Rellier, to the headquarters of the First French Army and to various French government offices. Shortly afterwards, another meeting t o o k place with Allen W. Dulles, at which Dulles made the first firm commitment to the Americans regarding stronger support for the Austrian resistance movement. In Besan$on, Fritz Molden was ceremoniously received by the Chief of the Post-Ridite Service of the First French Army and, in honor of the Austrian resistance movement, was given the rank of Colonel of the Allied Army. of a colonel in the Allied Army ...

On January 15, 1945, Molden was received in Paris by Monsieur Manuel, then head of the Deuxiéme Bureau. Monsieur Manuel confirmed France's willingness to help the Austrian resistance movement at any time and established contact with Botsdiafter Chauvel, the Secretary General of the Quai d'Orsajr. At Molden's request, Manuel also tried to establish contacts with the American, British and Soviet Russian embassies ...

On J Z January, an extensive discussion had taken place in the American embassy, which went very much in POEN's favor. The main success was that the agreement in principle to provide arms aid was reached. After obtaining the approval of the Allied High Command in the Mediterranean, which was responsible for Austria, 500 pistols and three tons of sabotage material and ammunition were to be delivered to the Austrian Maquis at the end of February ...

The first official contact between 05" and the Soviets took place in the Soviet embassy on the same day.

s&&aft took place. Molden, accompanied by the French com- mandant Robert, met with Kozureff, the Russian embassy's delegation councillor. In a conversation conducted in an unfriendly but reserved tone, he showed great interest in the activities of the 'POEN'. The maintenance of the connection was agreed upon.

After Molden's return to Switzerland, negotiations were held with the Swiss army staff, in which the Austrian committee in Switzerland was finally granted permission to register the Easter Reidians interned in Swiss military camps for the Austrian resistance movement.

gThe two Innsbru&er students Herwig Wallnöfer and Louis Mittermayer, under the names Weber and Moser, did an excellent job as couriers between Sd weil and t3sterrei& as well as organizers of the Innsbru'ker courier service, being good skiers and familiar with the Tyrolean-Vorarlberg mountains. In countless perilous journeys they crossed the border between the two Ridimngen, mostly in the Rhätikon o r Silvretta group. Loaded with up to 40 kg of weapons, radios and propaganda material, they drove through an area teeming with SS border patrols equipped with electric silencers and police dogs, despite storms and the danger of avalanches.

On a trip through northern Italy, Fritz Molden was able to initiate the formation of a group in Trieste under the leadership of Lt. Operationszone AdriatiMo Küstenlaiid' at VO OB-Siidwest, while the Austrian lieutenant Sudianek, who was a member of the p05" reporting head in Como, succeeded in connecting the 05' to the various Easter RUK staff (Ministry of Defense and War Production) ...

In consultations' in which Colonel Ho- ward Ghapin, the deputy chief of the American secret service in Caserta, Colonel Stone, Lin. Gdr. Alfred Ulmer a n d the former Osterreidier Captain Rudolf C. v. Ripper,

it was decided to substantially increase support for the resistance movement. Weapons and explosives were to be procured on a larger scale, ammunition reserves were to be built up and good, powerful radio equipment was to be made available. As larger transports could not possibly be carried out by couriers in the Third Reich, these were carried out by Allied aircraft. Initially, the area of the Dtz and Sellrain valleys was targeted and the American Lieutenant Fred Mayer was assigned to the operation. Lieutenant Mayer, together with an Austrian resistance fighter who had been trained as a radio operator by the American troops, jumped over the Tyrolean mountains with weapons and radio equipment at the beginning of April.

At the beginning of 1945, about ten mainly Austrian units in the reserve army were equipped with reliable officers who were privy to the plans of the conspiracy and, on the southern front, the staffs of three divisions and two brigades were so heavily staffed with defeatist three-man units that it was believed they could be deployed in case of need. This prompted Major Karl Szokoll, on the occasion of a trip to Budapest, to instruct his liaison officer there to submit a proposal to the British secret service to carry out a general uprising within three days on the binding promise of a relief by airborne troops.

In the autumn of 1944, Nikolaus Maasburg and Dr. Georg Zimmer-Lehmann established contact with Tito's 4th Partisan Zone on the Vissel estate in southern Styria, which belonged to Nikolaus Maasburg, via one of the officers of the brigades in this zone, the Slovenian Radovan.

Around the turn of the year 1944/45, about eighty percent of the replacement troops in Vienna or in the immediate and wider surroundings of Vienna were allegedly trusted members of the resistance movement in important positions, insofar as the commanders or some of the leading officers worked together with the resistance movement at all.

Captain Josef Ro0imayer, who was opposed to Hitler and Prussianism, reported that he founded an Austrian resistance group shortly after joining the German army in August 1941 and was deployed with it in the occupation forces from September 1941, where he made contact with Serbian partisans, whom he supported with advice and action.

According to Otto Molden, the climax of the resistance movement in Austria came in the first days of April 1945, when the Russian advance towards Vienna became increasingly clear after Stuhlweifienburg was abandoned. Major Szokoll (head of the organization department in the Deputy General Command **XVII,** led the July 20th conspiracy with Colonel Count von Marogna-Redwitz, head of the South-East Defence and close collaborator of Admiral Canaris in Vienna) decided to immediately establish contact with the Red Army High Command. He was encouraged in his plan by information brought to him by Lieutenant Igler, a member of the conspiracy, from the commander-in-chief of the south-eastern front.

Igler had learned from Major i. G. Günther Stotten in the High Command of Army Group South (also a conspirator) that two new Waffen-SS divisions were being formed. Szokoll managed to find out the identifiers of the two divisions "pBernstein" and "Diamant" by other means. One of the most important unresolved questions had b e e n clarified. The expected strength of the SS units had been determined. The Austrian resistance movement thus had an extraordinarily valuable trump card in its hand, not only for its own actions, but also for the negotiations with the Russians. It was now necessary to establish contact with the approaching Red Army as soon as possible.

Sergeant Major Ferdinand Käs, who had earned his spurs during the preparations for July 20, was appointed emissary for the negotiations with the Soviets.

In the night of April 2 to 3, 1945, Oberfeld- webel Käs, as the official negotiator of the Austrian resistance movement on the German-Russian front lines, went to the headquarters of the commander-in-chief of the Russian army deployed in Vienna, the commander of the troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front and Marshal of the Soviet Union F. Tolbudtin. Käs received fictitious orders from the German troops to re-establish contact with the Minister of War of the Szalasy government, which had fled from Hungary and was in the Semmering area. This made it possible for Käs to pass through the German lines.

to pass through the German lines.

He crossed the Russian lines, already known as a paramilitary ... and reached the commander-in-chief of the Russian army, Mars&all Tolbuchin, whose headquarters at the time were in the small town of Hodiwolkersdorf, south of Wiener-Neustadt ...

The following main points were planned for the meeting by Major Szokoll, about which he writes:

a) Announcement of the defense measures around Vienna,

b) description of the defense plan of the German army command.

The deployment chosen for the city:

The four SS divisions 'Totenkopf', 'Das Reich', 'Hit- lerjugend' and 'Der Führer', which had been badly battered by the previous long retreats, were to cover the eastern part of Vienna as far as the Vienna Woods in a defensive position. It was planned to reinforce this reception position, especially in the Sd wethat area (the expected focus of the Rus@n), with two freshly deployed SS divisions withdrawn from the main battlefield of Frankfurt an der Oder-Berlin, one on the Franz-Josef Railway and the other on the northern railroad.

The northern part of Vienna and the entire area north of the Danube were to be defended by the units that were fighting in the Prefiburg area, and the western part, which seemed to be the least threatened, was to be defended inland.

The Austrian combat battalions I had provided were deployed alongside Volkssturm and Hitler Youth troops and alarm units.

c) Vorsd was about the capture of the city, which was based on the previously sdiildered defensive measures:

The Russian troops from the Wiener-Neu- stadt area through the Vienna Woods to the St. Pölten area. Attack on Vienna from the west, approximately in the Hütteldod area, unification of the Russian troops with the Austrian units I had provided, the Russians entering Vienna without a fight and surrendering the city before the SS fighting in the east could have reached it.

d) Before going into the details of these plans, requests were submitted to the Supreme Command of the Red Army, the fulfillment of which by the Russians was considered by me to be a prerequisite for cooperation:

To ensure that the Allied bombing raids on Vienna were stopped, to keep the Viennese water supply intact, to approve a special regulation on the fate of Austrian nationality soldiers, the details of which were to be discussed after the liberation of Vienna.

The plan presented by Major Szokoll was largely accepted by the Russians, who undertook to fulfill SzokolJ's request. The Russians imposed the condition that the public buildings and the breweries were to be handed over in an intact condition and that the leading figures of the National Socialist regime in Wicn were to be arrested'° .®

According to Molden's report, Sergeant Major Käs was warmly received by the Red Army's High Command and was able to conduct the negotiations smoothly.

Erich Kern, however, describes this process in a significantly different way:

qIn the morning hours, Käs came across

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168 Otto Moldeit, "Der Ruf des Gewîsscns", page 226 lf.

the Soviet advance units. Despite the white flags, which, taken as a precaution, were now torn from the trunk, they were defeated. Then the Soviets were on top of them. The car wagged its owners, and the watches followed nadi. Kits desperately tried to make the Russians understand what he wanted. Finally, a German-speaking Soviet officer understood him and he was taken back. At the Red headquarters in Hod wolkersdorf he was interrogated by three Red generals. The Russians were suspicious. They suspected a trap. Only after hours, after they had compared the plans with their enemy position, did they present them to Marshal Tolbudiin. Tolbudlin demanded the surrender of the town and the battle commander General von Bünau on the Hütteldorf-Weidlingen road, as well as the siding and preservation of the Doiiaubrüdien. Käs, who had slowly become nervous, was interrogated the whole time.

Only the next morning was he led back to the HKL with his lance corporal and passed the main battle line in the Soos area. The two continued on foot. The car was no longer in the game. Near Alland they stopped a car driving towards Vienna. They showed the driver of the car their official courier IDs. The driver immediately let them in and took them to Vienna. It was the district leader of Wiener Neustadt, who had no idea who he was taking behind the lines.

A few hours later, the first sergeant reported the result to the ma;or
the result. Szokoll was full of enthusiasm'® °.'

Major Szokoll had set April 6, 1945 as Day X in cooperation with the Austrian resistance movement p05' and had planned the following:

8 p.m.: riots in the Simmering, Meidling and Florisdorf districts, provision of pilot tips for the accelerated marshalling of the Russians in the Hütteldorf area.

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t69 Eridi Kern, Die Uhr blieb stehen", Wels 1953, page 350 f.

9 p.m.: Riots in the inner city, erection of barricades in the east of Vienna to obstruct the SS fighting there.

2.30 p.m.: deployment of the riot squad to occupy public buildings and arrest prominent National Socialists.

10 p.m.: Traffic blockade, arrest of the government president and fortress commander. Forcing the signature o f the agreed surrender order. Cessation of hostilities, news blackout, seizure of the briquettes and public buildings.

11.30 p.m.: surrender of the city to the Russians, appeal to the Viennese population to occupy the broadcasting stations, entry of the Russians into Vienna "[0].'

Already in the evening of April 5, three Soviet J-gdflieger shot down the agreed red Leuditzeidien over Vienna, and Szokoll)ieß as pverstanden' green Leudstraketen hodlgehen.

It had been agreed among the negotiators that if the Soviets agreed, a roll call of the army patrol would take place, in which all the insiders would have to participate in full. Major Karl Biedermann was to draw his tasdieritudi directly and wave it back and forth several times.

That was the signal that the connection with the Soviets had been established. In fact, the men of the army patrol stepped up, Biedermann pulled out his white scarf and swung it demonstratively back and f o r t h a few times. The insurers looked a t each other. Now they knew. The army patrol station on the dock of General Command XVII on Stubenring went on radio standby.

Unfortunately for the conspirators, Lieutenant Dr. Walter Hanslik had also been informed due to an oversight. He r e p o r t e d his observations immediately, and a little later

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iZ0 Otto Molden, "The Call of Conscience", page 231.

The commander of the Groß-Wien military police patrol, Major Karl Biedermann, was arrested, and during the first interrogation he revealed the names of all the officers who had taken part in the meeting with Major Szokoll. Captain Alfred Huth and First Lieutenant Rudolf Rasdke were arrested in a flash.

The Putsdiversudi in Vienna **was thus** defeated for the second time. Biedermann was unable to occupy the bridges as planned, Huth was unable to occupy the public buildings and Rasdike was unable to occupy the Vienna radio station. The planned arrest of General von Bü- nau did not take place. The co-sworn lieutenant Barth was executed in the Bösendorfer Strasse.

Officially, this lieutenant Walter Barth is still known today as an Austrian resistance martyr who was shot by the SS. The truth, however, is different. On April 6, Walter Barth was shot in a dark house at Bösendorfer Straße 4. It was the house where the left-wing exponent of the Tiderständler, Georg Fraser, lived with his wife, and the young lieutenant was shot by Ferdinand Käs, the man who had passed on Vienna's defense plans to the Soviets on behalf of Major Szokoll.

After the war, two Austrian journalists named *Sebastian Leitner* and *Helmut Andic* described this incident in a series of articles in the Viennese newspaper 'pEx- press', apparently based on statements by the perpetrator Käs, as follows:

Sergeant Ferdinand Käs is the only one in this eyebli& who nod between the smashed action commandos of the Wehrmadit and the civilian resistance movement represents a kind of link. Käs must find Szokoll. At all costs. The sergeant knows that the SS is looking for him. He is missing from the collection of criminal counselor Sanitzer. Käs, the man who bred the defense plans to the Russians.

Käs is waiting for the Nadit in a cellar on the Kohlmarkt. He is not always in uniform. He no longer dares to go on

the street. He no longer has a valid Marsdl order. Only when it gets dark outside does he venture out of the cellar again. He sneaks to Bösendorfer Strasse, pressed against the walls of the houses.

He holds his briefcase under his left arm, his right hand buried in his coat. She clutches the pistol. Käs is ready to shoot down anyone who gets in his way.

The front door of the building in Bösendorfer Strasse that he is looking for is open. He knows that a man called Fraser lives here, a link to a resistance group. Fraser knows where Szokoll is. Käs climbs the stairs and knocks on the door. No one answers. He descends into the cellar. A few dozen faces stare at him, sdire&-filled. A sergeant major in uniform does not bode well. Käs asks for Mr. Fraser in a friendly manner. Emphatically friendly, just to avoid arousing suspicion. People shake their heads.

A woman comes after him as he is about to go back up the stairs. She h o l d s the sergeant major by the arm. old' am Mrs. Fra- ser,' she says quietly. What do you want from my husband?"

Käs doesn't know the woman. He doesn't know if she is really Mrs. Fraser. He says that he is looking for Major Szokoll. And that he knows that Major Szokoll is a friend of Mr. Fraser. And that he, in turn, is a friend of Major Szokoll. A good friend. Käs drii':cts out very carefully. If the woman is really who she says she is, she will understand him.

The woman shakes her head. She claims that she doesn't know anything about Major Szokoll because. She pulls Käs up the stairs into the hallway. She speaks nervously to him. She wants to find out why he is looking for her husband. She doesn't believe the sergeant. She thinks he is a spy.

In the dark hall of the house, the two people face each other in terrible distrust. Käs can hear from the woman's talk that she intends to hold him back. She is obviously waiting for anyone. Is she waiting for Fraser? Or is she waiting for the SS?

They are standing next to each other under the open gate when suddenly headlights flash. A motorcycle approaches. Käs recognizes it by the sound of the engine.

It's a Waffen SS signalman, Küs thinks. He has seen the SS erecting roadblocks on the ring road. Fraser is probably under arrest. They were probably waiting here for his liaison officers. The woman has been ordered to detain anyone who asks about Fraser. The woman is an SS informer!

Käs pulls out the pistol, jumps back, throws the front gate shut behind him. The woman is standing outside in the street. Käs listens. He h e a r s the bike stop. Then he hears two men's voices. Audi the woman speaks. Through the closed door, Käs hears the words: "There's a sergeant inside ...!"

Kits clasps the pistol in his right hand. This is the end, he tells himself. He is determined to sell his life as dearly as possible. A foot kicks open the door. Two figures rush into the driveway. In the backlidit of the bike's headlights, Käs only sees the silhouette of two figures and the black sd of a drawn pistol. A voice shouts: "Hands up!"

Käs raises his hand. Only one. The left hand in which he holds the briefcase. Then he rubs out the right hand with the pistol and pulls the trigger.

The man who shouted at him, "Put your hands up", staggers and collapses. Käs pulls the trigger again, the gun doesn't work - it jams. The second man flees past him to the landing of the cellar stairs. Käs rushes after him. He wants to finish him off before he is finished off himself. He wants to kill the stranger with the pistol.

A blackout lamp spreads dull light. After all: Lid t
enough to recognize a man. He recognizes the man he wants to kill. Käs recognizes him exactly. He stands frozen, as if struck dead. The man is Baron Maßburg, a member of the civil resistance movement.

Käs staggers back to the figure lying in the hallway, crushed by his bullet. The man is dead, undoubtedly dead. Käs bends over him to see his face.

He also knows this face. It belongs to Dr. Walter Barth. Dr. Barth is a member of the resistance movement. He was a first lieutenant at the beginning of the war, but then he had to disarm because of a heart condition. On this day, April 6, 1945, he took his old uniform out of the storage tank and put it on for the first time in four years. Because he had hoped to be able to move around Vienna as an officer. Now he is lying there in his German officer's uniform and is dead.

In the six days since Käs began his action on behalf of Major Szokoll, he has been in mortal danger so often that he can't even count them. He has never had to shoot to save himself. Never. In these sedis days he has now fired a single shot. The shot struck down a friend. Käs sd'leidit out into the Nadit with his shoulders hanging down.

The "DeuuÖie Wodien-Zeitung" wrote on 26. 2. t971: qFirst of all, it must be riditigated that Barth did not

First lieutenant, but was a second lieutenant. At the beginning of the war, he did not attend school and was only called up for military service in the fall of t940, after obtaining his war matriculation certificate. He was not promoted to lieutenant until June t, 1942. As a military war veteran with vein grade II, he had the opportunity to enrol and study at the University of World Trade from the military hospital or his Vienna office. On July 25, 1944, Barth passed the diploma examination for merchants, and on t6. February 1945 and the second viva on February 20, 194. On February 22, he was awarded his doctorate in economics.

Nevertheless, it cannot be true that the above-mentioned

The 'Expreß' report claims that on that fateful April 6, 1945, Barth 'picked up and put on his old uniform from the Sd rank for the first time in four years'. According to this, the last time he had worn uniform was in April 1941. In reality, however

he was only discharged from the army on April 5, 1944, exactly one year before his violent death.

his violent death, from the Wehrmacht.

However, some of the accounts of the course of events are not very credible. More detailed accounts reveal a completely different course of events. Let us leave undisputed for the time being that Baron Maasburg and Lieutenant Barth had driven to Bösendorfer Strasse in the military motor vehicle after t h e y had been informed by a telephone call for help that a stranger had conspicuously inquired of Mrs. Fraser about the absent left-wing resistance man Fraser and Major Szokoll. If this story is true - it is still not known for certain who made this call - Maasburg and Barth would have set out to confront a potential Gestapo informer. The account that Küs would have defended himself with a shot against the unknown intruder, whom he in turn thought to be a Häsdier, would then atidi fit this venion.

However, a number of studies contradict this official account.

Facts. According to the self-defense version, Käs should have killed Lieutenant Barth from the front with a single shot. On July 28, 1945, Chief Inspector Franz Modi, as the representative of the health department and the district governor, declared on oath in the presence of the witnesses Johann St. and Eduard Sdi. that he had exhumed the body of Dr. Walter Barth, had had relatives of the deceased examined and that the cause of death was found to be two gunshot wounds to the back of the head. On July 30, l94S, the Vienna-Innere-Stadt-Mariahilf registry office issued the death certificate for Lieutenant Dr. Walter Albert Barth, resident in Vienna VI, Stumpergasse 64, under the number 1689/45. The cause of death is given as: 'Two penetrating wounds to the back of the head'.

It is not only the two inserts at the back of the head that contradict the version that appeared in 'Expreß'. A number of other circumstances are also suspicious here. Shortly after the killing of Walter Banh on April 6, 1945, at 9 a.m. on April 7, two unknown persons

two unknown persons appeared on April 7 at 9 a.m., loaded the suffering man onto a handcart and dumped him. Details of this can be read in a shocking appeal that the widowed father, who had learned of the deed through friends in the meantime, had distributed in Vienna:

'Fallen in Vienna is my son, Lt. Dr. Walter Barth. He was picked up on April 7, 1945, 9 o'clock in the morning by two men in a handcart from the Bösendorfer Strafie, after an officer had taken his papers from him. I would ask the aforementioned gentlemen to provide me with further details (where is his grave?) in return for a good reward. Leonhard Barth, Vienna 6, Stumpergasse 64.

Several questions now arise: Who was the officer who took Walter Barth's papers from the dead man, apparently so that he could no longer be identified later? Who were the men who removed the papers? The body of the deceased was taken to his father, although the Fraser couple living in the house had known the deceased personally and should have arranged for the father's release and the transfer of the body. In the end, the girl with the two bullet holes in the back of her head disappeared without a trace. The father only heard vague rumors that his son had fallen* in Bösendorfer Strasse near house no. 4.

+< In July 1945, more than three months after the bloody deed, the desperate father was still searching for the body of his son. At this time, openings of the mass graves were taking place all over Vienna.
graves were opened all over Vienna, giving relatives the opportunity to identify their dead. In a letter to the public health department in Vienna, the father Leonhard Barth gave the authorities a precise description of his son and asked them to inform him if the body was to be found.

On July 28, 1945, the earth then r e v e a l e d its gruesome secret: during the excavation of the mass grave in Resselpark in front of the Tedi- nisd en Hodisdiule on Karlsplatz, Walter Barth's suffering was found and identified by chance among the hundreds of dead.

tified. The exhuming officer noted the two telltale influences on the back of his head.

One month later, on August 28, 1945, the official funeral services were h e l d at the Hietzing cemetery. Representatives of the 'resistance movement' take the opportunity to s p e a k moving words at the grave of the murdered man. There is talk of words like: 'The Almighty, who guides the fate of us all, wanted Walter Barth t o give his life for Osterreidi before the hour of *our* country*'s* freedom had come.

Yes, people are very moved at this funeral. Two plaques will be cast in ore for the dead comrade* and nodi and affixed to the house at Bösendorfer Strasse 4. But one thing will not be done: The wall of silence will not be removed. No one will go to I-eonhard Barth, the unfortunate father, and apologize for the alleged error. Nobody will try to clarify the question of why a shot w a s fired at a man in front and the dead man then had two wounds on the back of his head. Nobody will ask the unknown officer who took the identity papers from the victim to ensure her identification. No one will search for the two men who pick up the head and have it b u r i e d in the mass grave, so that the earth will soon cover the dead man with the two injections at the back of his head.

But least of all will the perpetrator, Ferdinand Käs, the bearer of the German defense pleas to the Russians, do his part to shed light on what happened. Käs, who after all wa s the son of Leonhard Barth, will not even be worth the effort.

£nden to apologize to the father and bride of the victim at all. Instead, however, the most fantastic versions of the lieutenant's death will soon emerge from Resistance circles. Upon request, a well-known resistance fighter will report to the 'Fédération internationale de la Résistance' that the deceased was carried from life to death by an SS patrol. In the 'documentary archive' of the so-called 'Dsterreidiisdten Widerstands-

movement' in Vienna, the picture of the deceased was unabashedly presented in 1970 as part of an exhibition under the title: 'Died for the cause of terror', although it is well known in these circles that the young lieutenant was in fact promoted from life to death by the hand of a supposed comrade.

Ferdinand Käs was never brought to trial. On the contrary - after 1945, Käs, who had earned fame as a member of the resistance, was able to build a stellar career. He advanced from sergeant major in the German army to colonel in the Austrian gendarmerie before finally retiring."

Biedermann, Huth and Raschke were demoted, sentenced to death by a court martial and howled at the Florisdoder Brü&e. Szokoll and Käs, however, managed to desert and evade arrest.

Despite this, the insurgents did not give up. They tried again to make contact with the Red Army. On the same day (8 April), Leumant Heinz Sdiei&elbauer succeeded in obtaining a precise plan for the reorganized defence of Vienna from the fortress commander, which was passed on by a messenger to the headquarters of Marsd all Tolbucliin. Three-man squads with pilotage duties are ordered to various parts of the city, and the organization of the squads is entrusted to Suppan and Mainbrugg.

On April 7 and 8, these two [Suppan and Mainbrugg] drove through the most exposed positions to determine the exact strengths of the Waffen SS units and thus supplement the new defense plan, which was stolen by Lieutenant Scheidielbauer in the office of the la dv fortress commander.

On the morning of April 9th, the insurgents established contact with the first Russian front troops and handed over the plans to the Soviet dismount commander.'"

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171 Salzburger Nachrichten, Salzburg, 29. Dezember 1945.

Appendix

The following is a selection of hundreds of reports intended to show the extent to which countless acts of sabotage were carried out in everyday life during the war.

These smaller acts of sabotage, taken individually, may be regarded as harmless pinpricks for the German Wehrmacht, but in the mass and in the long run they could not have remained without a very damaging effect on the course of hostilities.

Small-scale sabotage has occurred at all times and among all peoples. But that it was committed against the German Wehrmacht on such a catastrophic scale during the Second World War could only be possible because there was a conspiracy that prepared the ground for the poison of betrayal and sabotage to flourish from behind the highest ranks of the armed forces through their defeatism.

Mr. *Friedridi Rollenbeck* from Essen-Kupferdreh reports:

'On t7. December 1944, id' became a soldier for the fourth time during 'Aktion Helderiklaii'. He was drafted to Posen. On
December 31, after a thorough medical e x a m i n a t i o n , our company was reassigned because of my occupational disease, which was dust lung.

lung - w a s again driven off, via Flensburg-Weidic to Aalborg-East in Jutland. At the airfield, we were retrained as flight attendants and ground crew in a 4-day training course, i& had been an anti-aircraft soldier.

Aalborg East was home to Jagdgesdiwader 101 (JG10t), which had the task of turning transport and fighter planes i n t o jet fighters. At the end of February, flight operations had to be discontinued due to a shortage of fuel. Infantry service took the place of flight operations.

At the beginning of March, when the fuel started to roll, flight operations were to be resumed. There was a nasty surprise. We, the flight attendants, wanted to get the Arado 86 and the Me 109 ready for the pilots. Dodo soon realized iii with my Me t09 that this machine could not fly, because despite desperate attempts it did not manage more than 1400 rpm. A look out of the cabin showed me that several ship's officers were back on the ground discussing with the foremen. I got out and was greeted with the question 'How many tours? A loud flood followed

An investigation established that your power plant had been

which made it unsuitable for flying. And this was also the case at nodi three other airfields. The contaminated fuel was pumped from the underground tanks back into the tank wagons to be cleaned in a refinery. In Nadit, the railroad bridges and switches blew up in many places. There was spraying from 60 places. Many soldiers lost their lives. Then the jabos came and shot up the tank wagons. We didn't see any more air traffic until the end.

Dr. *Herbert Hänel* from Frankfurt am Main reports:

qOne of my comrades was at the Lultnadiriditenwaffe in Berlin and was sent to Dresden to pick up a finished device. The reply was: 'It's not ready, it's not even planned. (t944)

Another intelligence comrade, who had been deployed as a captain in southern France and who had urgently requested certain radio equipment (certain wavelengths) via Fellgiebel, was t u r n e d down. During the retreat, this equipment w a s discovered stacked to the c e i l i n g in the Lyon camp.

In the Stalfngrad **area**, the horses had been taken **to the** large 'reil in Rostov in the Sea of Azov because they had allegedly not survived the harsh Russian winter. Shortly afterwards, the cauldron closed. Jr;:h was a first lieutenant in a nadir reconnaissance company in the cauldron and came out with a forehead shot by airplane in November 42. Not verifiable was the talk that the mot. Units got the oats and the Hot. units the gasoline.

In September 1945, I met a young man in Leipzig who had been a submarine driver i n Norway. He reported that not a single 'eel' (torpedo) had been launched from his boat. The 'Blüdier' and other ships could have been protected.

Mr. *Fritz Scholz* from Münd reported:

'Idi, then a major (01. 11. 1943), was commander of Nad - riditen-Abteilung 212 *of the 212th* Infantry Division, which was deployed in the northern section of the Eastern Front in the arc south of Schlüsselburg **in the area** around Sinjawino and Mga.

Around the beginning of 1944, preparations were made for a planned withdrawal movement to a line on both sides of Pleskau. There was no time pressure on these preparations. My intelligence section was made fully mobile, and the equipment on the night rider unit had reached its target. The supplies in the sorry communications column, from which all units of the division had to be supplied with radio and telephone equipment, had also been brought up to target.

As the commander of the communications section was also responsible for supplying all the division's units with radio and telephone equipment in collaboration with the Ib

The commander of the intelligence section was also responsible for supplying all units of the division with nadiri equipment in cooperation with the Ib (general staff officer for nadiri equipment and supply) of the divisional staff. All living nadiri':hten equipment had audi been replenished here. The situation had not been this good for a long time.

Every day we waited for the commander who was to initiate the well-prepared dismounting operation. One day the la (1st general officer) of the division told me that I should now take a 14-day leave, because for the time being there was no need to talk about the execution of the withdrawal operation. I drove to Berlin, after I h a d handed over the leadership of the division to the head of the 1st company, Captain Goldau. There I heard the news of the beginning of the withdrawal movement. I returned to my detachment, which was already with the division in the withdrawal movement. movement with the division. Here idi learned of the following incident, which id' can only interpret as an act of sabotage on a grand scale: Immediately before the start of the withdrawal movement, entire trainloads of supplies were delivered to the front troops in Tosno and unloaded. The troops, whose stocks of all supplies had been fully replenished during the preparation phase, had no free transport space and were forced to blow up the unloaded supplies in large quantities so that they would not fall into the hands of the Russians. The blasting followed almost hot on the heels of the unloading.

Since the replenishment of the troops had been ordered at an early stage and the superior command authorities were aware of this through reports, this process can only be interpreted to mean that extensive material was deliberately given over to destruction without sabotage being detected at the highest level, since the material could be declared 'lost in combat'.

Dr.-Ing. Georg $ãierdin bus Bergisdi-Gladbadi-Sdiildgen beridttct:

oleh led the SD-Leitabsdinitt Rei';ben- berg during the last year of the war, which stretched from Eger to Mährisdi-Ostrau and encompassed the whole of southern Germany. In the fall of 1944, the entire transport of goods from west to east - i.e. from the interior of the Reidis area to southern Slovenia - was severely disrupted by the Allied air raids, so that there were long delays in the transport of goods, including those from the front line in front of Silesia. At that time, the lines of the Bohemia-Moravia Railway were not operating at full capacity. This railroad was independent of the Reidis Railway and operated as a separate service. The facilities of this railroad were not used to transport the Reidisbahn, although this would have meant not only a reduction in the capacity of the Reidisbahn lines, but also a significant shortening of the transport route.

One of our employees, who worked for a railway management company, now informs us that the use of the Böhøiisd-Mährisd railroad was not permitted on the grounds that there was a contract between the two railroads under which charges had to be paid for the use of the tracks of one railway by the other, i.e., the Reidtsbahn would have had to pay on the Böhmisds-Mähris railroad. On the German side, the Reidisbahn directorates in Nuremberg, Dresden and Breslau were involved in the Abu inÌtt.

My office sent a corresponding &ridit to the RSHA [Reidissidierheitshatipta'nt], which arranged via the Rei'fisverkehrs 'ministry that the transports were routed via Bohemia from then on during the B1o&ing of reidisdeu n Stre&en. It should be noted that during the entire period in which the %h- misdie Bahn was used, there were no attacks by Allied aircraft on these routes until the end of the war.

The Sadie had a close call. A few weeks after this incident, I was contacted by a senior official from the Wroclaw Railway Directorate, who, on behalf of his president, explained to me how regrettable it was that the railroad had been attacked.

lidi that the message had gone to Berlin and not to him, the President. He asked for cooperation for the future, and he had been appointed as liaison. He also asked for the name of our undercover agent so that he could be provided with the relevant information. As you can imagine, he was unsuccessful.

At the time, I could not have believed in such strict handling of bureaucratic

I could not believe in such stubborn handling of bureaucratic procedures when it came to vital transports, but in well-coordinated sabotage that could be hidden behind existing paragraphs ... This could not be blamed on those responsible. They had acted according to plan.

Mr. *Karl Hop penrath,* former captain of the army, from Radstatt (Salzburg), named:

qDuring the war, he worked for a long time as a sa&sman in the the Armaments Inspectorate XVIII Salzburg.

In December 1944, idi traveled to Berlin on official business to discuss a matter at the Reid Labor Ministry. I also visited the Office for Economic Affairs and Armaments of the High Command of the Armed Forces in Bendlerstraße to inquire when the urgently needed deployment of Russian prisoners of war in the armaments industry in our region was to begin.

I didn't get any precise information from the officers in charge. Only a civilian employee showed understanding for my concerns. He pulled an extensive set of documents out of his desk drawer, from which he read me the paragraphs I was interested in. It was the minutes of a meeting of the supreme command of the war economy chaired by Reidismarschall Göring and contained the Reidismarsdiall's personal order ordering the immediate deployment of Russian prisoners of war with training in the armaments industry. The necessary orders and a copy of the protocol were to be sent to the armaments inspectorates immediately. On my return, I reported to the

Major General von Nostitz the content of the Göring order.

However, the Armaments Inspectorate did not receive this extremely adverse order until much later, although our office was directly connected to the OKW by remote directories. The case was never clarified, although I reported it in my report and it was also included in General von Nostitz's monthly report.

If the sadte is really based on negligence on the part of lower-level employees - which is not very likely - the officer responsible for forwarding the information will always be accused of having violated his soldierly **duty** to the utmost due to a lack of service.

I noticed nothing during my work in the armaments industry. Winter equipment for the troops fighting in Ruhland was only ordered in the late fall of 1941. As an old professional officer with peacetime training, I thought this was almost a crime. According to the principles in which I was brought up, this should have happened before the start of the Russian campaign.

Mr. Robert C/'tu§ from Heidrege, former corvette captain in the navy, reports:

gAt the beginning of December 1942, id became commander of the 'ATAIR'. The 'ATAIR' was a newbuilding of approx. 10,000 gross register tons and was built at the shipyard in Amsterdam. It was a Z-ship and belonged to the Troltsdiiff association. Idi was at the height of his military career, Sdf Kptl. The 'ATAIR' was an exceptional ship, all functions on board to be used as a floating submarine base in northern Norway. The crew consisted of a total of t83 men.

On March 3, 1943, w e s a i l e d from Amsterdam fully built and were equipped for war in Wesermünde and Kiel. Then we went to sea with the escort Rid tung Narvik. The voyage w e n t quickly. At noon on April 3, 1943, we left, which was with

We anchored early in the harbor of Aale- sund on a bright day, without any special tasks, and remained here until Sunday, April 4, until daybreak, when we passed the dangerous town of Stadtlandet, where there was no fjord protection for about 19 sml.

When we were in the middle of the open sea - the weather was stormy - three planes approached us, coming directly from land from the hollow of two mountains, i.e. from German-occupied territory. Idi saw this and sounded the alarm. What we didn't think was possible at first was that they were enemy torpedo planes. Two missed, the third torpedo hit the ship amidships. The pilot next to me lost his leg in the detonation, and I lost my stiff leg. The s h i p 's agony lasted six hours.

Two days later, when I handed my ship to the Admiral of Absdinit and told him indignantly that there must have been a betrayal, because the enemy planes had only come ashore, the gentleman had four words for me: 'That can't be', turned around and there went 'ATAIR', an extremely valuable object of war with a construction cost of about 20 million.

In September t943 I was brought before a court martial, but was acquitted for lack of evidence of the causes of the loss. Before that, however, I had been promoted to Sdf-Korv-Kpt [special corvette captain]'

Mr. firifz *Sei fert* from Lünen reports:

In 1942/43, I was made fit for garrison duty and sent to the Hermann Göring Works in Brüx. Over 50,000 men were employed in this factory: Germans, Germans, Germans, French and English prisoners and concentration camp inmates. We semi-invalids from the Wehrmacht were there for protection and security, but we also had to work. We often had air raid alarms, but the bombers that came over Carinthia and Styria couldn't find us because the factory was artificially obscured.

One day, when we came out of the basement after a bombing raid, our telephone exchange was no longer there and many other things were missing. We had 114 dead people in the factory. How could something like that happen? An engineer said to me a few hours later:

'Mensdi, Mr. Seifert, imagine that Major von Klotsdiek (head of the camp) has been wounded, a set device has been found in his barracks, which the Tommys were aiming at, and this time they hit it exactly! Von Klotséhek is a fugitive and is wanted by the Gestapo!

I described this experience to a work colleague last year, when the foreman Willy Paul was walking past us and heard me mention the name of the city of Brüx. He sighed and asked me: 'How do you know Briix?

I told him that I had been there in 43 at the Göring works, to which he replied that he had been there. When he told me about the bombing and the many dead, he said to me:

'You, they didn't kill old Klotsdiek, he's no longer alive!
no longer alive!""

Dr. Gertrud Klein from Trofaiadl/Dsterreidi reports:

qIn the American concentration camp Glasenbadi near Salzburg in 1947, thanks to the understanding approach of our commandant, Colonel Wooten, who was particularly chivalrous towards us women, we were given some relief, and we were allowed to invite visitors from the men's blocks at certain times, for whose well-being we had to vouch. So a young man, Richard von Hel)y, an extremely likeable, fresh, soldierly type, came into my room as the besudi of a young girl from Linz. He was the nephew of a German general. We were talking - as we often did - about whether the war had not been carried on beyond what was justifiable.

Then Ridiard von Helly said: 'Whether you believe it or not, I believed in the possibility of our victory in February 1945, and I had reasons to do so. Then he said the following: He

was assigned to a development department of the rocket factory with a friend. The friend worked in the scientific department. Richard himself worked in testing. He took a half-lying position in the sdimal rocket and was lowered onto the approaching group of about 150 bombers. When an eyelid lit up, he adjusted the radar hostile setting rid'tig and jumped out with the parachute. He said: 'The display was so scary-great that the first time I almost forgot to pull the parachute cord in time. One bomber was hurled at another and burst to pieces. A spell of fire went down without suffering and a few escaped bombers flew away.

The Fieseler Stordi picked up Richard von Helly and brought him back. Soon afterwards, Ridiard was deployed a second time, with the same success. At the time, the Swedes were rubbishing him: 'Why is Hitler hiding his air victories? And the Swedish radio reported on it. The friends proudly reported to their superiors that the rocket, which had to bring about a complete change in the approach technique and would put an end to the bombing carpets, could be put into series production. But what happened then? The answer came: series production was out of the question because the losses would be too high. How could that be? A single unprepared man had been torn apart during testing. Eight days later, the friends were transferred separately to different infantry units. Ridiard said: 'Now I knew for sure we could lose the war

I was so shocked by this story that in 1966 I told Helmut Sündermaiin [former deputy head of the Reich press, Dr. Dietrich] ... about it. But he told me that he knew from discussions with the Führer that such missiles were planned but not fully developed. I was puzzled by this, because I thought I had gathered from Rid ard's report that the reports to the Führer's headquarters had just been suppressed ...

The pioneer of space travel, engineer Nebel, in a long-distance
the 1st moon landing on July 20, 1969, the launch of 50 bombers at Nuremberg and

of t50 bombers near Nuremberg and Sdiweinfurt by rocket flak on Austrian television.

Mr. *Roderü:h Fiedler* from Ansbadi reported:

qI was a draughtsman at O.Qu., Qu 2, and for a time I had a small post office in the Oberquartiermeister department of Army Group Center. While otherwise only letters and files, i.e. paper, had come through, one day sd were pieces of iron caught my eye. 'We are neither a spare parts depot nor a scrap yard,' we amused ourselves and naturally went to investigate.

It turned out that these saddles were on their way from the front to the 'ot'en', because they had been taken out of German tank factories as a corpus delicti of sabotage, after which the tanks loaded for storage had already broken down when they were unloaded.'

Mr. *Hans Marian Hübl,* veterinarian from Berlin, reports;

pThe most effective act of sabotage during the Second World War was the constriction of the concrete misdives at the construction sites on the Atlantic coast. Of necessity, the OT had to deploy a large number of French workers. The procedure was as follows: The burnt lime is converted into calcium carbonate in the air without the addition of water. To achieve a good concrete mix, sand or gravel was never added in excessive quantities.

The workers brought a few casts1 to the work site every day. This went unnoticed by even the strictest controls. Kaflec was served during the breaks; black and almost unsweetened. The excuse that the sugar for the coffee was boudien was unavoidable.

Adding sugar to the concrete mixer produced an effective reaction. Three to four cubes of sugar now caused the following: The very hard calcium carbonate was formed, but

but the less compact, slightly crumbling calcium sacdiarate. With the amount of sugar mentioned, it was possible to cast about t00 kg of concrete in places favorable for artillery hits. Since the reinforcement of the concrete depended solely on its strength due to the lack of steel, many seaward points of the Atlantic wall at Besdiufi were very vulnerable.

In the first two years of the war, when the German night hunt was not yet fully developed, England tried out another very simple method during the hay and grain harvest: moistened loosening paper was sprinkled with white or red phosphorus. This piece of solvent paper, about 2 square centimeters in size, was placed between a folded piece of photographic film and the whole thing was held together with a paper clip. These very sorry detonators were dropped in large quantities over meadows and harvest fields. Here and there, these slow-drying incendiary plates were carried in and caused fires that destroyed the crops.

Mr. *Erin Krämer* from Hild enbach reports:

In 1943, we had a few short shots in our 4th A.R. 9 (Kuban Brü':kenkopf) unit. As a result, the gunners noticed that the second or third of t h e five powder bags was missing from the cartridges. We checked all the cartridges and reported the result of our inspection. Thereupon a regimental order was issued that all cartridges had to be checked before use. We did not find out whether the infantry suffered any losses as a result of the short shots.

Dr. N@one presented from Bollsd because he reported:

qIt has been proven that traitors in officer and party uniforms did infiltrate here and there. In all the cases that have come to my attention, it was Communist-sponsored Germans from Russia who were dropped off by airplanes behind the front, such as in Polotsk. I&

was 4 km to the east. Polotsk was the army border between the middle and north of the border. ö0 Tiger tanks lay there in army reserve. One day before the attack, a supposed lieutenant colonel from the general staff appeared and ordered the Tigers to disembark in Pleskau. As the lieutenant colonel had no written orders and the commander of the Tigers had no connection to the army, he kept the lieutenant colonel with him and drove to Pleskau. The 60 Tigers, who would certainly have had a say in the attack, were missing. The alleged lieutenant colonel was a German communist captured in 1934, with whom the court martial made short work.

Mr. *U'dhelm Gump-Dblath from* Uelzen reports:

At the end of February/beginning of March 1941, I was sent with two men from the RR 9 replacement troop section in Fürstenwalde (Spree) to the reconnaissance section of the 50th Infantry Division nad Szloniki in Mandt with the order to report first to the front control center in Vienna (Rossauer Kaserne). Everything was clear and we were allocated a room for accommodation. At nine o'clock in the morning and 5 p.m. the next day there was a general muster in the yard, where the names of the transport leaders who were to be sent on were called out. For twelve days we wondered why we weren't there, because we didn't know our destination. The sadness got too much for me and I reported for duty. As soon as I had made my request, the head of the front control center pumped my lungs full and I was about to hear a lot. Then an officer who happened to be there intervened and said: "Sd au, he has the 'Goldene' (party badge)! The atmosphere changed immediately, and I was given the most expeditious work possible. To top it all off, as it was Saturday, I was given leave as a private until the weekend! The rest went amazingly smoothly. On Sunday evening we were already rolling into Bucharest, from where we quickly continued our journey.

How many units may have waited in vain for the requested replacement during the war.

After idi had later contracted malaria in Russia, he was

iÖi was assigned via the replacement troop section to the location platoon in Lübben (Spree- wald), whose task was to provide wadia and escort commandos for ammunition transports. The 'Krugau' ammunition plant was located near Lübben.

One day I was ordered to accompany a large ammunition transport with four men to the northern section of the eastern front. We lay idle in the ammunition depot for almost a week until the train was finally pulled onto the siding at Krugau station and we thought we would be leaving soon, as there was a different request from the army group or army. But again it took a good two weeks before we were finally able to set off. No comment is necessary in this case!'

Mr. *Martin Machule* from Stetten reports:

In April 1943, id a)s bank clerk living in JViündia was conscripted to the armaments industry, first to the Nibelungenwerk near St. Valentin/Lower Austria. Tiger tanks were produced there, allegedly only a few pieces each. Several thousand workers were employed, including Russian prisoners and guest workers. A staff of about 800 employees was engaged in sometimes completely nonsensical work such as statistics etc., instead of helping to increase the number of tanks.

For the most part, the employees were uk. people who tried to prove by hectic activity that they were indispensable, while they were absent from the front, even though they were fit for field service. On one occasion Göring and General Unruh were at Besudi. It was impossible to get close to them in view of the busy Sd warmth that always surrounded them. At that time, I turned to the Führer's Chancellery, describing the situation, but without r e c e i v i n g an answer. One day in August, I was brought before a factory

A committee consisting of directors, functionaries, etc., was summoned to answer for the unrest that i& was causing among all of the Drü':kebergers. If iii h a d not been an old Pg. and holder of the Golden Party Badge, he could have made acquaintance with the nearby Mauthausen concentration camp. But they didn't dare to do that, and so they transferred him to another armaments plant in Wiener Neustadt, where conditions were no different. V 2s were to be produced in this 'Raxwerk'. But this did not h a p p e n , because as soon as there was talk of producing rockets, the daily air raids began, proof of the treachery that was being practiced everywhere.

Mr. *Fritz Hahne* from Freienohl reports:

'My former company, which is now located in the workers' paradise (Bennedtenstein/Harz), was audi supplied with war-related products. In one case, it was a delivery of standardized wooden parts that were needed for the production of the V 2. The well-known 'Mittelwerk' was located in NiedersaAswerfen/ Harz. The wooden parts were shipped by wagon on the Harzquerbahn.

The terms of the order were very strict, as failure to meet the delivery deadline meant heavy fines and even the death penalty. The first wagon, which was loaded by us, was dispatched on time. So did the second wagon. When the third wagon was to be loaded, the stationmaster in charge refused to provide us with it. When we pointed out that we were dealing with very urgent deliveries to the Mittelwerk, the stationmaster told us that the first two wagons had not been unloaded and that each wagon was reserved for other goods.

This message was incomprehensible and unbelievable to me. As I knew the manager very well, I asked him to provide me with another wagon anyway so that I could fulfill my obligations. The wagon was then made available to me despite

the fact that the wagon was not available, and the delivery could be made accordingly. However, when iii asked for another wagon for a further delivery, this was strictly refused and I was asked to telephone the stationmaster of Niedena'liawrrfen personally. Here I was told that all the wagons were unloaded on a siding. Ida couldn't believe it and drove personally to Niedersadiswerfen.

Here iii was able to convince midi that all the wagons had been standing on a siding of the Harzquerbahn for a long time. I was unable to speak to the manager responsible for the average. After various attempts by telephone, they were ready to unload the wagons. It is known that the unloading was carried out by Mittelwerk personnel. In any case, the wooden parts were withdrawn from production for some time. Unfortunately, I can't remember the name of the manager in question. - So much for this process.

A young Austrian engineer, who had a position at Mittelwert, was staying with my sister at the time. In response to our remark that we would never win the war, he said with certainty that this would never happen. He, for example, had been assigned to a very important job, which he could never be talked into with his knowledge. Then he explained that prisoners had been used for this kind of dangerous and secret work, and that they would never do anything positive all day long.

Mr. Nf{ons *Claes* from Aichhalden reports about his report *of* September 19, 1942 to his superior for sabotage:

"Since January 1, 1942, I have been assigned to the N.S.K.K. and the Transporrbrigade 'Staflel Mitte' in the middle front detachment. I am filing charges against the squadron leader and his subordinates for sabotage by sabotaging the teaching force of our fighting troops. I cite the following reasons:

1. For a long time, we as drivers have been advised to be thrifty and to conserve fuel. Our squadron leaders

Our squadron leaders have so far not been bothered by this and, apart from many other unnecessary journeys, continue to drive their Russian whores home every day by car.

2. The intimate intercourse with these Russian women, who are outwardly treated as cleaning ladies, is carried out by the sub-commanders in such an offensive manner that it causes disgust and indignation among us drivers. In this respect, too, the German military leadership repeatedly demanded restraint towards Russian women and the preservation of moral standards and morals.

3. During various periods, the leadership in the Nawa barracks went on almost daily drinking binges and senselessly smashed windows and other valuables in their drunken stupor. In addition, they deprive the drivers living next door of their brief peace and quiet by making a racket all night long.

4. The drinks and food at these feasts come from the catering supplies of the men. In addition, it has been observed by individual soldiers how soda pop, canned food and glees were given to the Russian women. The former squadron commander, Peter Lei&t, who is currently on vacation, can provide more details. On one occasion, the crew was given neither soap nor additional rations for a longer period of time.

5. As far as I know, five cows have so far been stolen from Russian farmers on the orders of the squadron command, where some of them have been killed. It is not only this robbery (by force of arms), which is hated by the population, that is reprehensible, but also the uncontrolled meat t h a t was fed t o the population from these raids is a great danger to people's health. The stable manager Sdiwenzer, who went on vacation after one of the last Sdila'fitings, needed a passenger (as a business trip) to transport his extensive luggage from the Mannsdiaft. One of the cows is in a barn with the Russian mistress of the married column leader Jacob Kncip ...

6. On top of the cows mentioned, the squadron underpass does not have a Russian horse, which is being fattened for later slaughter. Why are the farmers deprived of this horse, which is needed to bring in the harvest and urgently cultivate the fields?

7. What is most serious in my report, however, are the embezzlements and shifts that the former head of rations, Wilhelm Küdienmann, was guilty of with the knowledge of the squadron's subordination. Not only did he not give the squadron's rationing strength to the HVL as 50 °/o more, he also sold sutler goods, which the squadron was not entitled to at all, to the ignorant comrades at a price far in excess of what they were worth. (He sold a bottle of stone hanger, fixed price 3.50 RM, for only 6.50 RM, soap at 0.35 RM only for t.00 RM, etc.) The administrative leader Burk stated that Küdienmann had sold sutler and catering goods by the wagonload.

As the current catering deputy Paul Seifert said, an examination of the documents revealed misconduct numbering in the thousands. It therefore puzzles all of us in the squadron that the kitchen man disappeared without a trace and that the whole matter was hushed up by the squadron leadership. Why? Because they felt guilty along with all the sub-leaders in the barracks. It is therefore inevitable that the attitude and discipline of the squadron towards its leadership will plummet.

When questioning the persons mentioned in this report, I would also ask you to examine the books and documents, insofar as they are still available. I would also like to hear the paramedic Paul Pilgrin as a further witness.

It is my duty to help at this serious time, when our soldiers are engaged in a fierce battle, to ensure that no pests of the people are allowed to operate with impunity behind the back of the Wehrmacht and thus jeopardize our final victory.

After a lengthy investigation following this complaint, our squadron was disbanded on November 24, 1942, and Squadron Leader Sdtwenzer was transferred to Vyazma for the time being, as were some of the sub-leaders. Some were taken into custody, and the entire squadron was assigned to Squadron 12 (Dept. König). Subsequently, the files were handed over to the NSKK Court of Justice in Berlin.

On September 24, 1943, he was pulled out of the eastern mission and joined the Ersatzabteilung iia& Berlin. From there he went to Italy on October 16, 1943 ... On June 20, 1944, I was assigned with three other truck drivers to the Fallsdiirm-Panzer Division Hermann Göring, 2nd Rgt, III BH, north of Rome (ammunition and troop transports), where we remained until the beginning of October. Kolonnenführer Kayser was in charge of our wagons. During the evacuation and return from these positions, there were dozens of Wehrma':lits canisters filled with diesel oil in a forest. The column leader and a corporal from the division tapped all the canisters so that the fuel leaked out. As I was very upset about this, the column leader told me that t h i s had been ordered by the division. I couldn't find a way to check it out because we were driving back to our unit headquarters, which was now in Brugherio near Monza. The oil could have been loaded onto our empty vehicles and taken back with us, where it would have benefited our vehicles. The destruction of the diesel oil could never have been ordered by the divisional office, it was pure sabotage. But who was supposed to be responsible for the destruction of each other in the major at that time?

On March 4, 1945, the unit was transferred from Brugherio to a small town called Buia in the northeast. There we had to bring loads from Udine to Gemona, which were then transported by rail to Germany. The first load I picked up there were large bales wrapped in Sa'kleine. Allegedly they were cruelty bags, intended for the bombed-out animal husbandry.

garden **in Berlin.** At the time, we drivers didn't know that Berlin had already been closed down. But what was really in the bales? - My second load the next day was boxes. When reloading in Gemona, I discovered that they were old, partly rather dilapidated c r a t e s with heavily oxidized aluminium interiors, which was no longer of the slightest value. But now it had worked for me. The empty wagons, which were filled to the top with this garbage, were used by our army command for other missions that were contrary to the war effort. That's what I told the Spieß when I reported back to the office, saying that the soldiers would no longer carry out the transports. The young squadron leader, who happened to o v e r h e a r this in the next room, came out and told me that such a violation of orders could get me court-martialed. I replied to him excitedly that then no-one else would have to suffer.

But I didn't hear any more about it, because the next day I was sent to Cividale (east of Udine). I was wounded there on t. May 194S was wounded by shrapnel and was taken prisoner in England …"

Mr. *Carl Heck* from Hanover, first lieutenant in the army during the war and wounded in the first army in Pomerania, experienced the following event:

"In t944, idi took part for the first time in a meeting convened by the Gauleiter, Regierungspräsident and Reichsverteidigungskom- missar Sd wede-Goburg. The participants were the commander of the I I. AK. in Stettin, General Kienitz, with his staff, the director of the Pölitz hydrogenation plant near Stettin, Duden, as well as leaders of the various party organizations.

At this meeting, Director Duden explained, among other things, that the hydrogen plant was running at full speed, but would soon have to stop operations because the Wehrmacht was not providing any containers such as barrels or canisters for the gasoline produced. Empties were no longer coming back from the front and, on the other hand, he could no longer

he could no longer be responsible for storing such quantities, as they posed a tremendous danger to the town of Pölitz and even to Szczecin in the current air situation. Schwede-Coburg then issued an order to the Wehrmadit and all party offices to search for empties everywhere.

Here I spoke up and told them about my visit to of the Wadimanrisd old of the ammunition plant 'Speck' between 'Speck' between Naugard and Gollnow, where I had seen huge stacks of petrol cans at a depth of at least 100 meters and several hundred meters wide, laid out in stacks over 4 meters wide and t0-t2 meters long.

When asked by Schwede-Coburg whether he, the general, was investigating this ammunition depot and whether he knew anything about these canisters, he answered in the affirmative, but doubted that my information was accurate. He was ordered to clarify the situation and report back. The general had his orderly clarify matters by telephonic call, who asked his general to report from the meeting room. After returning to the meeting room some time later, General Kienitz explained: 'Of course - I knew it right away, the reporter was wrong, those aren't canisters of benzene!' When the Gauleiter asked what kind of canisters they were, Kienitz replied: 'They are water canisters for the Africa Corps and no fuel may be filled in them! But since there were no fighting soldiers in Africa and therefore no thirsty soldiers, you can imagine what General Kienitz heard from us.

From the day after the end of the day, giiter wagons with fuel canisters rolled to the front. It didn't bother anyone now that the canister had a red stripe and was actually intended for drinking water."

Mr. *Will y Adler* from Bad Neuenahr reports:

p194Z I met a foreman from the Salzgitter factory in Seesen/Harz. He told me that they had developed an *aircraft rocket* there and that it had been tested in the spring of 1943. The tests showed that the rocket could penetrate thick armor plates from a great distance. They were satisfied with the result. A General Beck - as far as I can remember his name - was present from Berlin to inspect the test. The general went back to Berlin, and after some time the order came from there to stop further development of the rocket, as there was no use for it. The test rockets that had already been produced were packed in glass wool and walled up.

When the Americans arrived in 1945, they went straight to the site, had the missiles removed, loaded them onto trucks and drove off.

This missile, which was supposedly not worthwhile for us to continue wi&ling, was illustrated in a Sunday edition of the Houston Post (Texas, USA) in 1954, exactly as the foreman had described it to me. The newspaper linked the missile to a fighter plane and claimed that it was currently the most lethal weapon in the USA. According to my experience, this was sabotage by the general from Berlin.

Mr. *Kurt Drössler* from Neustadt (Waldnaab) reports:

In the spring of 1943, I joined the 12th Panzergrenadier Division, Regiment 25, in the middle section of the Eastern Front near Orel as an armored infantryman. Before a new deployment, I took part in a troop exercise in which live grenade launcher ammunition was used. The exercise had begun - I was lying on the ground, some grenades exploded in front of us - when I noticed the sound of injured comrades.

The flight was stopped. It turned out that the grenade throwers were shooting into our own ranks, even though the squad leader was not aware of it.

The day before, a non-commissioned officer had given us the ammunition for the exercise. He was now forced to realize that the ammunition was no longer correct, and he protested his impatience; we had no reason to believe him, as we all saw him as a reliable group leader in every respect. A saboteur must h a v e had a hand in it. There were two or three casualties, including one who suffered his injuries.

experience"

Mr. *Haldemar ZelJel* from Mödling reported:

In November and December 1944, he was trained as an armored infantryman in Salzwedel (Anhalt), coming from the air force. During exercises with live hand grenades, it happened a few times that they did not explode. After we had removed the fuses on t h e spot and opened the grenades, we discovered that they were filled with sawdust."

Mr. *Hans-Joachim Richard* from Bad Feilnbadi reports:

qI';h was adjutant of a tank artillery regiment in the south of the Eastern Front in the spring of J942. We were deployed here in order to make the breakout of the 1st German Army under Generaloberst Hube, which was closed in, at Tarnopol (Galicia) possible by attacking the encirclement from the west.

Both during the attack and later in the defense, the regiment's 10 cm cannon battery, which was of great importance due to its long range, was not operational, as no shells for cannons were carried in the area of Army Group South Ukraine due to the lack of ammunition.

The ammunition columns, which had to be sent to ammunition dumps far west of Lviv, regularly received ammunition there that w a s unusable for the 10 cm cannon. Despite extraordinary efforts, this 'error' could not be remedied. The same experiences were made by neighboring artillery regiments and divisions, where it was reported that

8.8 anti-aircraft batteries had been supplied with t0-cm cannon shells instead, which were also not usable for them. The 8.8-F1ak batteries were of decisive importance for anti-tank defense.

Interventions with the army group were unsuccessful. Even then, there was talk that sabotage had been involved in these 'errors'. It later emerged that the Quartermaster General of the Army Group, Colonel i. G. Finckh - who had overall responsibility for supplying the Army Group - had been involved in the events surrounding July 20, 1944, had been dismissed and executed.

My regiment was transferred back to the Normandy coast after the start of the invasion of France. During the major defensive battles between St. Ló and Caen, the regiment was reinforced by subordinate divisions of other units, with me in charge of 22 batteries.

Approximately 20,000 sdiuíl were delivered on several consecutive days, so that several columns had to be deployed each day in shuttle traffic to cover the high demand.

This resulted in considerable fuel shortages, which was due o n the one hand to the poor air quality and on the other hand to the fact that the empty columns had to cover considerable distances to the fuel depots in the Paris area.

During the sealing off of the Anglo-American Durdibrudi near Avrandies (Panzergruppe Eberbadi), the artillery belonging to the deployed divisions was almost immobile because the necessary fuel was missing.

A f t e r a huge explosion, the smoke of which r e m a i n e d in the sky for several days, we learned that a fuel depot in the vicinity of Le Mans (17th Army) had been blown up in front of the approaching enemy. It is said to have been a stock of 20 million liters.

At this time, all units of this detachment were under the command of Army Group B (Commander-in-Chief GFM Rommel, General Staff Chief GLT Speidel).

During the Ardennes offensive we were only equipped with 2 fuel kits (2 VS) because there was a shortage of fuel. Under normal conditions, the fuel was only sufficient for about 2 x 60 km, under the ice and snow conditions of the mountains and the clogged advance routes even less. The required distance was to be ensured by capturing a large US Army fuel depot near Bastogne and by columns which, contrary to the advance direction, had to drive back across the Rhine.

From information available today, it appears that many millions of liters were available west of the Rhine, but had to be blown up when the enemy approached from the Aa';hen area.

After the Ardennes offensive, the Dietrid armored army was moved in express transports to the Raab-Stuhlweißenburg area (Hungary) in order to push the attacking Russian armies back to the Danube, to destroy the Austro-Hungarian and Hungarian fields and to establish a large defensive position in front of Vienna.

The plan at the time was - after consolidating the situation in the Austrian-Hungarian border area - to push the Dietridi Panzer Army through Bohemia and Moravia towards Sdilesia in order to cut off the Red Army in its advance on Berlin with a major attack from the south (east of the Oder), to encircle other parts attacking from the north and west and toseek the decisive battle here.

Due to the clear failure of the Quartermaster Division of the Hee- res Group, however, the disengagement of the parts of the Dietridi Panzer Army intended for this operation from the Eifel front was considerably delayed, so that, for example, the artillery was initially unavailable for the attack in Hungary, but could only be deployed very hesitantly.

As İdi was responsible for the overall nade- rior guidance of my armored artillery detachment and other parts of the division from the Codiem tMosel area), but had neither fuel for the engine nor rail transport space, I drove myself to the Hee- resgruppe, whose quartering division had been accommodated in Oberpleis east of the Rhine. To my urgent inquiries, the Qu 2, a Lieutenant Colonel i. G. König (with a golden arm band), explained to me that neither transport trains (with a golden arm band) explained to me that neither transportation trains across the Rhine nor fuel could be provided. In response to my urgent intervention, the gentleman advised me that I should "send" the guns and vehicles to units that were to remain west of the Rhine so that my naval weapons could then join the army already fighting in Hungary ...

Outraged, I left the headquarters of the Quartermaster General of the Army Group and drove to Koblenz, where the Plenipotentiary Transport Officer (BTO) responsible for the battle area, an older Major of the Railway Pioneers, had his command headquarters at Ehrenbreitstein Fortress.

The elderly gentleman took note of the facts with a slight shake of the head and within a few minutes promised to send the appropriate transport space. In the following nights, the armored transport trains were indeed lifted over the Rhine and parked in the Cochem railroad tunnel in such a way that they could be loaded even when the air situation was threatening and the trains could then be driven back over the Rhine immediately as dusk fell and put into marsh.

Admittedly, according to all war experience, in many cases incompetence and incompetence must also be cited as major sources of error in the overall warfare. In my opinion, however, there can be no doubt that there was primarily flat treachery involved, which can only surprise us by the unscrupulousness with which some of the responsible general staff officers fell into t h e ranks of the fighting troops.